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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
Knipe land Company, an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

vs.

____________________ and

A. Robertson and Johnnie L.
Robertson, husband and wife; and
Robertson Kennels Inc.~ and Idaho Corporat"on
Defendant/Respondents,
Rich~rd

j.

vs.
John Knipe, an individual,
_~~~~~~~~~___

Thi0dP~rty

and

Defepdant/
Appell ant.

Appealed from the District Court of the __T!.. !h.!. Ci'-!.r-=d>--___
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and
for _ _
P_a"-y_e_t_te-'--__r - - County

,
\

Is"I,.L:~l:::;?~;;-:~~- ~ ~i

H~tephen ~L

Drescher

District Judge

t1ark Gestoo
Attorney__ for Appellant__

Robert Wetherell

Attorney__ for Respondent_
Filed this _ _ _ _ day of ____________, 20_
______________________ Clerk

By __________________ Deputy
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brought a lawsuit requiring Defendants to defend against claims for $220,000 in
damages, as well as interest and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 as a commercial
transaction. Now, in opposing an award of costs and fees, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not
the prevailing party. Additionally, Plaintiff avers that Defendants' costs and attorneys fees are not
reasonable. This Reply will show, however, that: (1) Defendants are the prevailing party based upon
the final result of the action; (2) Defendants are entitled to reasonable costs; (3) the accounting of
the attorneys fees are reasonable and necessary; (4) Plaintiff s pre-trial briefing was appropriate; and
(5) Plaintiff has presented no admissible evidence, and only argument, in response to the affidavit
presented to the Court. That is, no affidavit has been filed by an attorney competent to testify that
the costs and attorney fees presented to the Court are not reasonable. As such, the only admissible
evidence regarding reasonable costs and fees are contained in the Affidavits of Mr. Wetherell and
Mr. Pica.
As the Court is aware, the law firm ofBrassey, Wetherell & Crawford appeared in this matter
only a few days before trial. The firm's services were needed to take the lead in trial and to provide
necessary trial support. Mr. Pica is a sole practitioner who handled all of the pre-trial litigation by
himself. This fact is significant in assessing attorneys fees, given that Plaintiff often had more than
one attorney attending hearings and in providing pre-trial support. In addition, Plaintiff had a lead
attorney, an associate attorney, and a paralegal attending the trial proceedings. Thus, this alone shows
the reasonableness of Defendants' fees in this matter.
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Under these circumstances, Defendants were able to obtain a complete defense verdict, in
that Plaintiff did not recover any of the $220,000 sought in its Complaint. Further, Defendants
prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, in which they asked the jury for
an award of nominal damages. As a result, Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter.
Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attomeys Fees.

II.
ARGUMENT
A.

Defendants are the Prevailing Party in this Matter and Therefore are Entitled
to Attorneys Fees.

Plaintiff argues Defendants are not the prevailing party in this matter. Instead, Plaintiff
contends that the Court should consider the separate claims and weigh attomeys fees accordingly.

See p.7 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. In doing so, Plaintiff avers that the Court should distinguish
between Defendants' claims against Knipe Land Company and John Knipe. See p.8 of Plaintiffs
Memorandum. In connection with these arguments Plaintiff cites the case of Ngyuen v. Bui, 146
Idaho 87,191 P.3d 1107 (Ct. App. 2008) and Ram co v. H-KContractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108,794
P.2d 1386 (1990). These arguments, however, are without merit as the Court is to consider the final
result ofthe action in determining attomeys fees.
Rule 54 provides in significant part:
Rule 54( d) (1 ). Costs - Items allowed.
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action
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prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.

See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B)(emphasis added).
As such, the prevailing party question is examined from an "overall view," not a claim-byclaim analysis. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009) (citing

Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLCv. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719,117 P.3d 130,
133 (2005)).
The case of Nguyen as relied on by Plaintiff supports this proposition.! In that case, the
Idaho Court of Appeals recognized:
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are
claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court
determines who prevailed "in the action." That is, the prevailing
party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not
a claim-by-claim analysis.

See Nguyen, 146 Idaho at 194, 191 P.3d at 1114 (quoting Eighteen M.ile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho
at 719, 117 P.3d at 133).
Similarly, in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
Where, as here, there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the
mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single
claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on the
claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates an award of fees
only to the party or parties who prevail "in the action."

See Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133.

Moreover, Plaintiffs reliance on the case of Ramco is misplaced, as the referenced portions deals
solely with a determination of costs, and not attorneys' fees. SeeRamco, 118 Idaho at 113, 794 P.2d at 1386
(stating the "claims should be severed and costs analyzed separately for each," but also holding that the
district court improperly denied attorneys' fees under a separate analysis).
!
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As such, the question becomes a determination of which party prevailed in this "action." See

id.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffbrought this lawsuit seeking $220,000, plus interest, costs and

fees, and was awarded nothing by the jury. As the Court is aware, Plaintiff s claims and Defendants's
defenses thereto consti tuted the vast maj ority of this action. Therefore, Defendants are the prevailing
party.
Plaintiff s arguments are analogous to the district court's decision in Eighteen Mile, in which
it focused too much attention on the sued parties less than tremendous success on its counterclaim,
and seemingly ignored the fact that the party avoided all liability as a defendant. See Eighteen Mile

Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that
"logic suggests that a verdict in Nord Excavating'S favor and a victory on its counterclaim (albeit
a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a prevailing party." See id. Such is the case in this
matter, as Defendants obtained a complete defense verdict on Plaintiffs claims, and obtained a
favorable verdict on its counterclaim. Thus, Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter.
Further, Plaintiffs proposition to segment and separate Knipe Land Corporation and John
Knipe is unsupported by the cases provided by Plaintiff. Notably, none of the cases cited by Plaintiff
involve a situation where the corporation and its owner both were named as parties and were
significantly involved in the lawsuit. As a result, the Court should follow the well established rule
and examine the prevailing party question as to attorneys' fees under an overall view, and not a
claim-by-claim analysis. See Shore, 146 Idaho at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125.
Plaintiff also contends that the claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act should be
separated from the other claims for purposes of awarding attorneys fees. See p.15-16 of Plaintiff s
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Memorandum. Nevertheless, based upon the foregoing case authorities, this matter must be
considered as a whole, and a determination must be made as to "this action." Therefore, Defendants
prevailed in this matter when considering the claims in their entirety.
As the Court is well aware, the vast majority of all briefing, discovery, and trial proceedings
relating to the employment contracts and Plaintiffs claim thereto. As such, the fact that Defendants
successfully defended against these claims, and Plaintiff received nothing, shows Defendants are the
prevailing party. See Shore, 146 Idaho at 914,204 P.3d at 1125. Moreover, Defendants prevailed
on their own claim for nominal damages under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Therefore,
Defendants are the prevailing parties, even if they did not recover fully on their Third-Party
Complaint. See id.
Plaintiffs final argument is that settlement offers cannot be considered in deciding whether
a party prevailed in the matter. See p.16-17 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. In making this argument,
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish between settlement demands and the relief initially sought by the
parties. This distinction, however, makes little difference in this case as Plaintiff sought $220,000
in its original Complaint and recovered nothing in this matter. Moreover, the express wording of the
rule states that the Court shall "consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to
the relief sought by the respective parties." See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).
Furthermore, the Court in Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000), recognized
that "the parties' offers of settlement should have been a factor in determining which party
prevailed." [d. at 3l3, 17 P.3d at 257. This holding was reaffirmed in the recent case of Zenner v.
Holcomb, 210 P.3d 552,557 (2009) (citing Polk)("This Court has held that offers of settlement,

including offers ofjudgment, should be considered in detenniningthe final judgment or result ofthe
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action in relation to the relief sought."). Thus, settlement offers are a factor to be considered by the
Court. See id.
In this case Defendants offered Plaintiff $92,500 to settle the matter months before trial.
Defendants did so to avoid the stress of a trial on the 72-year old retired Defendants who faced a
claim against them for $220,000 plus costs, Plaintiff's attorney fees estimated at $150,000, and
defense costs and attorney fees estimated at $125,000. Plaintiff would take nothing less than
$200,000 to settle and therefore forced the case to trial. Literally, these retired Defendants faced a
potential liability of $500,000. In looking at the prevailing party issue and the punitive damage
issue, the Court should consider this conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. It is undisputed that
Plaintiffs sought far more in this matter than Defendants, and recovered nothing. As a result,
Defendants are the prevailing party.
B.

Defendants are Entitled to Costs.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendants have overstated their costs. Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that Defendants are only entitled to costs in the preparation of exhibits that are admitted in
evidence at trial. See p.9 of Plaintiff's Memorandum. Plaintiff's argument, however, fails to
recognize that twelve sets of many of these exhibits were presented and published to the jury.
Additionally, Defendants utilized many ofthe exhibits proffered by Plaintiff in an effort to improve
efficiency, and to reduce confusion and multiplication of documents for the jury. Therefore,
Defendants should not be penalized for seeking to increase efficiency by sharing exhibits at trial.
Thus, Defendants are entitled to these costs as a matter of right.
Discretionary costs also should be granted as this matter involved unique issues of first
impression in Idaho, and will protect consumers from future deceptive practices. Further, Defendants
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were required to defend this action despite the fact that it never should have been brought in the first
place. Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' costs.
C.

Defendants' Attorneys Fees are Reasonable and Necessary, and Should be
Awarded by the Court.

Plaintiff contends the attorneys fees should be reduced based upon the billing entries, and
their alleged duplication in this matter. As set forth below, however, the billing entries are sufficient
and reasonable.
In assessing attorneys fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set forth in
Rule 54( e)(3) and may consider any other factor it deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145
Idaho 746, 749-50, 185 P.3d 258,261-62 (2008). The bottom line for an award of attorneys fees is
reasonableness. Id. at 750, 185 P.3d at 262 (citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas

Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,86 P.3d 475 (2004)). Moreover, the number of attorneys necessary
to handle a case depends upon whether the trial court concludes that the attorneys were reasonably
required. Id. at 751, 185 P.3d at 264.
Plaintiff first argues that the summary of fees and costs provided by Defendants contained
several block-build entries. Further, Plaintiff quibbles over two entries. Nevertheless, a review of
the professional services provided as well as the Affidavits of Counsel show that the time entries
adequately set forth the person performing the services, the date the service was rendered, an
adequate description of the services rendered, and an itemization of amount of time needed to
provide that service. No affidavit is presented to contest the verified evidence presented to the
Court.
Plaintiff complains that Mr. Richardson spent only 1.8 hours oflegal services at trial and two
hours oftravel time on June 24,2009, with respect to his entry of3.8 hours. Notably, this entry was
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done based upon Defendants' sensitivity and keen awareness of fees in this matter. As a result, it
was a tactical decision to allow Mr. Richardson to attend only parts of trial in this matter. This is
significant given the fact that Plaintiff had a lead attorney, an associate attorney, and a paralegal
attending trial throughout the entire proceedings. Therefore, any complaint that Mr. Richardson spent
approximately only 1.8 hours at a particular day of trial lacks merit.
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Wetherell billed for additional time in comparison
to the time ofMr. Derek Pica for the last day oftrial on June 25,2009. Nevertheless, this argument
fails to take into consideration the amount of preparation before and at trial on that day by Mr.
Wetherell as the lead attorney in this matter. As a result, this entry is appropriate. As the Court is
well aware, Mr. Wetherell and Mr. Richardson came into this case with little time before trial in
order to prepare. Reviewing the entries as a whole shows that their law firm was efficient and
knowledgeable in preparing and obtaining a favorable jury verdict in this matter.
Plaintiffs also argues that Mr. Richardson billed for the third day of trial on this matter.
Nevertheless, as the Court may be aware, although Mr. Richardson attended much of the trial on
June 25,2009, the firm made the decision not to bill for his travel time or trial attendance, despite
the fact that he continued to provide services during that time. Thus, there should be no complaint
that Defendants chose to be sensitive to their time expenditures and billings.
Plaintiff also contends that the hourly rates for Defendants' paralegal in this matter is
excessive. In making this argument, however, Plaintiff fails to recognize that hourly rates typically
are increased for trial preparation and trial attendance. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court recently
recognized a district court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in the Boise area for
attorneys ranges from $250.00 an hour to $400.00. See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 777,203
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P.3d 702, 707 (2009). Thus, the fact that the paralegal's rate was only somewhat less than the rate
charged by Mr. Pica does not fairly take into account the fact that Mr. Pica's rates increased for his
trial preparation and trial work. Therefore, the rates of Defendants' paralegal are reasonable.
As a result, a consideration of the individual entries and the outcome obtained in this matter
shows that the billing summaries for Defendants are entirely appropriate in this matter and should
not be reduced.

D.

The Pre-Trial Motions and Activities Show that the Attorneys Fees Are
Reasonable.

Plaintiff's final argument is that Defendants should not have filed a second Motion for
Summary Judgment or a Motion to Reconsider and/or a Motion for Clarification. Plaintiff also
contends that this briefing did not contain any new law or evidence, and therefore was unnecessary.
A review of that briefing, however, shows that these arguments were not only made in good faith,
but presented issues with a significant chance for prevailing.
Moreover, there is no requirement that a party must submit new evidence in order to raise
a motion for reconsideration or clarification. See Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P .3d
100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that although Rule I1(a) permits a party to present new
evidence, it does not require new evidence).
Thus, the time expenditures for the pre-trial motions are reasonable in this matter and notably
only contain the work of a single attorney, in comparison to two attorneys which regularly attended
hearings for Plaintiffs during the pre-trial phase in tllls matter. Moreover, the Court will note that
Plaintiff did not prevail on its own motion to amend the complaint to add punitive damages, or on
its motion in limine. Accordingly, the pretrial motions were reasonable and do not change the fact
that Defendants prevailed in this matter.
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III.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant to Defendants the requested attomeys fees
and costs in this matter.
DATED this

$ay

of August, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of August, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing upon each of the following mdividuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
~and-Delivered
__ Ovemight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

~. Mail, postage prepaid

Derek Pica
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302
Boise, Idaho 83702

Hand-Delivered
Ovemight Mail
Facjmile 336-4980
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inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
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inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
5.
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Plaintiffs First Set ofInterrogatories to Defendants.
6.
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inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
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inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
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Page 562
these are IDJI instructions that gives us the
platform to move forward.
THE COURT: Mr. Geston, we will make your
proposed 13, just by serendipity we will make that
13-A in our packet given to the jury.
MR. GESTON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't you make
yourselves comfortable. I don't know where those
folks are, and let me make sure they're ready to join
us.
MR. GESTON: Your HonorMR. WETHERELL: Can I MR. GESTON: - could we move for a directed
verdict?
THE COURT: Oh, you wanted to amend your
pleadings too?
MR. WETHERELL: Yes.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
MR. WETHERELL: Yes, Your Honor, I forgot, we
would move the court now to amend the pleadings to
conform with the proof, on behalf of my client.
MR. GESTON: In what particular?
MR. WETHERELL: Well, I - actually, I mean,.1
think that there is - I think you could allege a
fraud in this case, quite frankly. I think that a

Page 563
fraud case has been tried.
MR. GESTON: In that case I object.
MR. WETHERELL: Just for the record, I think a
fraud case has been tried.
I believe that when they asked my client
to sign the February 20 extension of the employment
contract and at the same time withholding the
information what they planned - how they planned to
interpret that contract against him, I think they
fraudulently induced him into signing that
agreement. And I think that the facts are clear that
that is what they - exactly what they did in this
case was conceal a material fact from my client to
induce him to sign that contract. And I think they
did this throughout there dealings with him as a
course of fraudulent indUcement, because of the way
they were holding in their pocket what they planned
to do with these contracts.
THE COURT: All right, sir.
Mr. Geston.
MR. GESTON: I object, Your Honor. I mean,
this is the first inkling we ever heard of such a
thing, and it counsel's justification for trying to
make it part of the pleadings is for actions that
have nothing to do with the rights of the parties as
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they were originated and then finally set.
THE COURT: Right. I think I'll sustain the
objection. Case has been tried within the framework
of the pleadings and I don't think we should open
additional avenues at this juncture, so 1'/1 sustain
it.
And now, Mr. Geston, did you have
something else you want to take up?
MR. GESTON: Yes, sir. The plaintiff would
move under Rule 50 for directed verdict. Your Honor,
we covered a lot of what I was going to say in our
observations on the contracts, but just to impose on
the court's patience and counsel's, to recap where we
are after hearing what turned out to be actually a
pretty straight-forward trial and a limited number of
facts, which are all largely in agreement. What
we're starting out with is what the court determined
months ago. There are two valid and legally
sufficient contracts. All right. So all the talk
about what's in the them under the license law and
all that, which the court on the second visit to that
issue found don't apply. So that's fine. We're
starting out with two contracts and we've got some
very simple language in them.
Now, I know the court's going to give the
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jury instructions on looking for ambiguities and what
to do with them if they find them, but I don't think
that's the jury's job. We're kind of straddling the
fence here by saying if it's clear then you apply it,
but if there is ambiguities, well, then you sort
things out. But the court, I don't think should be
saying, "if" to the jury. The court ought to say
it's either ambiguous or it's not, and I don't see
how, when we were talking about the dictionaries,
"forfeit" has common meaning. The court said so
itself. There is nothing unusual, there is nothing
deep or difficult about monies paid on deposit, which
Mr. Robertson agreed with me, and forfeiture, and he
agreed with me there too. So beyond that, what do we
have?
All right. We have monies that were for
paid on account and that were forfeited. What is the
defense to that? Waiver.
And I went over that with the comments on
the instructions. Waiver requires evidence of
reasonable reliance on a clear act that works to the
detriment of the person trying to assert.
If the payment of bills with money I took
that I don't deserve is a detriment, how can it be a
detriment when I am relieved of a debt by doing
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(1)
right about this time, wasn't there, and that is your
(2)
listing agreement was up, wasn't it? Your contract
(3)
with my client was up; right?
(4) A. It would have been up I think the 28th of
(5)
February.
(6) Q. When was it?
(7) A. Would have been the 28th of February, I
(8)
believe.
(9) Q. And you wanted Richard to sign a new
(10)
listing agreement with you, didn't you?
(11) A. Richard wanted me to continue to market.
(12)
He said he had a French company coming in and he
(13)
asked me to go ahead and we would relist.
(14) Q. All right. So now that let's just make
(15)
sure we,have this set up.
(16)
The course of dealing over all this time
(17)
is that Richard keeps the nonrefundable earnest
(18)
money, the check goes directly to him, correct, from
(19)
September of '05 through February 28 of '08; right?
(20) A. I think(21) Q. Is that correct?
(22) A. I think so.
(23) Q. All right. And then the transaction
(24)
doesn't close, so Richard for the - this is the
(25)
first time this ever comes up - Richard sends you an

(1)
(2)
(3)

A.

(4)
(5)
(6)

(7) Q.
(8)
(9)

A.

(10) Q.
(11)
(12)
(13)

A.

(14) Q.
(15)
(16)

A.

(17)
(18) Q.
(19)
(20)

A.

(21)
(22) Q.
(23)
(24)
(25)
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email and says, I would like that 22-5 back because
the deal didn't close, it's your commission; right?
He sent an email saying, I thought since
I didn't sell it, it would come back to us. He did
not say, I want it back. He did not make a demand
letter. It was a question.
Says whatever says. You got that
emailYes.
- though; right?
And then you testified under oath that
all did you was hand that over to Mr. Knipe; correct?
I gave it to Mr. Knipe, yes.
Okay. And you had no other involvement
with that; correct?
Other than - other than telling him what
it was that day that I was doing.
Okay. Right at this time you're listing
agreement is over with; correct?
The date on this is February 11. The
listing was not over with till I believe the 28th.
Okay. So in any event, Mr. Knipe
responds to Richard and Johnnie, and I'm going to
hand you what's been marked as Exhibit RR.
Have you seen that document before?
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(1)

A.

(2) Q.
(3)
(4)

A.

(5)

(6)

(7) Q.
(8)

A.

(9) Q.
(10)
(11)
(12)

A.

(13) Q.
(14)

A.

(15) Q.
(16)
(17)
(18)

A.

(19)
(20) Q.
(21)
(22)
(23)

A.

(24)
(25)

I have.
Okay. Could you tell the jury what that
is.
This is addressed to Richard and Johnnie
just saying that they haven't produced, and anyway,
it would be asking for half of the money Okay.
- the forfeited money.
Okay. So from September '05 to Richard's
email of - everybody has it but me - what's the
date on Richard's email to you?
This is the 20th of January?
Oh, no. This is February 11.
February 11. This whole time Richard is
retaining - Richard retains all nonrefundable
earnest money; right?
He retained all of the nonrefundable
earnest money.
And he tells you how happy he is that he
is able to payoff all these debts. I mean, one of
the - it was debt; right?
He had a - I don't know if he was in
debt. He just said he had paid the debt on the farm
and bought new pickups and new R.V.'s.
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Okay. Now, okay, but(2) A. - four-wheelers.
(3) Q. - he did tell you how happy he was to
(4)
spend - that he got that money?
(5) A. He said it was pretty nice. He didn't
(6)
have tosell(7) Q. Okay.
(8) A.
- the property and he had money.
(9) Q. So the first thing that happens is he
(10)
sends that email on February 11. Now, what is
(11)
happening right at this time? The listing agreement
(12)
is it up on February 28; right?
(13)
No listing agreement; correct?
(14) A. On the 28th it would have expired, yes.
(15) Q. Okay. And so you want a new listing
(16)
agreement with Richard.
(17) A. Richard wants me to continue to market
(18)
his property.
(19) Q. You and Richard want to enter into a new
(20)
contract; right?
(21) A. Richard has asked me, said he had some
(22)
properties coming. We offered to extend and continue
(23)
to market the property. Listings are expensive to
(24)
have.
(25) Q. Mr. Knipe responded to Richard's request
(1)Q.
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BSA
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

for the 22-5 by letter that you have in front of you;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that exhibit number?
A. It says RR.
Q. Thars not a number, is it?
MR. WETHERELL: I'd ask for admission of RR,
judge, if it hasn't already been.
(Defendants' Exhibit RR moved for
admission.)
MR. GESTON: No objection.
THE COURT: RR will be admitted.
(Exhibit RR admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. Do you 'really recall going to Richard's
home to'get him to sign a new service contract with
you?
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, I'll object to this
line of questioning. /t's irrelevant to the
controversy. The rights of the parties have already
been set by this time.
THE COURT: It is outside. Is there some
relevance to it?
MR. WETHERELL: Oh, it - it's - yes, Your
Honor. I just - these are my last questions. I

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)
(9) Q.

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

A.

(16) Q.
(17)
(18)

A.

(19)
(20) Q.
(21)

A.

(22) Q.
(23)

A.

(24)
(25) Q.
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just want to know what happened THE COURT: All right.
MR. WETHERELL: - on a certain day.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay?
THE COURT: Sure. Overruled.
Go ahead.
BY MR. WETHERELl:
You have the request from Richard for the
22-5, you handed it over to the broker and you said
you had no other dealings with it, the listing
agreement is up, and then you send this email.
Do you see that? What exhibit number is
that?
It's 00.
Okay. And is this an email from you to
John Knipe?
Yes. This is after the termination of
the - of American.
And you have Mr. Knipe's letter?
Yes, I do.
What exhibit was that?
His email is PP, and that's the 22,000
and wanting me to market for the French company.
Okay. But didn't I just ask give you a

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

A.

(5) Q.
(6)

A.

(7) Q.
(8)

A.

(9) Q.
(10)
(11)
(12)

A.

(13) Q.
(14)

A.

(15) Q.
(16)

A.

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16) Q.
(17)
(18)
(19)

A.

(20) Q.
(21)
(22)
(23)

A.

(24) Q.
(25)
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letter of Mr. Knipe's response to that? I didn't?
RR, would you look at RR, please. And
that's been admitted.
Yes.
And so you look at QO. You have that?
Yes.
Now, 00 is referring to RR, isn't it?
Yes.
And what does RR say? RR is saying, we
want half the earnest money - we want half of all of
this money; right?
RR?
Yes.
Yes.
Okay.
That isMR. WETHERELL: I'd ask for - this is your
email.
I'd ask for admission of OQ, judge.
(Defendants' Exhibit 00 moved for
admission.)
MR. GESTON: Renew the objection, Your Honor.
We're gOing forward here far beyond the controversy
of between the parties (indecipherable.)
THE COURT: Let me see 00.
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MR. WETHERELL: Do you have that before you?
Oh.
THE COURT: I'll permit it. 00 will be
admitted.
(Exhibit 00 admitted into evidence.)
MR. WETHERELL: May I publish it to the jury,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. WETHERELL: Did I publish RR, the Knipe
letter, to the jury?
THE COURT: No.
MR. WETHERELL: Can I publish RR to the jury,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
All right. let's get this set up.
You need to get a new listing agreement
signed by Richard; correct?
He wanted me to sign a new one, yes.
Okay. And you said you had nothing to do
with that Knipe letter other than you sent him the
$22,000 request; right?
Yes, that's what I said at the time.
Okay. So you're on your way to get a new
listing agreement, and you send an email to John in
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he did back out of it?
I heard Rowena say that, yes.
Do you recall her saying that?
MR. GESTON: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Back out of what deal, counsel?
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Backed out of this listing of February
20, 'OB, that he could back out at any time and he
did. Do you remember her telling the jury that?
I remember her telling us that, yes.
Okay.
I'm not saying that I agree with it,
butWell; you don't agree with it because
you're sUing him for it?
I'm not saying I agree with it or I don't
agree with it.
Okay.
I'm just saying, yes, I heard her say
that.
But the next day after he signed the
contract he actually got a copy of your letter;
correct?
In the U.S. mail?
Yes?

Page 407
Okay.
Q. Okay? Rowena said he could get out of
this contract, but you're suing him because he didn't
go through with that last listing, aren't you?
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, excuse me again. If
we're referring to by this contract to this
relisting, that's not part of our controversy.
That's not what we're talking about.
THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. I don't know if - I mean, we have a
Consumer Protection Act claim, so do I - would the
court like me to wait to put on that evidence or THE COURT: I would.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. Mr. Knipe, I'm handing you what's been
marked as Exhibit KK. DO you see that?
A. Could you repeat the question?
Q. Do you recognize Exhibit KK?
A. Can I have a second to read through it?
It's hard to read.
Q. Please go ahead. It is very hard to
read.
A. Yes,l do.

A.
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(1) Q.
(2)

A.

(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9) Q.
(10)
(11)
(12)

A.

(13)
(14)
(lS)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

(22)
(23)
(24)
(2S) Q.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(S)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(lS)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)

A.

(20) Q.
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

A.

And what is that?
It looks like a note I wrote to Richard
and Johnnie telling them that First American says
they have the earnest money, they're going to prepare
a document for everyone to sign confirming it's okay
to release the money, it's nonrefundable money.
"Will fax or email to you their document upon
receipt. Thank you, John."
So now this is an email that you sent to
Richard. Was this on the very first $150,000 that
was released from the MidAmerican deal?
I don't see that it says, but I assume it
is.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay. I'd ask for the
admission of Exhibit KK.
(Defendant's Exhibit KK moved for
admission.)
MR. GESTON: No objection.
THE COURT: KK will be admitted.
(Exhibit KK admitted into evidence.)
MR. WETHERELL: May I publish it to the jury,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
All right. This is the very first

Page 409
$150,000, and you are telling Richard what's going to
happen to this money, it's hard to read, but number
one - correct me if I'm wrong - one, you say
following up on our conversation a few minutes ago,
you say, one, have call in to title company to
confirm they have received money into escrow.
Waiting for them to confirm. They were all in some
company meeting and expect a call back in few
minutes. Two, wilt instruct the company - the title
company to cut you a check as follOWS: A, half to
Robertson Kennel, Inc.; B. half to Richard and
Johnnie Robertson personal property; C, will ask them
to deduct 5 percent commission on money depOSited.
Our listing says we are to be paid 5 percent on any
noriforfeited nonrefundable money you receive at the
time that it is paid to you. That money is to be
credited back at clOSing.
Do you see that?
Yes.
Okay. So this was - what did you
consider to be - you're saying that this is
nonrefundable earnest money and they get 95 percent
of it; right?
Well, I - I think at the very beginning
I'm saying that the title company is preparing escrow
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199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302
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TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144
FACSIMILE: (208) 336-4980
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559
ATTORNEY FOR Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
)
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and )
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., )
an Idaho Corporation,
)
)
)
Defendants.
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
Corporation,

Case No. CV 2008-682
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO
DEFENDANTS

)

COMES NOW, Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson,
husband and wife; and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an Idaho Corporation and Answers
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please state the name, address, and telephone
number of each and every person known to you or your attorneys who has any
knowledge of, or who purports to have any knowledge of any of the facts of this case,
and please further describe in as much factual detail as you are able the evidence or

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO
DEFENDANTS - Page 1

infonnation which each such person or party is believed by you to possess. By this
Interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks names, addresses and telephone numbers of all individuals
who have knowledge or who purport to have knowledge of the facts of this case which
pertain to issues of damages as well as liability as well as the substance of such
knowledge as each of them may possess insofar as you are aware.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.1:
Richard A. Robertson
Johnnie L. Robertson
Richie Robertson
John Knipe
Rowena Strain
Robert Hannon
Sheila Hannon
Mark Norem
Cindy Crane - Pacific Corp.
Bill Fehnnans - President, Mid-American
Employees of First American Title Company of Idaho, 7311 Potomac Drive,
Boise, Idaho 83704; (208) 375-0700
Plaintiff is fully aware of the address and telephone numbers of the above
persons. Plaintiff is also fully aware of the knowledge each person has with regard to this
litigation.
Defendant's response to this Interrogatory will be supplemented as additional
witnesses are identified.
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify each and every person you expect
to call as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, and for each person state:
(a)

(b)

. The qualifications upon which you intend to rely to establish the person as
an expert witness;
A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed, and the basis and
reasons therefore;

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO
DEFENDANTS - Page 2

(c)

Each and every fact, document, date, or other infonnation relied upon or
provided to each expert witness in fonning and rendering his or her
opinions or inferences, in accordance with Idaho Rule of Evidence 705
, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26;

(d)

Any exhibits or documents to be used as a summary of or support for such
opinions; and

(e)

A listing of all other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at
trial or in deposition in the last five years, including the case caption,
number, venue, and attorneys of record, as well as a general description of
the subject of each lawsuit.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.2: No experts have been identified.
This response will be supplemented if an expert is retained.
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please separately identify and describe all real
property owned by you and each of you in Payette County and/or Washington County,
Idaho, at any time after January 1, 2005, which real property was the subject of either the
2005 Employment Contract or the 2007 Employment Contract, and all real property
owned by you or each of you in Payette County and/or Washington County that was not
subject to either such Employment Contract.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.3: Defendants cannot answer this
Interrogatory as to the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract as
they failed to contain a legal description that was agreed upon by Plaintiff and
Defendants. The real property owned by Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie

1. Robertson in Payette County is legally described in the two (2) Agreements to Sell and
Purchase they entered into with Mid-American dated October 21, 2007 which Plaintiff
has in its files', The real property owned by Defendant, Robertson Kennels, Inc. in the
counties of Payette and Washington is legally described in the Agreement to Sell and
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Purchase that Robertson Kennels, Inc. entered into with Mid-American dated October 21,
2007 which Plaintiff has in its files.
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify the amount and time of deposit or
payment of all monies received by you from potential purchasers named Harmon, or all
or a portion of the real property owned by you in Payette County and/or Washington
County, Idaho.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.4: Defendants are unsure of the total
amount of money deposited by Harmons in a realtor's trust account in regard to their
potential purchase of real property owned by Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and
Johnnie L. Robertson. Defendants are also unsure of the date the funds were deposited as
they were also deposited in a realtor's trust account. Defendants, Richard A. Robertson
and Johnnie L. Robertson did receive $35,000.00 from a realtor's trust account relating to
the Harmons ..
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please describe in as much factual detail as you
are able, each and every act, statement, communication, or other circumstance which you
contend indicted or otherwise lead you to believe that Plaintiff had no interest in or claim
to any of the monies deposited or paid by Harmon and described by you in your response
to the preceding Interrogatory under the terms of the 2005 Employment Contract, or that
Plaintiff had renounced, released, or otherwise waived any such right or claim as it may
have had thereto.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.5: OBJECT as this Interrogatory is
overbroad and vague as to the information it is seeking.
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INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please state whether you contend that the terms of
the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them,
had not been extended until at least February 28, 2008. If you contend that the term of
either of such Employment contract had not been extended from the date of their
respective executions until February 28, 2008, it is requested that you describe all
contractual provisions, agreements, notices oftermination, statements, documents, or
other circumstances of any sort which, to the extent, embody, refer to, or reflect the
expiration or termination of the term of either or both such Employment Contracts prior
to February 28,2008. If your response hereto is that the effective terms of either or both
of the Employment Contracts had not been extended to at least February 28, 2008, it is
further requested that you further state the date or dates upon which you contend each
such Employment Contracts was terminated or expired and that you fully set forth the
factual and legal bases for such contention.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.6: The 2005 Employment Contract
attached as EXhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Complaint expired by its terms on September 1,
2006. Further, the 2005 Employment Contract is very specific that the renewal clause on
the 2005 Employment contract must be signed for it to be extended. Neither party signed
the renewal clause.
The 2007 Employment Contract attached as Exhibit "B" to Plaintiffs Complaint
expired by its terms on June 1,2007. Further, the 2007 Employment Contract is very
specific that the renewal clause on the 2007 contract must be signed for it to be extended.
Neither party signed the renewal clause.
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In reality, neither contract ever became effective as they were not complete as
required by Idaho Code § 54-2050.
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please disclose the amount(s) and time(s) any
potential purchaser ofreal property owned by Defendants, or any of them, in Payette
County and/or Washington County, Idaho paid or deposited any money with respect to
such intended purchase. Your response hereto need only disclose all such payments
deposited or made on or after January 1,2007.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.7: Knipe Land Company has these
records in their possession as to the amounts and times of any deposits made by any
potential third party purchaser as is required by Idaho Code § 54-2045. Any such deposit
would have been made into a trust account controlled by Plaintiff and its broker, John
Knipe. Defendants have never directly received any deposits by a potential third party
purchaser.
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please state whether any of the payments
described by you in your response to the preceding Interrogatory were paid or deposited
by potential purchasers of real property owned by you in Payette County and/or
Washington County that was not the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and the
2007 Employment Contract. If your response hereto is in the affirmative, please further
describe such real property as was owned by you but which was not subject to the said
Employment Contracts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: There was no agreement as to
what real property was the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract attached to
Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit "A" or the 2007 Employment Contract attached as
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Exhibit "B" as neither contract contained a legal description of any real property that was
to be the subject of the respective contracts. Since no legal descriptions were contained
in the respective Employment Contracts, all real property owned by each respective
Defendant in the counties of Payette and Washington was not the subject of the
Employment Contracts. The legal descriptions for all real property owned by each
Defendant in the counties of Payette and Washington are contained in the respective valid
Sale and Purchase Agreements entered into with Mid-America, which Plaintiff has
personal records of and is acutely aware.
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please describe in as much factual detail as you
are able, each and every act, statement, communication, or other circumstance which you
contend indicted or otherwise lead you to believe that Plaintiff had no interest in or claim
to any of the monies deposited or paid at any time after January 1,2007, by potential
purchasers of real property owned by Defendants in Payette County, and/or Washington
County, Idaho or that Plaintiffhad renounced, released, or otherwise waived any such
right or claim as it may have had thereto. Your response to this Interrogatory should
further describe any documents which embody, refer to, or reflect such admission or
waiver.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.9: OBJECT as being overbroad and
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking.
INTERROGATORY NO. to: Please describe all circumstances, acts or
omissions of Plaintiff which you contend prevent or deprive Plaintiff of any interest in or
right to recover monies paid by Potential purchasers of the real property that is the
subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either
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of them, or which otherwise reduces or diminishes Plaintiff's entitlement thereto,
including without limitation, any acts or omissions which you contend constituted a
breach by Plaintiff ofthe 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment
Contract, or either of them. Your response hereto should include but should not be
limited to the identification of every statutory, regulatory, or factual defect or
insufficiency in the form, content, execution or performance of the 2005 Employment
Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, that would prevent or
restrict the enforcement of either such contract in a court oflaw.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: OBJECT as being overbroad and
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. Defendants further object as the
Interrogatory seeks the work product of Defendants , attorney. Without waiving this
objection, see Defendants' Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Claim.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: To the extent you have not already done so,
please identifY and describe with particularity each and every factual, statutory or
regulatory insufficiency in the form, content, execution or performance of the 2005
Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, which
would prevent or to any extent restrict enforcement in a court oflaw of that provision in
each Employment Contract that if a deposit or amount paid by a prospective purchaser on
account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by Plaintiff as the
"Broker" in each Employment Contract.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: OBJECT as being overbroad and
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. Defendants further object as the
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Interrogatory seeks the work product of Defendants' attorney. Without waiving this
objection, see Defendants' Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Claim.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12: To the extent you have not already done so,
please describe each and every contract, understanding, or other circumstance under
which monies actually deposited or paid after January 1,2007, by any potential purchaser
of all or any of the real property that is the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and
2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, should not be considered as forfeited as a
result of such potential purchaser's not consummating the purchase of such real property.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: OBJECT as this Interrogatory
continues to assume there was real property that was the subject of the 2005 and 2007
"Employment Contracts" that are attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibits "A" and
"B" respectively. Those Employment contracts do not comply with Idaho Code § 9-503
(Idaho's Statute of Frauds) and Idaho Code § 54-2050. Further, the monies in question
were not forfeited pursuant to the specific terms of the respective Real Estate Purchase
and Sale Agreements.

INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify and describe all listing
agreements or other contracts you have entered into with licensed real estate brokers or
agents since January 28,2008 to market or sell any real property owned by Defendants in
Payette County, and/or \Vashington County, Idaho.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: None.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please describe in as much factual detail as you
are able, all statements, communications, or other actions taken by you to terminate,
revoke, rescind, or renounce any agreement by you to extend the term ofthe 2005
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Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract until September 1, 2008. To
the extent your response hereto is embodied in, referred to or reflected by any letter,
email, or other document, please fully describe each such document.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: See previous Interrogatory
responses. Further, on February 20, 2008, Defendants, after receiving a letter from
Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, demanding one-half of the earnest monies paid by MidAmerica, Defendant, Richard A. Robertson contacted Rowena Strain and advised her that
he was not going to continue to list the property with Knipe Land Company and Rowena
advised him she would not turn in the "Renewal Agreement" and would send Defendant,
Richard A. Robertson, a termination form. No termination form was ever sent.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: In previous correspondence, you have denied that
Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of deposits or amounts paid on account of the intended
purchase of real property that is the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and the
2007 Employment Contract by potential purchasers named Harmon and, after January 1,
2007~

by other potential purchasers of real property owned by Defendants in Payette

County, and/or Washington County, Idaho. To the extent that you have not already done
so, please set forth the factual and legal bases of your denials and identify all witnesses
and tangible items of evidence which you contend support such denial.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: OBJECT as being overbroad and
vague as to the information Plaintiff is seeking. Without waiving the objection, John
Knipe, on behalf of Knipe Land Company, Inc., personally signed "Instruction to
Escrow" to First American Title Company ofldaho on September 26,2007; October 23,
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2007; and December 18, 2007 specifically instructing earnest monies to be released to the
respective Defendants based upon the terms of the Employment contracts.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please describe with specificity any interest that
Derek Pica has or had in any real property owned by you in Payette County and/or
Washington County, Idaho at any time on or after September 1, 2005. Your response
hereto should include, but should not be limited to, any options to purchase or otherwise
acquire any such real property or any interest therein or to otherwise participate in the
sale or offering for sale of any such real property.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Derek Pica has no interest in any
real property located in the counties of Payette or Washington, state of Idaho, including
any real property owned by either Defendant. Further, Mr. Pica never entered into an
agreement of any kind to purchase, lease or otherwise obtain an interest in any real
property in either the county of Payette or the county of Washington, state ofIdaho,
including any property owned by Defendants. Mr. Pica's dogs have from time to time
attempted to claim a territorial interest in Defendants' real property by marking certain
trees, shrubs, rocks, fence posts, vehicle tires, etc. when hunting on the property.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: If you deny any of the Requests for Admission
propounded in Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission, or if your response to any
of said requests is anything but an unqualified admission, for each denial and/or partial
denial, set forth in full and complete detail the factual basis for each such denial and/or
partial denial and, identify each and every witness and/or document which you contend
supports each denial and/or partial denial.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: See Responses to Requests for
Admissions.
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That he is one of the Defendants in this action, has read the above Defendant's
Answers to Plaintiff's First Set ofInterrogatories to Defendants, knows the contents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

n-J

I, the undersigned, certify that on the...L£ day of July, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATqRIES TO DEFENDANTS to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by
the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the
following person(s)
Mark S. Geston
STOEL RIVES, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900
Boise,ID 83702

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

/

Derek A. Pica
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OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:
THE COURT: Please be seated.
We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel
and parties are present.
Counsel?
MR. WETHERELL: Excuse me, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Somebody want to take something
up?
MR. WETHERELL: Oh, yes, Your Honor, I had an
offer of proof on using the dictionary, because this
is the last witness of the plaintiff's case in chief,
and I just wanted to say that both Rowena testified
that YOI,fuse. the plain and ordinary meaning of the
term. It's' my understanding - well, the law is if
it has a set legal meaning you're supposed to go with
the set legal meaning.
Well, I can't find Idaho case that has a
set legal meaning for forfeiture. The closest one I
could find was that opinion of Judge Mitchell where
Judge Mitchell had this very contract in front of him
and the defense argued that - the defense argued
that it wasn't enforceable and what Judge Mitchell
ruled was that as matter of law that since there was
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no breach of contract there couldn't be a forfeiture,
and therefore this provision that we're talking about
here didn't apply. That's the closest thing I find
that's a set legal meaning.
And then it's my understanding under the
law that if it isn't defined in the contract, there
is not a set legal meaning, you would go to plain and
ordinary meaning. And, of course, it's our position
the plain and ordinary meaning would come right out
of the dictionary, so I have the American Heritage
Dictionary where it would define forfeitureJudge, I ended up in the emergency room
last night because of this eye and I'm having a hard
time reading today. I kind of look like Popeye.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay.
The American Heritage, if I was allowed
to I would have the witnesses testify the very first
definition is, quote, "something surrendered as
punishment for an offense or breach of contract."
And then Webster's plain and ordinary
meaning of the term is the very first one,
forfeiture, from Webster's Handy Collegiate
Dictionary. is a deposit - a posit hostage or agreed
penalty surrendered through neglect default, a crime,
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error, et cetera. And that's what I would use,
judge.
And I don't want to do it with Mr. Knipe
if the court's going to stay with its ruling, so I
wanted to make that offer of proof at this time.
THE COURT: Mr. Geston.
MR. GESTON: Well, Your Honor, I think the
court's decision is correct. I mean, the very
argument itself shows that we don't need a
dictionary. Counsel says let's refer to a treatise
for a plainly and ordinary meaning of a word. Well,
if the jury can't - doesn't know the plain and
ordinary meaning of a particular word, it's not a
plain and ordinary word. So that's the jury's
business and I think they can perfectly well figure
out what the word "forfeiture" means in this
contract.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the
objection. I think forfeiture is - the
understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this
context is just an unequivocal surrender of any claim
or interest in controverted sum. So I think they
understand that.
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the
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objection. I think it would be time-wasting, I think
it would be a diversion of our juror and factfinder
for something that's easily comprehended by them.
I'm going to sustain it.
MR. WETHERELL: And then, judge, with that
ruling then I will not use this - I won't use this
at all.
THE COURT: Just have him tell us what he
thinks it means, and then have your client tell us
; what he thinks it means, because that's why we're
here.
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge.
THE COURT: All right. Thanks.
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:
THE COURT: All right. Please be seated.
We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel
and parties are present, jurors are present.
We're continUing with the
cross-examination of Mr. Knipe.
Sir, you will recall you have been sworn
and are under oath.
Go ahead, sir.
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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the court's rulings.
MR. WETHERELL: And then the one - well, and
then I don't need to tell you why I agree with the
court's instructions do I? I mean, I think the
record is clear.
THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you go ahead and
tell us. We might as well make a record.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay. Let's do make a
record.
Your Honor, first of all, as to waiver
we're going to argue three things. First of all,
when the funds were released, there was a known right
or a known contingency in those funds and it was
waived. My client specifically told the plaintiffs
how, you know, that it was nice to have this money,
he was able to payoff his farm, the money was spent,
basically. And there were many opportunities for the
plaintiffs to tell my client over almost a two well, more than a two-year period that he needed to
hang on to that money and not spend it basically to
his detriment, and their silence and their release of
those funds.
The next one is when they waited, when
the Harmon money was released and then wait two and a
half years later to ask for it back, that delay is a

waiver.
And then the last one that I'm - that I
want to make sure the court knows I'm going to argue
is that by - under the Idaho Code, by failing to put
in this real estate contract how forfeited earnest
money should be divided, that acted as waiver also.
Because it is an affirmative duty on the part of the
broker to put in the purchase and sale agreement how
forfeited earnest money is going to be divided
between the broker and the client, and that wasn't in
there.
So those are my three waiver arguments.
On conversion, I think that the testimony
is very clear that the plaintiffs took that money in
anticipation of a clOSing, that when the closing
didn't happen it should have been returned, my client
started this fire by simply writing a letter asking
for the money that had been taken out of the deposit
to be returned to him because there wasn't a
closing. So they have converted it and they've kept
it since we asked for it. We're the first ones that
asked for that money back, so we of course never
waived our right to that money, and, in fact, we're
the ones that asked for it back.
So now with that said, judge, I would ask
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for punitive damage instruction, and just for this
very one fact. I realize that it would only be an
advisory verdict to the court, but I think that it
would be proper to instruct the jury on, is this
conduct outrageous, you know, the standard punitive
damage instruction that we have submitted, and then,
you know, you, you wouldn't have a damage figure for
it, but it would be in the special verdict form, was
the plaintiff's conduct outrageous, et cetera,
et cetera, like you would in a punitive damages.
I think understand that Consumer
Protection Act of course you have to decide if there
are any money to be given for punitive damages, but I
think that has an advisory verdict it would be proper
for the jury to be instructed on that and let them
have a chance to deliberate and provide the court
with their opinion as to whether or not the conduct
is outrageous.
THE COURT: I'm going to decline your
invitation to instruct the jury on the issue of
punitive damages. Thank you, though.
MR. WETHERELL: And I wanted to make sure I
addressed Oh I was - judge, I believe that it's
proper because all contracts have the covenant of
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good faith and fail dealing. I'd just ask for the
IDJI on that every contract contains a duty of
reasonable performance. The covenant of good faith
and fair dealing requires the - I would say the
parties to perform in good faith the obligations
contained in the parties' agreements. And I think
just a simple THE COURT: I think in view of your client's
testimony that he was highly satisfied with the
activities and endeavors and efforts of Knipe that
it's really obviated and would make surplusage only
and lends itself to confusion for me to give the good
faith and fair dealing instruction.
MR. WETHERELL: And obviously my client was
happy until he got sued.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WETHERELL: And the good faith goes to THE COURT: We will.
MR. WETHERELL: - not telling my client the
whole time that they were going to do this.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. WETHERELL: And I believe that's it, Your
Honor, unless THE COURT: I appreciateMR. WETHERELL: .- outside of that I agree

, J
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I. INTRODUCTION
The jury's June 25, 2009 verdict denied Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("KLC") any
relief because it found that Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie
L. Robertson, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, "the Robertsons") had not breached the

two contracts they entered into with Plaintiff to list their land for sale (the "Employment
Contracts"). The jury awarded the Robertsons a judgment of $1,000 on their Third Party
Complaint against Third-Party Defendant John Knipe for violating the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act (Idaho Code §§ 48-603, 48-608) (the "ICPA"), but it also determined that John
Knipe had not tortiously converted $22,500 paid to KLC out of earnest money paid by a
prospective purchaser ofthe Robertsons' land, MidAmerican Nuclear Energy LLC
("MidAmerican"). The jury was not asked, nor did the verdict form proposed by the Robertsons
and given to the jury by the Court provide the jury an opportunity to identify just what John
Knipe did to offend the ICPA. Finally, the jury did not find that KLC had violated the ICP A.
That verdict notwithstanding, the Robertsons now try to exploit the ICP A to demand still more
relief from the Court itself for causes of action that they had every opportunity to plead and seek
relief for at trial but which the jury did not allow them.
In opposing the Robertsons' Motion for additional relief, KLC and John Knipe
incorporate their prior Motion for a New Trial, or, In the Alternative, For Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV Motion") and a supporting Memorandum. 1 They also

I KLC and John Knipe will therefore not repeat their arguments asking that the Judgment
entered be amended to delete reference to the Court retaining jurisdiction of this case to entertain
claims for additional relief by the Robertsons and that Judgment not being "final" for that
purpose.
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submit, herewith, the Affidavit of Mark S. Geston ("Geston Aff."), attaching portions of the
transcript of the June 23-25 trial and the Robertsons' Answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 14.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

The Jury Has Fully Resolved the Controversy and There Is No Opportunity for
Further Relief, Equitable or Otherwise.
The claims and causes of action under the ICP A the Robertsons chose to litigate were set

forth in Count One of their Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint which they served on July
15,2008. When the Court granted KLC leave to file its First Amended Complaint on June 10,
2009, the Robertsons declined to take advantage of that opportunity to amend their own
responsive pleading. Importantly, when they moved to amend their pleadings to conform to the
evidence after both parties had rested at trial, the only thing they could think to propose was an
additional claim for "fraud" concerning conduct that occurred on February 20,2008, long after
the parties' contracts had been signed, performed, and their respective rights to the monies
actually in controversy determined. The Court denied the Robertsons' motion to amend, finding
that the "[c]ase has been tried within the framework of the pleadings and I don't think we should
open additional avenues at this juncture, so I'll sustain," the objection to the proposed
amendment. (Trial Tr. 563 :25-564:4; see Geston Aff. Ex. A, Trial Tr. 562: 15-564:04.)
The Court's denial of the Robertsons' Rule 15(b) motion to amend their pleadings to
conform to the evidence is consistent with Idaho law holding that matters not framed by the
pleadings may nevertheless be allowed by post-trial amendment only if such amendments deal
with issues that were actually tried with either the express or implicit agreement of both parties.
As has already been discussed in Plaintiffs JNOV Motion:
I.R.C.P. 54(c) states that "every final jUdgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." If
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the trial court grants relief not specifically plead[ ed] by the parties,
then the issue must be tried by express or implied consent of the
parties. An issue must be tried by express or implied consent in
order to give the parties notice and the opportunity to present
evidence.
O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911, 188 P.3d 846, 853 (2008) (citations
omitted); see also MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196
(1980). The Robertsons' ICPA claims were fully framed by their pleadings and resolved by the
jury.2 The mere fact that testimony was introduced at trial about the February 2008 agreement to
extend the effect terms of the Employment Contracts and KLC's decision not to demand the
monies already due it by virtue of MidAmerican' s prior termination of its land purchase contract
and consequent forfeiture of the earnest money it had paid, does not mean that the parties
consented to try the propriety of those events as a new cause of action. "'Implied consent to the
.trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to that issue was
introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to
be aimed at the unpleaded issue.''' Hughes v. Fisher, LLC, 142 Idaho 474, 483, 129 P.3d 1223,
1232 (2006) (citation omitted). There was no agreement by KLC and John Knipe to these events
being the subject of a new cause of action by the Robertsons. To the contrary, express objection
was made by KLC to such testimony at triaL (See Geston Aft. Ex B ,Trial Tr. 302: 14-23, and
Geston Aft. Ex C, Trial Tr. 407:5-9.)
Of course, a major problem that confronts any discussion of how the ICPA figured into
this case is that neither the evidence presented nor the jury's verdict provides any clear insight

2 In so arguing, KLC does not concede that John Knipe personally violated the ICPA, that
his conduct in February 2008 was properly before the jury, or that its determination that he did
something to violate that statute can stand against KLC's alternative motions for a new trial or
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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into exactly what John Knipe did to violate the terms of that statute-and in this respect, it bears
repeating that KLC was not found to have violated any provision of the ICP A, something that the
Robertsons' Motion deliberately tries to ignore. As discussed in the JNOV Motion, the only
logical guess that can be made based on the evidence presented at trial and the verdict that
emerged from it (and, given the record, it can be nothing more than that, a guess) is that it was
related to John Knipe's February 19,2008 email exchanges with KLC's agent, Rowena Strain.
As noted above, that concerned KLC negotiating an agreement with the Robertsons to renew the
effect of terms of the two Employment Contracts before it demanded one-half of the earnest
monies the second purchaser of the Robertsons' land, MidAmerican, forfeited on January 25,
2008, when it terminated its land purchase contract. Lacking any better factual defenses, and any
legal defenses at all, the Robertsons highlighted the events to portray John Knipe and Rowena
Strain as unscrupulous people. One is at a loss to imagine what other actions John Knipe
undertook that the jury could have decided violated the ICP A, particularly in light of the jury's
determination that John Knipe did not tortiously convert the $22,500 KLC received from
MidAmerican's earnest monies, its award of only the statutory minimum of damages allowed by
Idaho Code § 48-608(1), and its failure to find any statutory fault with KLC's conduct. 3 But if
the events concerning the signing of the renewal agreements in February 2008 are, in fact, what

The only events that the Robertsons' own Memorandum describe as justification for the
additional relief they now demand are, first, the February 2008 events, even though they were
irrelevant to the matters actually in controversy. The second thing they propose is the idea that
KLC somehow made more money when MidAmerican terminated its land purchase contract than
it would have if that contract had been consummated and the Robertsons' land actually
purchased -an argument that they know has no relevance to the ICPA or anything else
connected with this controversy, and which was, in any event, explicitly refuted by the
documentary evidence.
3
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the jury had in mind, the Court must confront the fact that those events had nothing to do with
the competing claims that were actually tried.
The parties' agreement to renew the two Employment Contracts in February 2008 had
been part of the litigation as it was originally framed by Plaintiffs Complaint, because the
Employment Contracts provided that Plaintiff would remain entitled to receive a commission for
180 days after they were terminated if the Robertsons sold their land to a party which KLC had
introduced them to. This was potentially a significant issue since the lawsuit was filed at a time
when that termination period still had time to run. However, time passed as this action wended
its way toward trial, and the 180-day time period unquestionably expired before the time the trial
was scheduled to begin. KLC therefore asked the Court for leave to amend its Complaint to add
punitive damages and to eliminate the issue of the renewal of the Employment Contracts from
the controversy. The Court did not allow punitive damages but granted KLC leave to file an
Amended Complaint that discarded any claim concerning the February 2008 renewal of the
Employment Contracts, and that First Amended Complaint was filed on June 10,2009. The
Robertsons never filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint, and that was how the
pleadings were postured going into the trial. KLC therefore objected to Rowena Strain being
cross examined at trial about the renewal of the Employment Contracts in 2008. (Trial Tr.
302:14-23; see Geston Aff. Ex. B). Objection was also being made to John Knipe being

similarly cross-examined, on the ground that it was "not part of our controversy. That's not what
we're talking about," and the Court sustained the objection. (Trial Tr. 407:5-9; see Geston Aff.
Ex. C.) Yet the Robertsons now try to capitalize on these events as, in practical or legal effect, a
separate cause of action requiring additional relief that they either never asked for at trial or
which is frankly contradictory to what is in the jury's verdict.
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The Robertsons had every opportunity to seek all the relief they wanted from the jury
under the ICP A. They obtained only minimal relief against John Knipe and none against KLC,
but that is all they managed to persuade the jury they were entitled to. The scope of that relief
should not now be unilaterally expanded by the Court.
B.

The Robertsons Can Have No Relief Under Idaho Code § 48-608 Because They
Elected Their Remedies.
As pointed out in Plaintiff and John Knipe's JNOV Motion, Idaho Code § 48-608(1)

provides that a consumer who purchases services
and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property ... as a result of the use or employment by another
person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by this
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in
the alternative, may bring an action to recover actual damages or
one thousand dollars ($1,000) ....
(Emphasis added.) It was never disputed that the Robertsons terminated the Employment
Contracts as soon as KLC demanded half of the forfeited MidAmerican earnest money, and that
the parties had no further dealings after February 2008. Attached as Exhibit D to the Geston Aff.
is the Robertsons' answer to KLC's Interrogatory No. 14, plainly stating that Defendant Richard
Robertson terminated the Robertsons' agreements with KLC as soon as he received a demand for
half of MidAmerican's forfeited earnest money. The evidence at trial can lead to no other
conclusion but that the Robertsons "treat[ed] any agreement incident thereto [i.e., the agreement
to renew the Employment Contracts, as well as the Employment Contracts themselves] as
voidable," just as specified by Idaho Code §48-608(1). Under this Code section, which
embodies the ICP A's private right of action, the Robertsons could either sue for monetary
damages (including the statutory minimum of $1 ,000), "or, in the alternative" treat the
agreements to extend effective terms of the Employment Contracts as "voidable," if those
PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS/
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agreements had been deceitfully induced by John Knipe. Having chosen the latter remedy, they
cannot recover the former too.
C.

There Is No Evidence of Any Ascertainable Damages So There Can Be No Award of
the Statutory Minimum Damages of $1,000.
Idaho Code § 48-608( 1) allows a private right of action under the ICP A only to a

consumer who "suffers any ascertainable loss of money." Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 780,
133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006), held that "[o]nce a violation of the ICPA is found, it is error to not
award statutory damages." However, to be entitled to even this minimal relief, a consumer must
still prove that he or she suffered
some "ascertainable loss of money ... as a result of the use or
employment by another person of a method, act or practice" ...
prohibited by the act. Thereafter, a consumer is entitled to a
statutory damage award of$500 [now $1,000] for his actual
damages, whichever is greater. When a consumer merely pays an
existing legal obligation, he does not suffer damages although
there may be involved deceptive acts or practices.
Yellowpine Water User's Ass 'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 351-52, 670 P.2d 54, 56-57 (1983)

(citation omitted).
The Robertsons failed to produce evidence of any "ascertainable loss" of money that
could be remotely connected with the conduct of John Knipe. This assertion acknowledges the
Robertsons' claim that they had been wrongfully deprived of the $22,500 KLC received from the
earnest money MidAmerican paid before it terminated its purchase agreement. However, if the
fact that the Robertsons did not get that sum had anything to do with the ICPA, the jury would
have undoubtedly awarded that precise amount to them and not resorted to the statutory
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minimum instead. 4 That statutory minimum is to be used only where a loss has been shown, but
it is either less than $1,000 or not subject to reasonable estimation. Yellowpine Water User's
Ass'n allows no other interpretation of the damage provisions ofIdaho Code § 48-608(1). In the
absence of any evidence of such a loss, even if it was less than $1,000 or could not have been
reasonably quantified, the Robertsons were not entitled to even the minimal statutory damages in
Idaho Code § 48-608(1). See also In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839, 856, 857 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2001).

D.

There Should Be No "Constructive Trust" for the $22,500 the Jury Determined the
Robertsons Are Not Entitled To.
Further exploiting the language ofIdaho Code § 48-608(1), allowing a consumer to "seek

restitution," the Robertsons ask the Court to give them the $22,500 that the jury found they were
not entitled to. The Robertsons maker demand under the guise of imposing a "constructive trust"
on the money that "Plaintiff retained." (Robertsons' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Equitable Relief ("Robertsons' Memorandum") at 4.) In this, the Robertsons casually ignore the
fact that the jury did not find that KLC did anything wrong under the ICPA. Second, they ignore
the fact that the jury could have awarded the $22,500 as damages under the IepA but it did not,
and instead resorted to the $1,000 statutory minimum. Third, they ignore the fact that the
$22,500 was paid to KLC, not to John Knipe, personally, and that there is therefore nothing in
John Knipe's possession that any constructive trust may be imposed upon. Put another way, the
Robertsons are trying to equitably grab money they were denied as damages. But a constructive
trust is not meant to be "an all-purpose remedy which is available when all other remedies fail.

The jury also found that John Knipe had not wrongfully converted the $22,500, and this
is additionally incompatible with any argument that the Robertsons had suffered some
"ascertainable loss."
4
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A general claim for money damages will not give rise to a constructive trust." In re Allied
General Agency, 229 B.R. 190, 196 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1998).

Fourth, and once again, the Robertsons ignore the fact that the jury found that the
$22,500 had not been kept by John Knipe "without the right to do so," as it decided in
connection with the Robertsons' conversion claim. (See Court's Instruction No. 18.) One is at a
loss to see why equity, at this late stage of the game, demands the imposition of a "constructive
trust" upon monies that the jury has already decided have not been wrongfully taken from the
Robertsons. 5
E.

The Robertsons Should Be Denied Their Request for Injunctive Relief.

The Robertsons have demanded that the Court enjoin KLC from "future use in business
practices associated with Plaintiffs forfeiture provision as contained in its broker employment
contract." (Robertsons' Memorandum at 6.) The origin of this claim is unknown, as is the
evidence presented at trial that would justify it. The Robertsons asked for no such relief in their
pleadings. To this writer's recollection, no mention of such a thing was made at trial, even
during closing argument.
To repeat, the jury did not find that KLC violated the ICP A in any respect, yet it is that
entity's form contracts that the Robertsons now want to edit. The jury determined that John
Knipe had violated the ICPA but, as discussed above, one can only guess at what conduct the

The Robertsons' invocation of equity tempts them into repeating their argument that
KLC made more money from a forfeiture of the MidAmerican earnest money than it would have
if the Robertsons' property had been sold-an irrelevant claim they know is completely false.
Although John Knipe so testified, it was by mistake, and that may be readily confirmed by
reading the documents he was commenting on and doing a little arithmetic, both of which show
that KLC would have earned much more money from a commission had MidAmerican closed its
purchase agreement.
5
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jury had in mind-and in that respect, the only thing that suggests itself is the events concerning
the relisting agreement in February 2008, a matter that had no relevance to the matters actually in
controversy and that was not shown to have caused Robertsons any ascertainable loss, however
remotely. As the Court itself said with respect to argument over whether the Robertsons could
cross-examine John Knipe with a dictionary to divine the true meaning of the word "forfeiture,"
"I think forfeiture is - the understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this context is just an
unequivocal surrender of any claim or interest in controverted sum so I think they [the jury]
understand that." (GestonAff. Ex. E, Trial Tr. 416:18-23.)
There is no justification for this request.

F.

Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Punitive Damages.
The Robertsons finally ask for punitive damages. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) does allow

such an award where there have been "repeated or flagrant" violations of the ICP A. However,
the issue of punitive damages in general, and the determination of whether any conduct violating
the ICPA was "repeated or flagrant," was never submitted to the jury. Idaho has not yet held that
ajudge may, independently of what ajury decides, award such damages under Idaho Code
§ 48-608(1). Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198, 879 P .2d 1126, 1131 (1994). In any
event, the Court denied the Robertsons' belated request to inject punitive damages in to this
controversy after the evidence that closed. (See Geston Aff. Ex. F, Trial Tr. 559:25-560:21.)
Their Memorandum supporting the present Motion suggests nothing new to the Court to justify
the renewal oftheir demand now.
Secondly, the Robertsons never moved to amend their Third Party Complaint in the
manner required by Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) to include a claim for punitive damages. Mac
Tools, 126 Idaho at 196-98, 879 P.2d at 1129-31, held only that Idaho Code § 6-1604(1),
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defining the standard of proof needed for a common law award of punitive damages (i.e., proof
of "oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous conduct") did not displace the
separate standard of proof for punitive damages provided by Idaho Code § 48-608(1) (i.e., proof
of "repeated or flagrant" violations ofldaho Code § 48-603). Mac Tools said nothing about
Idaho Code § 6-1604(2), which unqualifiedly requires that claims for punitive damages "in all
civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted," first be added to the litigation by an
appropriate amendment of the pleadings upon a showing, at a separate hearing, of evidence to
allow the court to conclude that the moving party has established "a reasonable likelihood of
proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." None of that was done
by the Robertsons and they should not now be allowed to ignore Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) in
order to ambush John Knipe with a claim that they had not given the slightest hint of pursuing
until the close of evidence.
Furthermore, it is impossible to find any evidence adduced at trial showing conduct by
John Knipe that not only might have violated the ICPA but that could also be characterized as
"repeated or flagrant." As noted above, what John Knipe might have done to violate the statute
in any respect remains open to debate. The Robertsons' sole justification for demanding these
damages is, once again, their fallacious argument about KLC earning more money on the
termination of the MidAmerican purchase contract than from a commission earned at a closing,
and their umbrage at John Knipe for not having demanded the money they owed it until after
Richard Robertson renewed the Employment Contracts in February 2008-an agreement that he
promptly repudiated with no further consequences to the Robertsons, and that was, in any event,
irrelevant to the controversy actually tried.
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G.

There Is No Occasion for an Award of Prejudgment Interest.
Persisting in their refusal to acknowledge absence of any verdict that KLC violated the

ICPA, and, further, that whatever John Knipe did to violate the ICPA merited damages of only
$1,000, the Robertsons now ask the Court for prejudgment interest on the $22,500 that the jury
has decided they are not entitled to. The demand must be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
The provision in Idaho Code § 48-608(1) that the "court" award equitable relief is not an
invitation to judges to ignore all the restraints of pretrial procedure and the decisions rendered by
juries. The matters in controversy in this case were fully framed by the pleadings, tried to the
jury, and resolved. It is unfortunate that the Robertsons subsequently concluded that they should
have asked for more relief than they did and presented more issues to the jury than they chose to,
but those were their decisions and the Court cannot unilaterally fix their oversights for them.
The Robertsons had every opportunity to show the jury why they were entitled to gain the
$22,500 they consented to be paid to KLC. They failed to do so, and, if nothing else, the fact
that the jury awarded only $1,000 in damages against John Knipe conclusively demonstrated that
they should have no further relief in that respect, especially under the guise of an equitable
device such as a "constructive trust."
The Robertsons' demand for an injunction, rewriting KLC's contracts, should be denied.
Such a claim was never made and there was no evidence to justify it, and KLC never violated the
Iep A in the first place.
Finally, the Robertsons' sudden thirst for punitive damages cannot sidestep the
procedural requirements ofIdaho Code § 6-1604 (2). That statute, by its plain language, applies
to "all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted," and the present controversy is no
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exception. The absence of any evidence showing any "repeated or flagrant" conduct by John
Knipe that violated the ICPA is further ground to reject this demand.
Finally, since there should be no further award of monetary damages to the Robertsons,
there should be no consideration of any claim for "prejudgment interest."
DATED:

August~,

2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT,
FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.
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I.
INTRODUCTION

After a three-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict denying Plaintiffs claims for $220,000.
Plaintiff now seeks to take this matter away from the jury. In doing so, Plaintiff asks the Court to find
that the term "forfeited" is plain in its meaning, and shows a breach of contract by Defendants.
Plaintiff further asks the Court to prohibit Defendants from obtaining additional relief under the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and moves for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The Court, however, should deny Plaintiffs motion and uphold the jury's verdict.
This Memorandum will show that: (1) the judgment should be amended to allow Defendants
additional remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (2) the jury verdict conforms with
the clear weight ofthe evidence at trial; (3) Plaintiff presents no errors oflaw that justify a new trial;
and (4) there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and therefore a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is not merited.
According, the Court should deny Plaintiffs motion.
II.
PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As the court is well aware, the relevant provision in the employment contract in dispute in
this matter states:
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall
find a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price
and terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, ... I hereby
agree to pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in
amount to 5 percent of said selling price. Should a deposit or
amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof
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may be retained by you, as the Broker, as the balance shall be paid to
me. The Broker's share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid on
account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission.

See Exhibits "A, 4 and 17" as admitted at trial (emphasis added).
On February 12,2009, the Court ruled that the underlying employment contracts in 2005 and
2007 were valid, but the terms and language of the contracts must be applied to the facts of this case.
That is, the contractual meaning of the term "forfeited" could only be defined by the parties
themselves and the actual way they employed the terms. Specifically, the Court's order states that
"[t]he balance of the issues and claims of both parties fundamentally go to course of conduct,
which are issues for the jury." See Court's Order on motions for summary judgment dated
February 12, 2009 (emphasis added).
Consistent with this ruling, the Court allowed both parties to present evidence at trial
regarding the contractual terms employed by the parties and the meaning of the term "forfeited,"
which encompassed prior course of conduct. As such, Defendants introduced evidence they did not
breach the employment contracts. A brief summary! of this evidence includes the fact that:
Plaintiff's own representative, Ms. Swain, had previously considered the deposited
monies as a commission, not forfeited money, which would require a closing on the
transactions subsequent to Plaintiff receiving payment.
Ms. Swain's testimony that the money paid in the Harmon transaction was paid as
non-refundable monies to extend the closing date on the Harmon offer.

This sUlmnary is in no way exhaustive, and highlights only some of the evidence provided at trial.
Specifically, dictionary definitions or plain and ordinary definitions from both Websters and New World
Dictionary were not allowed into evidence as no foundation could be laid that these definitions were used
or considered by the parties.
I
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•

Mr. Knipe's email dated September 26, 2007, admits that at the time Plaintiff
distributed the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican, those monies had not been
forfeited.

•

Mr. Knipe's testimony that he considered the 5-percent deposit as an advance on his
commission, not as forfeited money under the employment contract.

•

Mr. Knipe's testimony that he collected a 5-percent "commission" totaling $22,500.

•

Plaintiff disbursed all of the deposited monies to Defendants in the Harmon
transaction, and did not characterize them as forfeited funds.
Ms. Strain's testimony that she was aware that Defendants were spending the funds
in both transactions without mention that Knipe alleged a claim on such funds.
Mr. Robertson's testimony that neither the purchaser in the Harmon transaction nor
in the MidAmerican transaction forfeited any money.
Ms. Crane's testimony that the money paid by MidAmerican was paid to the
Robertson's for access to the Robertson's property and was not earnest money that
MidAmerican forfeited.

•

Ms. Crane's testimony that MidAmerican had not breached the land purchase
agreements it signed with Defendants, and therefore had not forfeited the money it
paid under the terms of the contracts.

•

That under Plaintiff s theory, Plaintiff would make more money by keeping deposited
earnest monies under the contract, than by closing on a transaction.

On June 25, 2009, the jury rendered its verdict, finding that Defendants did not breach their
employment contracts. Thus, the jury found that Plaintiff was not entitled to any of the $220,000 it
was seeking. See Ans. To Questions I and 3 of Verdict. Additionally, the jury found that Plaintiff
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violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and awarded Defendants $1,000.00 in nominal damages
as was requested and was the most the jury could award under the Act. See Ans. To Questions 6 and
& of Verdict.

On July 7,2009, the Court entered Judgment recognizing the jury's verdict, and reserved its
right to grant Defendants equitable remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Defendants
subsequently moved for costs and attorneys fees, and for its equitable remedies under the Act. On
July 20,2009, Plaintiff moved the Court to am,end the judgment, for a new trial, or in the alternative,
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendants now provide their response.

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Judgment Should Be Amended to Include Additional Remedies Under
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff's first argument is that the Court should amend the judgment to eliminate references
to any pleadings, and to make the judgment final.

See p.8-9 of Plaintiff's Memorandum.

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the jury's verdict prohibits the Court from rendering additional
remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See p.9-l4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not grant punitive damages to Defendants. See p.13 of
Plaintiff's Memorandum. 2 The Court, however, should exercise its statutory authority under the Act
and grant Defendants additional damages.
As an initial matter, Defendants agree that the final judgment rendered in this matter should
not include any reference to pleadings. That being said, the judgment should be amended to include
equitable remedies for Defendants under the Act, as well as an award of attorneys fees and costs.
Plaintiff makes these arguments in response to Defendants' prior Motion for Equitable Relief, as
previously filed with the Court.
2
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Under the Act, a party may seek equitable relief from the Court in addition to any actual or
nominal damages. The Act states as to this issue:

§ 48-608. Loss from purchase or lease - - Actual and punitive damages.
(1) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby
suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal,
as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method,
act or practice declared unlawful by this chapter, may treat any
agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, may
bring an action to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars
($1,000), whichever is greater .... Any such person or class may
also seek restitution, an order enjoining the use or employment of
methods, acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and
any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion may
deem just and necessary. The court may, in its discretion, award
punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems
necessary or proper in cases of repeated or flagrant violations.

See LC. § 48-608 (emphasis added).
Thus, under the express wording of the statute, the Court may grant restitution, an order
enjoining violative practices, punitive damages, and any other appropriate relief, all in addition to
Defendant's recovery of actual or nominal damages. See id.
The Court acted properly in this case by allowing the jury to consider the issue of nominal
damages, while retaining its own right to grant addition remedies. Therefore, the judgment
previously entered acknowledges this fact. 3

3 It should be noted that Plaintiff also argues that Defendants made an election of remedies in treating
the employment contracts as voidable, and therefore should not be entitled to monetary damages. See p.12
of Plaintiff s Memorandum. This argument, however, fails as Defendants pled to make the contracts
voidable, or in the alternative, to obtain damages. Despite the year-old pleadings, the actual trial proceeded
under the theory that there was a valid and enforceable employment contract and that the Robertson's
intended to live up to the tenns of the contract and fulfil their obligations under the contract. The case was
tried under a theory that no breach had occurred. For the Plaintiff to specifically ask Defendant to stand
before the jury and stipulate that a valid and enforceable contract existed between the parties (which was
done) and then argue to this Court that an election to have the contract declared void makes one wonder if
the Court itself has a consumer claim for deceptive practices.
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Plaintiff also claims that evidence regarding the 2007 extension agreements does not fall
within the Defendants' claim under the Act. Significantly, the Act encompasses any misleading,
deceptive or unconscionable acts. See I.e. § 48-603(17),(18). Thus, Plaintiff's conduct surrounding
the 2007 employment agreements goes directly to the Defendants' claim under the Act.
At trial, it was shown that Defendants were fraudulently induced to enter into an extension
ofthe 2007 employment contracts by intentional non-disclosure of a demand letter drafted, but not
presented, until two days after Defendants' signature was obtained. Plaintiffthen sued Defendants
in this action after Defendants refused the extension that they were induced to enter into. These facts
are highly relevant to claims of misleading, deceptive or unconscionable acts. See I.e. § 48603(17),(18). This specific act of concealment went hand in glove with the course of conduct of
releasing funds and allowing the Robertson's to believe the funds belonged to them. This is
especially telling when Plaintiff Knipe testified, under oath, that he "mentioned to the trust officer
at the title company" that the title company "might want to mention to the Robertsons" that Knipe
Land Company "may want the money back." No one could listen to such testimony and not
understand the deception of the Plaintiff: He was Robertson's broker yet neither he or his licensed
real estate agent ever mentioned that there would be a later "call" on the money. Also, under Idaho
law if a title company trust officer knows of any actual or potential claims on trust funds, that title
officer must inform all parties and hold the money in trust until the issue is resolved. Plaintiff Knipe
has, with his testimony, implicated a title company trust officer in a conspiracy and a breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Unless" of course, the jury believed the Knipe testimony was simply a new
twist on an old deception.
With respect to punitive damages, Plaintiff avers that such damages should not be granted
based upon the requirements of I. C. § 6-1604. The essence of Plaintiff s argument is that Defendants
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must first amend their pleading prior to receiving punitive damages. See p.l3 of Plaintiff's
Memorandum.
As set forth more fully in prior briefing, however, punitive damages under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act are unique. These damages are not an abrogation or codification of
common law punitive damages, but rather present an entirely new remedy created by the legislature.

See Mac Tools Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198,879 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1994). In fact, under the
Act, punitive damages are only considered by the Court, and not by the jury. See I.e. § 48-608(1).
Furthermore, it is well established in Idaho that where a theory of recovery is tried by the
parties, the Court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings amended accordingly.

SeeMikesellv. NewworldDevelopment, Corp., 122 Idaho 868,877,840 P.2d 1090,1099 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing M.K. Transport v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192,1196 (1980)). As a
result, a failure to amend pleadings to include issues tried by the parties does not affect the trial
court's findings. See id. (citation omitted). This holds true for cases involving punitive damages.

See id. at 878, 840 P.2d at 1100 ("Because the issue of punitive damages was fully tried by the
parties, the district court should have treated the issue as if it had been properly pled.").
Plaintiff was well aware in advance of trial as to the evidence used to support Defendants'
claim for punitive damages. This is because the supporting evidence and testimony at trial came
primarily from the deposition ofMr. Knipe. Further, Plaintiff itself filed its own motion for punitive
damages prior to trial.
As the Court is aware, after the closing of both parties' cases, the Court took up its potential
jury instructions. At that time, counsel for Defendants requested that the jury be instructed on
punitive damages, and that this decision by the jury would be advisory to the Court under its
authority pursuant to the Act. The Court declined this invitation, and instead appropriately stated
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it would consider such evidence at a later time. The Court's approach in this case is consistent with
the new remedy as set forth in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which specifically allows the
judge to grant punitive damages. See I.e. § 48-608(1).
As a result, the Court should amend the judgment to reflect the additional amounts owed to
Defendants under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, including punitive damages, and include an
award for attomeys fees and costs.
B.

The Court Should Deny Plaintiffs' Motion for A New Trial as the Jury Verdict
Conforms with the Weight of the Evidence.

Plaintiff next argues that the plain meaning of the term "forfeited" or "forfeiture" shows that
Defendants breached the employment contracts.

See p.15-19 of Plaintiffs Memorandum.

Essentially, Plaintiff attempts to remove this case from the jury. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that
Defendants' witnesses lack credibility, and thus there is a lack of evidence to sustain the verdict.
Nevertheless, the Court should deny Plaintiff s motion for a new trial under Rule 59( a)( 6), as the jury
verdict conforms with the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial. This particularly is true
where the Court considers the credibility of the evidence, and the context in which it was given.
Rule 59 states in pertinent part regarding this issue:
Rule 59(a). New trial- Amendment of judgment - Grounds
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part ofthe issues in an action for any of the following reasons:

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against the law.
See I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6).
Under this Rule, the trial court must weigh the evidence presented at trial and grant the
motion "only where the verdict is not in accord with its assessment of the clear weight of the
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evidence."

Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 647-48, 200 P.3d 1191, 1196-97 (Ct. App.

2008)(citing Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 46, 58, 943 P.2d 912, 924 (1997) and

Pocatello Auto Color v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 45, 96 P.2d 949,953 (1995)).
The trial court has broad discretion in weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of
witnesses, and in making independent findings offact. See Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892,
749 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Ct. App. 1988)(citations omitted). Significantly, the Court must only grant
the motion after considering whether a different result would follow upon retrial. Gillingham

Construction, Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 23, 121 P.3d 946, 954
(2005)( citation omitted).
The mere fact that the evidence is in conflict is not enough to grant a new trial. Quick v.

Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 767, 727, P.2d 1187, 1195 (1986). Additionally, courts should be mindful
to respect the findings and conclusions ofthe jury, and only grant a new trial where a mistake clearly
is made. The Idaho Supreme Court explained in this regard:
[R]espect for the collective wisdom of the jury and the function
entrusted to it under our constitution suggest the trial judge should,
in most cases, accept the jury's findings even though he may have
doubts about some of their conclusions .... If having given full
respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial.
[d. at 768,727 P.2d at 1196 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).

As the court is well aware, the relevant provision in the employment contract states:
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall
find a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price
and terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, ... I hereby
agree to pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in
amount to 5 percent of said selling price. Should a deposit or
amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof
may be retained by you, as the Broker, as the balance shall be paid to
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me. The Broker's share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid on
account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission.

See Exhibits "A, 4 and 17" as admitted at trial (emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that the term forfeited is ordinary, not needing interpretation, and thus does
not require further evidence. See p.16 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. Nevertheless, Plaintiff objected
to references to dictionary definitions of this term at trial, despite its alleged plain meaning. As
previously briefed, the term forfeited or forfeiture requires a breach by the prospective buyer in order
for it to become applicable. This very issue has been addressed by another Idaho district court.
As explained in the Idaho district court case, Sauls v. Luchi, CV 2004-1616 (Dis. ct. First
Judicial Dist, Idaho June 17,2005):
The primary purposes of earnest money is to ensure that the seller
will recover damages if the buyer defaults .... In the present case, the
buyer did not breach the contract, so even if the forfeiture clause is
valid regarding the earnest money deposit, it is not applicable.
The Defendants attempted to obtain summary judgment arguing the same to this Court.
Defendants then presented the facts to the jury which, as a matter of fact, detennined that with no
breach of the contingent real estate contracts involved, the forfeiture clause does not apply.
Notably, courts from other jurisdictions have defined "forfeiture" as requiring a breach of
contract or neglect of duty. See People v. Blair, 831 N.E.2d 604, 615 (Ill. 2005)(defining forfeiture
as the loss of a privilege or property because of crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty);

Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation v. GraysoTl, 746 So.2d 121, 123-24 (La. App. 3rd
1999)(defining forfeiture as a surrender of something as a punishment for a crime, offense, error, or
breach of contract); Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Ky. 1930)(stating that the word forfeit
has a well-established meaning, which is "to divest or to suffer divestiture of property without
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compensation in consequence of a default or offense"). Hence, a deposit or amount held in trust is
only "forfeited" upon a breach by the potential buyer.
In this matter, Plaintiff could not prove that the Harmons or MidAmerican committed a

breach. Therefore, under its plain meaning, there was no forfeiture .entitling Plaintiff to its claim for
the nonrefundable monies.
The continual rehashing of this issue does not advance this case. The Court previously ruled
that the interpretation of this term was for the jury to decide, based upon the conduct of the parties.
More specifically, the Court held that the "balance of the issues and claims of both parties
fundamentally go to course of conduct, which are issues for the jury." See Court's Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment dated February 12, 2009 (emphasis added). As a result, all of
Plaintiffs briefing regarding the plain meaning of the term forfeiture is irrelevant, as the Court
determined that evidence was needed to resolve the factual issues presented and how those issues
fit with the language used.
All of that being said, the weight of the evidence at trial shows there was no breach by
Defendants. Plaintiffs own representative had previously considered the deposited monies as a
commission, or an advance on commission, requiring a closing on the transactions subsequent to
receiving payment. Further, Mr. Knipe's own email dated September 26, 2007, to Defendants
admits that at the time Plaintiff distributed the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican, those monies
had not been forfeited. See Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. Specifically, this email states that
"our listing says we are to be paid 5% on any non-forfeited -non-refundable money you receive at the
time it is paid to you." See Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. Plaintiff Knipe then had the title
company deduct five percent of the MidAmerican deposit prior to dispersing funds to the
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Robertsons. Further, the email itself characterizes the money to be paid to the two real estate
companies on deposit as "commission." See Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial.
Mr. Knipe also admitted at trial that he considered the 5-percent deposit as an advance on
his commission, not as forfeited money under the employment contract. As such, Mr. Knipe
instructed the escrow company to "deduct 5-percent commission on money deposited" when
distributed, and that the "commission paid to the two real estate companies on deposits before
closing will later be discounted from commission due at time this deal closes .... " See Exhibit 32
of the deposition of John Knipe, as admitted at trial. Additionally, Mr. Knipe's testimony as read
to the jury confirms that he collected a 5-percent commission totaling $22,500. See p.l 04 of the
deposition of John Knipe. Thus, the evidence from Plaintiff shows that it considered the deposited
money as commission, not as forfeited monies and that he was only entitled to the $22,500 ifthe deal
closed. More to the point is Plaintiff's prior course of conduct, in which it disbursed all of the
deposited monies to Defendants in the Hannon transaction, and did not characterize them as forfeited
funds at that time. Even Ms. Strain's testimony confirms that the money was not considered forfeited
money but was paid on a non-refundable basis for extending the closing of the Harmon transaction.
In fact, Defendants explained to her that they intended to spend the deposited monies, to which she

did not object or instruct them otherwise.
Significantly, the foregoing evidence all stems from Plaintiff's own witnesses and therefore
carries much weight and credibility. The evidence from Defendants' witnesses further shows that
no breach of the contractual terms.
Mr. Robertson testified that neither the purchaser in the Harmon transaction nor in the
MidAmerican transaction had forfeited any money. This was true because there was no breach or
improper conduct on the part of the buyers. Likewise, Ms. Crane testified that MidAmerican had
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not breached the land purchase agreements it signed with Defendants, and therefore had not forfeited
the money it paid under the terms ofthe contracts. Further, Ms. Crane testified that the money had
been paid to Defendants solely to allow MidAmerican to enter the property and to use it. Thus, Ms.
Crane's testimony highlighted the meaning of the term forfeiture, as applied to the property as a
whole and the course of dealing in this matter.
As a final note, the Court should deny Plaintiffs motion on the grounds that it failed to put
forth any evidence, or even argue, that a new trial would bring about a different result. See

Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628,632,769 P.2d 505,509 (1989).
Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial, as the weight of the
evidence clearly supports the jury's verdict.
C.

Plaintiff's Motion Presents No Errors of Law That Justify a New Trial.

Plaintiff argues that several jury instructions and other events at trial constitute errors oflaw,
justifying a new trial. The Court should deny this motion as Plaintiff has presented no errors oflaw
that justify a new trial.
Rule 59 states in pertinent part regarding new trials:

Rule 59(a). New trial- Amendment of judgment - Grounds
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part ofthe issues in an action for any of the following reasons:

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial.

See LR.C.P. 59(a)(7).
With respect to jury instructions, no new trial is needed where the instructions, as a whol~,
fairly present the issues and the state of the law. Gillingham Construction, Inc. v. Newby Wiggins

Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 15,24,121 P.3d 946,955 (2005)(citingSilver Creek Computers,Inc.
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v. Petra, Iltc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 672, 675 (2002) and Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho
Equipment Company, Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 581, 51 P.3d 392, 395 (2002)).
Thus, a court's review ofjury instructions generally is limited to a consideration of them "as
a whole and not individually." Highland v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009
(1999)(citing Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,256,805 P.2d 452,462 (1991)).
Typically, only instructions that are pertinent to the pleadings and evidence should be given.

Id. Nevertheless, the submission of an instruction not founded on an issue of the case does not
require a new trial absent a showing of substantial injury from that instruction. Id. Additionally,
the giving of an erroneous jury instruction does not justify a new trial unless the moving party can
establish it was prejudiced thereby, and that the error affected the jury's conclusion. Id.
As set forth below, the submitted jury instructions and rulings of law do not require a new
trial.
Instructions Nos. 11,12,13: Plaintiff contends the Court erred by failing to decide whether
the employment contracts were ambiguous. See p.20 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. As a result,
Plaintiff argues that Instructions Nos. 11-13 should not have been given. Nevertheless, a review of
Idaho case authority shows no error.
In Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794, P.2d 1381 (1990), the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized that a trial court implicitly rules that a document is ambiguous upon
allowing the admission of parol evidence at trial. Id. at 111,794 P.2d at 1384. hlRamco, the trial
court modified a standardized jury instruction, stating that the underlying agreement "could be"
unclear. Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that this instruction potentially gave
the issue of ambiguity to the jury, which issue must be determined by the court. Id. Significantly,
however, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that "the trial court had already ruled on whether the
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document was ambiguous when it determined to allow the admission of parol evidence at trial." [d.
The Court further held that although the modified instruction suggested that the jury itself might
determine the contract was ambiguous, it did not limit the jury's inquiry once that determination was
made. [d. Instead, the jury was instructed that "[ t]he intent may also be gathered from any conduct
or dealings ofthe contracting persons." [d. As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial.
In this matter, the Court's conduct shows that the challenged instructions are appropriate.
The Court's order dated February 12, 2009, found that the underlying employment contracts were
valid, but implied that the contractual terms were ambiguous. The Court held that "[t]he balance of
the issues and claims of both parties fundamentally go to course of conduct, which are issues for
the jury." See Court's Order on motions for summary judgment dated February 12, 2009 (emphasis
added). Consistent with this holding, Instruction No. 11 (IDJI 6.08.1) allowed the jury to consider
the contract as a whole to determine the intent of the parties, and contained the following
standardized provision:
Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting
parties showing what they intended and how they construed the
doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently
with the remainder of the terms.

See Instruction No. 11 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Instruction No. 12 (IDJI 6.08.2) and Instruction No. 13 (IDJI 6.08.3)
appropriately instructed the jury to consider the testimony of witnesses to clarify an ambiguity, and
allowed for the construing oflanguage where the intent of the parties could not be ascertained. Thus,
the Court properly instructed the jury to consider parol evidence consistent with its prior order dated
February 12, 2009. Accordingly, the Court found an ambiguity in the contractual terms and properly
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allowed the jury to consider additional evidence regarding this issue. In short, many contracts are
110t ambiguous on their face. However, when the language is applied to a factual scenario, the way
the parties behave toward one another gives meaning to the terms they employ. An "accident" is not
an ambiguous term but punch the phrase into West Law and see how it has been used and interpreted
by courts and juries under different factual scenarios.

Instruction No.4: Plaintiff next argues that the Court improperly gave Instruction No.4 as
an opening jury instruction. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that this instruction stated that Plaintiff
received a "5% commission," when the parties had not agreed to this fact. See p.21-22 of Plaintiff s
Memorandum. Plaintiff s Memorandum further notes that the Court determined to keep this
instruction after hearing one of Plaintiffs own key witnesses, Ms. Strain, who testified consistent
with what had been read to the jury in Instruction No.4. See id. According to Plaintiff, this is
significant because the Defendants allegedly claimed that the "Ellsworth Dobbs Rule" prohibited
Plaintiff from receiving anything under the employment contracts.

See p.21 of Plaintiffs

Memorandum.
Plaintiff s arguments, however, are without merit as Defendants did not argue the Ellsworth
Dobbs Rule to the jury, and thus there is no showing that the instruction affected the jury's
conclusion. See Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 343, 986 P.2d at 1009. Further, the Court
properly allowed the initial instruction to remain as subsequent evidence at trial supported that
instruction. See id. ("Whether ajury instructi~n should or should not have been given depends on .
whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction.").
In fact, not only was Ms. Strain's testimony supportive of this instruction, so was Mr.
Knipe's own testimony. Mr. Knipe's testimony as read to the jury shows that he considered the 5percent deposit as an advance on his commission, not as forfeited money under the employment
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contract. As such, Mr. Knipe instructed the escrow company to "deduct 5-percent commission on
money deposited," and that the "commission paid to the two real estate companies on deposits before
closing will later be discounted from commission due at time this deal closes .... " See Exhibit 32
ofthe deposition of John Knipe, as admitted at trial. Additionally, Mr. Knipe's testimony confirms
that he collected a 5-percent commission totaling $22,500. See p.104 of the deposition of John
.Knipe. Thus, the Court acted appropriately in maintaining the initial instruction. 4

Instruction No. 16: Plaintiff also argues that the Court improperly submitted Defendants'
affirmative defense ofwaiver by estoppel to the jury. See p.22 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. Notably,
this was the only affirmative defense allowed by the Court. Plaintiff argues that there was
insufficient evidence to submit this instruction to the jury, and that there was no detriment to
Defendants. See p.22-23 of Plaintiffs Memorandum.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff s argument is moot and irrelevant, as the jury found no breach
by Defendants. Thus, the jury never reached or considered Defendants' affirmative defense of
waiver on the special verdict form. As such, there is no showing by Plaintiff that this instruction
affected the jury's conclusion, and thus a new trial should not be granted.

See Highland

Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 343,986 P.2d at 1009.
Additionally, the evidence at trial clearly showed that Defendants relied upon Plaintiff and
its agent's conduct regarding the money given to Defendants. Specifically, testimony at trial showed
that Defendants even told Ms. Strain that they intended to spend the money provided to them by
Plaintiff. Neither Ms. Strain nor anyone else working for Plaintiff objected to Defendants' actions,

It should be noted that if any party was prejudiced by Instruction No.4, it was Defendants. The
instruction that a 5-percent conunission was paid prior to closing on the transaction magnifies Plaintiffs
theory that it was entitled to an advance on commission before it closed on the transaction, which could be
why the jury mistakenly did not return those funds to the Defendants.
4
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or provided any indication or infonnation leading to a contrary conclusion. In fact, this was
consistent with Plaintiffs prior conduct in which it had previously given Defendants the entire
deposited monies from the Hannon transaction, and thus created a course of conduct that waived any
contrary position. These actions constituted waiver and legal detriment.

Testimony by Cindy Crane: Plaintiff next argues that the Court improperly allowed Cindy
Crane to testify at trial. Plaintiff concedes that Defendants disclosed her name during pre-trial
discovery, but argues that Defendants were required to disclose her knowledge and anticipated trial
testimony. See p .24 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. 5 Plaintiff argues that Rules 26( e)(4) and Rule 33
require disclosure of a third-party's testimony.
A review of the corresponding rules and case law as to this issue show that the Court acted
properly in allowing Cindy Crane to testify at trial. Significantly, Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent
part that a party may discover the "identity and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable
matter." See LR.C.P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Further, Rule 26(e) states in part that a party is
under a duty to seasonably supplement the "identity and location of persons having lmowledge of
discoverable matters." See LR.C.P. 26(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Further, the fact that a party
requests infonnation in the fonn of an interrogatory under Rule 33 does not change the parameters
of discovery pursuant to Rule 26. See Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 310, 404 P.2d 589,593
(1965)(Recognizing that the scope of examination under LR.C.P. 33 is the same as under LR.C.P.
26(b)).
As a result, Defendants' disclosure in this case that identified Ms. Crane's name and her
employer was sufficient. Thus, the Court acted properly in allowing Ms. Crane to testify.

Plaintiff previously filed a motion in limine regarding this same issue, which was denied by the
Court. See p.23 of Plaintiff s Memorandum.
5
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Furthennore, lay witnesses may be allowed to testify even where not properly identified. The
interplay between the disclosure of the identity of a lay witness and a court's discretion to sanction
under Rule 26(e)(4) was discussed in the case of Wiseman v. Schaeffer, 115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d
800 (Ct. App. 1989).
In Wiseman, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the identity of each witness is
discoverable. Nevertheless, the Court went on to hold that a trial court's empowennent to exclude
testimony under Rule 26(e)(4) rests in the "sound discretion of the trial court." [d. at 569, 768 P.2d
at 802. The plaintiffs had challenged the admission oftestimony from two operators oflocal towing
businesses, as they had not properly been identified. [d. The defendant called these witnesses to
defend against a negligence claim. [d. The court allowed the witnesses to testify regarding the
customs and standard practices in theindustry for tow truck operators. [d. In doing so, the trial cOUli
correctly perceived the issue of whether to admit the testimony as one of discretion. Thus, the Idaho
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.
In the instant matter, the court acted properly in allowing Ms. Crane to testify at trial.
Nowhere in the rules is a party required to disclose the substance of a third-party's knowledge or
expected testimony. This particularly is true when such infonnation regarding the third-party is
gathered through diligent efforts on the part of one party, and constitutes significant effort and
attorney work-product. There is no showing why Plaintiff could not have subpoenaed Cindy Crane
and taken her deposition in this matter. Additionally, Defendants indicated as early as July 15,
2008, that Cindy Crane worked at Pacific Corp., and was a person who was believed to have
knowledge regarding this case. Plaintiff was well aware ofthis fact and included Cindy Crane in its
own discovery responses dated September 8, 2008. Interestingly, Plaintiff knew exactly who this
witness was, where she was, and what her knowledge was. Defendant cannot be penalized for
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Plaintiff s failure to talk to the person who negotiated directly with Plaintiff Knipe and signed the
MidAmerican contract, a six million dollar contract from which Plaintiff Knipe hoped to collect
several hundred thousand dollars.
As a result, the Court acted well within its discretion in allowing Ms. Crane to testify, as
Defendants properly identified her name and the company where she worked to Plaintiff.
Use of Licensing Statutes: Plaintiff contends the use of any real estate licensing statutes was
inappropriate. In support of its argument, Plaintiff avers that the case of Callis v. 0 'Neal, 2009 WL
1929326 makes the Idaho real estate licensing statutes irrelevant to contract disputes. See p.25 of
Plaintiff s Memorandum.
Notably, the Court had ample Idaho appellate authority to allow cross-examination with
standards from Idaho real estate statutes. In Johnson v. McPhee, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009), a
real estate agent brought suit against a developer alleging breach of contract. The Idaho Court of
Appeals allowed the use of the real estate licensing statutes to determine whether a real estate
agreement was valid. See id. at 569. Significantly, Johnson did not involve a disciplinary matter
before the Idaho Real Estate Commission, and thus shows the applicability of the licensing statutes
to civil suits. See id. While not controlling as law in any particular case, a licensed real estate
broker's knowledge of his legal responsibilities is always relevant.
As the Court is well aware, licensing statutes are frequently used to prove civil cases in other
contexts, such as bad faith insurance claims, bad faith adjusting claims, real estate claims, and legal,
accounting and medical claims. As such, it was entirely appropriate for the Court to allow
Defendants to question Plaintiff and its representatives as to their knowledge of laws and rules that
govem their activities, particularly in connection with claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act.
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Moroever, Plaintiff s reliance on Callis is unmerited. The opinion in Callis was not rendered
at the time of trial and, at this point, has not been released for publication. Additionally, Callis is
distinguishable from this case in that it involved the express issue of whether there was a repeal of
statute by implication. See Callis, 2009 WL 1929326 at *5. In this case there is no such issues of
conflicting statutes. Moreover, neither party in the Callis case cited or raised the appellate authori ty
as contained in Johnson, as the issue was not squarely before the Court.
More importantly, Plaintiff has failed to meet its requirement under the rules to show in
particularity that it was prejudiced, and that the alleged error affected the jury's conclusion. It is hard
to understand how asking Plaintiff what his professional obligations are and the knowledge he has
ofthose obligations causes prejudice. Highland, 133 Idaho at 343,986 P.2d at 1009. Accordingly,
the instruction was proper.
Instruction No. 15: Plaintiff argues the Court erred by requiring Plaintiff to prove that a

contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs own brief concedes that
the jury "presumably found that there were contracts between the parties (otherwise they would not
have found that the Robertsons did not breach them). See p.26 of Plaintiffs Memorandum. Thus,
by Plaintiff s own admission this argument is unfounded.
The Court also will note that counsel for Defendants stipulated to inform the jury in its
closing statement that there was a valid enforceable contract between the parties. True to this
stipulation, Defense counsel informed the jury of this fact both during Plaintiffs closing and as
argued by Defendants. Additionally, the verdict itself specifically informed the jury that there was
an agreement between the parties. The verdict inquires in relevant part: "Did the Defendants breach
the employment contracts they entered into with Plaintiff?" See Question No. 1 of Verdict. As a
result, there is no error.
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Likewise, Plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 15 improperly instructed the jury that Plaintiff
had the burden of proving the amount of damages. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the amount of
damages should have been presumed. In making this argument, however, Plaintiff provides no legal
authority and is required to carry its own burden of proof in bringing its case.
Again, Plaintiff has failed to show the instruction affected the jury's conclusion.
Accordingly, Instruction No. 15 provides no basis for a new trial.

Instruction No. 20: Plaintiff contends Instruction No. 20 omitted an intent or knowledge
component, which Plaintiff argues is required under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See p.26
o fPlaintiff s Memorandum. Plaintiff further avers that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not
apply to regulatory situations, and thus the Idaho real estate licensing statutes are ilTelevant. See
p.26-27 of Plaintiff's Memorandum. Again, however, these arguments are unsupported.
With respect to intent or knowledge, the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not require
such a showing. Under Idaho law, proof of intent is not required, as only a tendency or capacity to
mislead is needed. See State v. Master Distibutors, Inc., 110 Idaho 447, 453, 615 P.2d 116,122
(1980). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that under the Act, "proof of intention to
deceive is not required for finding that an act is unfair or deceptive." ld. at 453-54, 615 P.2d at 12223 (citing Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F .2d 669 (2d. Cir. 1963)). As a
result, Instruction No. 20 was proper.
Furthermore, the evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff waited to infonn Defendants about
its intent to seek a return of the monies until after Defendants had reenlisted on the commission
agreement. Such evidence is more than sufficient to show any elements of deceitful conduct. See
Exhibit "KK," which is the email withholding demand until after the signature on the extension was
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obtained. To top it off, Plaintiff sued for breach of the extension agreement Defendants were
fraudulently induced to sign. See Third Claim for Relief of Plaintiff s original Complaint.
With regard to the Idaho licensing statute, the Act simply states that its provisions Calmot be
used in other regulatory proceedings, which clearly is not the case here.
In conclusion, the Court used IDJI instructions which clearly and properly set forth the law.

The instructions set forth a platform for the parties to argue their respective positions. There is no
misstatement of law alleged and no allegation that Plaintiff was prevented in any way from
presenting his arguments. Therefore, there are no legal issues that would require a new trial.
D.

The Court Should Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict.

Plaintiff s final argument is that the Court should grant it a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. See p .28-31 of Plaintiff s Memorandum. Plaintiff contends that the term "forfeiture" speaks
plainly, and that parol is not needed. This argument appears to be a recitation of Plaintiffs prior
arguments. See p.28-29 of Plaintiffs Memorandum.
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the standard for granting a JNOV is "demanding." See p.28 of
Plaintiff s Memorandum. Unlike a motion for a new trial, the trial court in considering a JNOV is
not allowed to weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, nor make separate findings
offact. Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986)(citingGmeinerv. Yacte,
100 Idaho 1,4,592 P.2d 57, 60 (1979)). Rather, the moving party admits the proof of all adverse
evidence and all inferences that can be drawn. Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 646,200 P.3d
1191,1195 (Ct. App. 2008).
The central issue is determining whether substalltial evidence supports the jury's verdict.

HighlandEnterprises,/nc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 337, 986P.2d996, 1003 (1999). Nonetheless,
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substantial evidence does not require that the evidence be uncontradicted. Id. The evidence need
only be of a sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude the verdict
of the jury was proper. Id.
As such, the motion should be granted "only where there can be but one conclusion as to the
verdict that reasonable minds could have reached and when that conclusion does not conform to the
jury verdict." Carlsoll, 146 Idaho at 646, 200 P.3d at 1195. Thus, ajudgment notwithstanding the
verdict gives a trial judge the last opportunity to order judgment that the law requires. See id.
As set forth above, the Court previously ruled that the conduct of the parties should be
considered in this case. This ruling was confirmed at trial upon the Court's allowing of parol
evidence from both sides. As a result, Plaintiffs continued recitation of this argument is without
merit and does not support a JNOV.
Plaintiff also indicates that Defendants' affirmative defense ofwaiver by estoppel would not
bar Plaintiffs recovery in this matter. Again, as set forth above, the jury did not reach the issue of
Defendants' affirmative defense, as the jury found no breach ofthe employment contracts. Moreover,
as set forth above, there is more than sufficient evidence to show waiver by estoppel in this case.
Additionally, there is substantial evidence showing no breach by Defendants. This includes
the fact that Plaintiffs own representative had previously considered the deposited monies as a
commission requiring a closing on the transactions subsequent to receiving payment. Further, Mr.
Knipe's own email dated September 26, 2007, to Defendants admits that at the time Plaintiff
distributed the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican, those monies had not been forfeited. See
Exhibit "KK" as admitted at trial. Mr. Knipe also admitted at trial that he considered the 5-percent
deposit as an advance on his commission. See Exhibit 32 of the deposition of John Knipe, as
admitted at trial. Additionally, Mr. Knipe's testimony confirms that he collected a 5-percent
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commission totaling $22,500. See p.l04 of the deposition of John Knipe. Thus, the evidence from
Plaintiff shows that it considered the deposited money as commission, not as forfeited monies.
Plaintiff's prior course of conduct also shows that it disbursed all of the deposited monies
to Defendants in the Harmon transaction, and did not characterize them at that time as forfeited
funds. In fact, Defendants explained to Ms. Strain that they intended to spend the deposited monies,
to which she did not object or instruct them otherwise.
Mr. Robertson further testified that neither the purchaser in the Harmon transaction nor in
the MidAmerican transaction had forfeited any money. This was true because there was no breach
or improper conduct on the part ofthe buyers. Likewise, Ms. Crane testified that MidArnerican had
not breached the land purchase agreements it signed with Defendants, and therefore had not forfeited
the money it paid under the terms of the contracts as payments for access to the property.
There is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, and therefore Plaintiff's motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied.
IV.

CASE SUMMARY
Plaintiff fundamentally misunderstood the issues and evidence presented at trial. Was the
Harmon money paid as forfeited earnest money or was it paid to extend the closing date under the
terms of the Harmon contract? Was the MidAmerican money paid as forfeited eamest money or was
it paid to give MidArnerican access to the Robertson property? The evidence was overwhelmingly
in Defendants' favor.
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V.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court should deny Plaintiff s Motion for aNew Trial and for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Additionally, the Court should amend the judgment to
include additional remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
DATED

/«

thiS~ day of August, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP

etherell, Of the Firm
ttorneys for Defendants
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Come now Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("KLC") and Third Party Defendant John
Knipe, by and through their attorneys, Stoel Rives LLP, and submit this Reply in Support of Their
Motion to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs' (the "Robertsons") Response to Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict (the HRobertsons' Response") demonstrates that their jury verdict is principally
suspended from a single slender thread. That is, that the word "forfeited," as identically used in
the two real estate listing contracts KLC and the Robertsons entered into in 2005 and 2007 (the
"Employment Contracts"), is ambiguous and thus requires explication by reference to extrinsic
evidence. The only such extrinsic evidence introduced by the Robertsons at trial for this purpose
was Richard Robertson's personal opinion of what "forfeited" me8.l1S and the testimony of
another witness, Cindy Crane, but who airily explained the operation of other, separate contracts
that she, and apparently the jury, thought illuminated the original intent of the Employment
Contracts, even though she knew nothing whatsoever about the Employment Contracts
themselves.
In the Robertsons' view, money paid by a third party on account of that party's intended
purchase of the Robertsons' land would not be "forfeited" within the terms of the Employment
Contracts, even though that party had terminated its purchase contract and suffered the
contractually specified consequence of losing all right to that money-unless the third party had
also "breached" its separate land purchase contract with the Robertsons. (Trial Tr. 434: 1-25; see
Supplemental Affidavit of Mark S. Geston in Support of Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFffHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE
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Motion to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial. or, in the Alternative, for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict C'Geston Supp. Afl.") Ex. A.) Since neither of the two prospective
purchasers of the Robertsons' land "breached" their respective land purchase contracts, the
earnest monies they paid to the Robertsons were never "forfeited." Therefore, the Robertsons
did not "breach" the Employment Contracts which only required them to share "forfeited"
earnest money with KLC. 1 The inconvenient fact that both of the prospective purchasers I the
Harmons and MidAmerican Nuclear Energy LLC ("MidAmerican"). contractually lost all rights
or benefit to the money they had paid on account of their intended purchase of the land when
they decided to close was obviously of no significance to the jury. With all due respect to the
jury, it is impossible to reconcile its verdict with the evidence.
A.

The Employment Contracts Are Unambiguous and There Is No Evidence to
Support the Robertsons' Argument That Earnest Money Can Be "Forfeited" Only
if Another, Independent Contract Has Been i'Brea~hed"

The Robertsons' opposition to a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
depends on the existence of evidence that would have allowed the jury to reasonably find that the
Robertsons had not breached the Employment Contracts. Such evidence does not exist. Wha.t
was presented at trial were the Robertsons' admissions that (1) the Harmons and MidAmerican
had paid the money in controversy "on account of [the] purchase" of the land; (2) each of those
purchasers lost any right to that money, which would have been applied to the total purchase
prices they had agreed to, when they decided not to purchase the land after all; and (3) the
Robertsons kept almost all of the money, rather than sharing it equally with KLC. The only
explanation for the jury's conclusion that the Employment Contracts had not been breached, and

I It should be noted that, instead of just referring to "earnest moneYJ" the Employment
Contracts broadly refer to IIdeposit[s] or amounts paid on account of purchase" of land.
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the Robertsons owed KLC nothing more, is the Robertsons' argument that earnest money paid
by a third-party purchaser cannot be forfeited unless there is also a showing that the purchaser

"breached" an independent land purchase contract with the seller. The basis for this
interpretation is Mr. Robertson's testimony that that was what he "felt" the word "forfeited"
meant; and the testimony of Cindy Crane, a MidAmerican employee who had nothing to do with
the Employment Contractst who opined that MidAmerican had not "breached!! its purchase
contract with Robertsons because it was entitled to back out any time before closing, at the cost
of losing the benefit of all the money it had previously paid against the purchase price.
Of course, Mr, Robertson's "feeling" that the earnest money was not forfeited here was
not supported by any factual or documentary evidence. He admitted that he had not shared his
belief with any of the other parties. Indeed, the Robertsons did not even make this argument in
the litigation until a week before the trial began. They never claimed, in their three unsuccessful
motions for summary judgment, or in any of their responses to pretrial discovery, that the
Employment Contracts were ambiguous, alone and that the word "forfeited" should be
interpreted and applied in such an unwieldy fashion. (Trial Tr. 454:1-455:1; 493:15-495:25;

507:21-508:20; see Geston Supp. Aft. Exs. B, C, & D, respeotively.)
Ms. Crane testified that MidAmerican had not "breached" its own contracts with the
Robertsons because it had a "window" between the time it signed the contracts and the agreed on
closing deadline, to tenninate the contract. Therefore) the MidAmerican contract was never
"breached" because MidAmerican could walk away-although it would lose the $450,000 it had
paid as part of its intended purchase of the land. On cross-examination, Ms. Crane agreed that

nothing she had testified to about the MidAmerlcan land purchase contracts could be found in
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see Geston

Supp. Aft. Exs. E & P, respectively.)
The detennination of whether language in a contract is ambiguous or not is the obligation
of the court, not the jury. If the court finds the language is not ambiguous, it must instruct the
jury that it can only apply that language as it is written and may not refer to extrinsic evidence to

detennine its meaning. Indeed, it has been held that we where the contract is tmambiguous, the

court must enforce it. Only if the court decides there is an ambiguity such that the wording may
have two competing reasonable interpretations, may the jury be given the task ofUinterpreting"
that language in light of extrinsic evidence. See Cannon Y. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d
393,396 (2007); Farnsworth v. Dairymen's CreameryAss'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148,
152 (Ct. App. 1994); St. Clair v. Krueger 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989);
j

Bauchman..Kingston P 'ship, LP v. Hafoldsen, No. 3455 I, 2008 WL 5133788. at *2 (Idaho Dec.

8,2008); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 527, 181 P.3d 450, 453 (2008).
Sustaining an objection to the Robertsons' cross-examination ofnC)s witness about the
meaning of the word "forfeiture:' the Court observed that "[t]here is a plain and clear meaning of
forfeiture, It and that there was therefore no need for such argumentative interrogation on that
point. (Trial Tr. 240:3-4; see Geston SUpp. Aff. Ex. G.) Later in the trial, the Coun denied the
Robertsons' offer of a dictionary into evidence, stating that "I think forfeiture is-the
understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this context is just an Wlequivoca! surrender of any
claim or interest in controverted sum." (Trial Tr. 416:18-417:4; see Geston Supp. Aff. Ex. H.)
The Court therefore observed, in cormection with its denial of the Robertsons' motion to dismiss
made after KLC rested, that, "in both these ... transactions the purchasers did forfeit the money,
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that iSI they made a voluntary and unequivocal surrender to any claim or interest in controverted
sums. There was a literal forfeiture." (Trial Tr. 475:10-13; see Oeston Supp. Aff. Ex.!.)
The Court therefore never ruled that "forfeited," as used in the Employment Contracts,
was ambiguous, but instead found the term clear and unambiguous. The Robertsons nevertheless
argue that "on February 12,2009. the Court ruled that the underlying employment contracts in
2005 and 2007 were valid, but the tenns and language of the contracts must be applied to the
facts of this case. That is, the contractual meaning of the term 'forfeited' could only be defined
by the parties themselves and [by] the actual way they employ the terms." (Robertsons'
Response at 3.) The Court found no such thing. It merely found that the Employment Contracts
were "valid and suffer from no legal deficiency. The balance of the issues and claims of both
parties fundamentally go to course of conduct, which are issues for the jury." As the Court will
recall, the focus of the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment it decided in the February 12, 2009
Order was whether certain provisions of the Idaho Real Estate License Law, namely Idaho Code
§§ 54-2050 and 2051, rendered the Employment Contracts void as a matter of law. The Court

decided that this was not the case and that the Employment Contracts were valid, and the
correctness of that decision has been confirmed by Callies v. 0 'Neal. No. 34968. 2009 WL
1929326 (Idaho July 7, 2009).2

2 The Court also anticipated the Callies decision in its June 9, 2009 Order on Motions,
denying the Robertsons' Motions to Reconsider its decision on the first Summary Judgment, It
also found the Employment Contracts could not be statutorily attacked on the basis of whatever
was or wasn't in the provisions of the MidAmerican land purchase contract when it held that
"[w]ith xoespect to the issue of the statute of frauds under Idaho Code § 54-2050 and § 2051, this
Court does not believe that the statutes are applicable in the case at hand. Rather, the statutes
appear to be applicable in the context of administrative hearing by the Commission against a
broker."
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Other matters were raised by KLC, John Knipe and the Robertsons on the first CrossMotions for Summary Judgment (the meaning of the word "forfeited" notably not being among
them), but the Court declined to make any aftinnative ruling with respect to them, least of all
make the decision that the Robertsons claim it did on at page 3 of their Response.
The Robertsons' argument therefore relies on what the Court's February 12, 2009 Order
did not decide. They wish to treat its denial of summary judgment as an implicit ruling that the
Employment Contracts were ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence is needed to construe them.
But the denial of a motion for summary judgment decides nothing. "[AJ denial of summary
judgment is not a decision on the merits; it simply is a decision that there is a material factual
issue to be tried." 1OA Charles Alan Wright. Arthur R Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2712 (2009). "[T]he denial of a motion for summary judgment on the
ground of the existence of genuine issues of material facts does not conclusively and finally
determine the claim of right involved. In fact, such a ruling leaves the issue yet to be decided. II

Mueller v. Auker, No. 07-35554.2009 WL 2424803, at *8 (9th Cir. Aug. 10,2009); see ,,/so
Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999); Hunter v. State, 138
Idaho 44,47,57 P.3d 755,758 (2002); Moore's Federal Practice 3D § 56.41 [3][d] ,
The Robertsons claim that the Court's allowance of "parol evidence" (presumably Mr.
Robertson telling the jury what he felt Hforfeited" meant and Ms. Crane telling the jury that, in
her opinion, MidAmerlcan had not '·breached" its land purchase contracts) constituted an implicit
ruling by it that the Employment Contracts were ambiguous. They cite Rameo v. H-K

Contractors, Inc.• 118 Idaho 108, 794 P .2d 1381 (1990), but that authority contradicts rather than
supports their argument. The controversy in Romco arose from the trial court's express l1nding
at trial that the contract in question was ambiguous and its subsequent modification of a standard
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jury instruction (it told the jury that the contract terms "could be" lUlclea:r, not that they "are"
Wlclear). The Romeo court held that because the trial court had the obligation to decide whether
a contract was either ambiguous Or unambiguous, giving an equivocal instruction to the jury was
clear error. The Supreme Court, however, deemed the error hannless because the disputed
instruction did not affirmatively prevent the jury from considering the parol evidence the court
had allowed after ruUng that the contract was ambiguous. 118 Idaho at Ill, 794 P.2d at 1384.
There was no such ruling at trial here. To the contrary, and as noted above, all of the statements
from the Bench indicated that Hforfeited" was an ordinary word and did not need explication by
dictionaries Or Hparol evidence. ,,3
The Robertsons cite several cases that purportedly attach a specific legal meaning to the
term "forfeited/' arguing that they show that that there can never be a forfeiture unless there has
also been some "breach" or Hdefault" of an obligation. None of that authority is pertinent and
none of it defines "forfeited" or "forfeiture" as such. Sauls v. Luchi, No. CV 2004 1616.2005
WL 1663285 (Idaho June] 7,2005) dealt with a land purchase contract between a land owner
and a prospective buyer.4 Although the court's opinion referred to a "forfeiture clause" in the
subject oontfact, none of its terms were explained in any more detail. This Court therefore has
no way of knowing what circumstances the parties in that case explicitly agreed to that might
cause any "forfeiture" of earnest money.

3 The Robertsons have never explained just what could constitute a "breach' I of their
independent land purchase contracts. Do the Robertsons propose that they and Plaintiff agreed
to have a nonsense term in the Employment.Contracts? Is there any logical way for the jury to
have imagined why the Employment Contracts include a nonsense term or one whose
effectiveness would depend on the operation of separate contracts that had not yet been written
when the Employment Contfacts, themselves, were executed?
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Of the three out-of..state cases cited on pages 11 and 12 of the Robertsons' Response, one
was a criminal matter concerning a murder, the second dealt with the "forfeiture" of statutory
workers' compensation benefits, and the third concerned the statutory forfeiture of a devise
under a will. None of these cases deal with situations having any relevance to the Employment
Contracts between KLC and the Robertsons. None of these cases hold that any I'forfeiture" may
not arise unless there has been a separate contractual wrong by a third party. To the contrary.
these cases stand only for the proposition that property or money may be "forfeited" as a
consequence of circumstances peculiar to each of those cases.
The consequences giving rise to the Harmons and MidAmerican's forfeiture of their
down payments on the Robertsons' land were, in each case, their failure to consummate the
purchase they had contracted for. It should be of no significance that the Harmon and
MidAmerican land purchase contracts anticipated such a default (a term used interchangeably
with "breach" by the authority cited by the Robertsons) and specified the loss of benefit ()f

monies previously paid by such purchasers as the consequence of their failure to close. The loss
of their mone)' by the Harmons and MidAmerican was just as much a "forfeiture" wtder those

terms as it would have been if there had been some other default or failure to deprive them of the
benefit of their payments that could be labeled a "breach."
The Robertsons buttress their argument that there was no "forfeiture" of the first
purchaser's lost earnest money because both of KLC' s witnesses did not "consider" that the
Harmons' money was forfeited when it was released to the Robertsons. Similarly, the
Robertsons' Response asserts that KLC's agents did not "consider" the MidAmerican monies

4

An unauthenticated and unsigned copy of that opinion was attached to the Robertsons'

Trial Brief.
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"forfeited" when it was released. But there was no dispute at trial that all the actual distributions
of these monies occurred before the two purchasers announced that they would not consummate
their purchases of the Robertsons' land. Since there could be no forfeiture until those purchasers
announced they could not or would not close. there was no reason for anyone to consider the
monies "forfeited" at the time they were distributed.

Mr. Robertson admitted that the monies paid by the two prospective purchasers have
been deposited were paid as part of their intended purchase of the Robertsons' land-precisely as
the Employment Contracts specified. He also admitted that when he exercised his remedies
under the MidAmerican land purchase contracts, be deemed those monies "forfeited." He
admitted that the payments would 'be credited against the agreed-upon purchase price for the land
had there been a closing. His federal income tax return reported the MidAmerican money he and
his wife kept as "earnest money forfeited." (See Ex. 43.) Ms. Crane's conclusory statement that
MidAmerican had not "breached" its separate contractual obligations under its land purchase
contracts was, by her own admission, Wlsupported by anything actually in the contracts it entered
into with the Robertsons,
FinaJly, it is inherently illogical to re~y on the legal significance ofthe purchase contracts
entered into between the Robertsons and the third-party purchasers of their land, to detennine
how the Employment Contracts that the Robertsons and KLC entered into long before those
contracts were even dreamed of let alone drafted and signed~ should be enforced.
B.

The Weight of the Evidence Requires a New Trial at a Millimum.
To decide whether, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), there should be a new

trial, "the trial judge must 'weigh the evidence and determine (1) whether the verdict is against
his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would prclduce a
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different result,m Harger v. Teton Springs Golf& Casting,

LLC~

145 Idaho 716, 719. 184 P.3d

841 ~ 844 (2008) (citation omitted), A new trial should be ordered where "the trial judge ... has
weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses ...
[and] concludes that the verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the
evidence." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,766.727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). Importantly, the
Court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Robertsons in such an
analysis, and may grant a new trial even if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict. 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P,2d at 1195.
Given that the monies paid by the Hannons and MidAmerican was lost to them when
they refused to consununate their purchases, there can be no question but that the Robertsons
breached the Employment Contracts and owe KLC half that money (minus the $22,500
previously paid to KLC with the consent of all parties). The only ways around this factual
evidence are to accept (1) Mr. Robertson's story that "forfeiture" does not mean what it says all
by itself but is. instead, preconditioned on some kind of legal fault concerning the perfonnance
of entirely separate contracts, and to accept (2) Ms. Crane's opinion that one of these separate
contracts was not "breached" by her employer. How the jury found that there was no breach of
the Employment Contracts in the face of such evidence is frankly a mystery.
Beyond the undisputed evidence, the Court should also recall its Own estimation of Mr.
Robertson, the individual who undertook all relevant actions and made all the decisions for the
Defendants: " ... [t]here is no inequality of bargaining power here. I'm satisfied by the proofs
that although Mr. Robertson did not even complete the tenth grade, he's obviously a man of vast

intelligence. and better yet he's shrewd." (Trial Tr. 474:14-18; Oeston Supp. Aff. Ex. 1.)
At the very least, a new trial must be granted.
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFtrHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S
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The Court's Errors of Law Require a New Trial at a Minimum

There were also significant errors of law at trial that require a new trial. As noted above,
it

was the duty of the Court to tell the jury what it had already told the attorneys during the trial,

that the Employment Contracts were not ambiguous and that the tenn "forfeited" has a simpJe,
easily comprehended meaning. Ramco, 118 Idaho at 111,794 P.2d at 1384. The Court
nevertheless allowed Mr. Robertson and Ms. Crane to explain. over objection, what the word
"forfeitedh in the Employment Contracts "really" meant and how it should operate. Their
testimony did not concern anything actually written in the Employment Contracts, but instead
consisted of Mr. Robertson's private belief about what the word "forfeited," considered ill
isolation, meant and Ms. Crane's opinion about how the independent land purchase contract of
her employer functioned.
The Court again abdicated its duty to determine whether the Employment Contracts were
ambiguous or not when it allowed the jury to decide that issue by submitting instructions on both
points. This was unquestionably errOr and, given the absence of any ruling during the course of

trial that the Employment Contracts were ambiguous, cannot be said to have been "harmless" as
was the case in Ramco. [d.
KLC and John Knipe's objection to the Court's opening Instruction No.4, dealing with
whether the monies disbursed from the MidAmerican earnest money payments to KLC were
agreed by the parties to be "commissions," although seemingly a minor point, was not hannless,
particularly when considered with all the other instructions. First. the Instruction purported to
tell the jury what the parties had agreed to, when, in fact, the parties had not agreed at all. The
fact that the Court concluded, halfway through the first witness's testimony, that the Instruction
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was factually correct, constituted additional error by preswning to make a finding of fact midway
through a jury trial.
Instruction No. 16 is cited by KLC and John Knipe as another ground for granting a new
trial. The Robertsons argue that the significance of this Instruction is moot because the jury
never decided that affirmative defense. That may be a fair pointJ but only if the Instruction is
considered in isolation. Plaintiff's point is that it cannot be so regarded but must, instead, be
viewed as an integral part of all the Instructions, which. as a groUPt invited the jury to render a
verdict that was completely at odds with both the factual evidence and a plain reading of the
Employment Contracts. This Instruction invited the jury to look beyond the wording of the
Employment Contracts, just as the uncalled-for Instruction inviting the jury to look to extrinsic
evidence to understand what KLC and the Robertsons intended by the language in the
Employment Contracts did.
The Court should not have allowed Ms. Crane to testify, first, because the substance of
her knowledge of relevant events was not disclosed to KLC. even though KLC had explicitly
asked the Robertsons for that information in an Interrogatory propounded long before trial, The
Court dismissed KLC and Jo1m Knipe's concerns about such stonewalling tactics by simply
saying that when "we"ve got experience[d] counsel like this and they see Ms. Crane knocking
around the case, then they can take whatever action they want to take." (Trial Tr. 484:7-9; see
Geston Supp. Af!. Ex, J.) The Robertsons have now built on this observation to hide behind the
specification in Rule 26(e)(I) that there is only a duty to supplement prior discovery concerning
"the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." According
to the Robertsons, they had no duty to supplement their prior, incomplete answers and to provide
any information about what they thOUght Ms. Crane knew that was relevant to the controversy.
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However, that Rule applies only where a party "has responded to a request for discovery with a
response that was complete when made . ..." Rule 26(e) (emphasis added). The Robertsons'
original answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory was intentionally incomplete when it was made, and
they revealed nothing more to KLC until shortly before trial, when Ms. Crane was named as a
witness. KLC and John Knipe listed Ms. Crane as a person with knowledge because they knew
she had represented MidAmerican in its efforts to buy the Robertsons' land, and would
presumably have knowledge about MidAmerican's refusal to go through that purchase, but since
that event was not in dispute and documented by MidAmerican's January 25, 2008 tenninadon
letter to the Robertsons (Trial Ex. 38) and the consequent forfeiture its earnest money, KLC had
no need to rely on her or reason of its own to depose her. 5 for its case. And even if her
deposition had been taken, it would have been of little use, since the Robertsons' invention that
could be no forfeiture of earnest money without a "breach" was first revealed in their trial brief,
served a week before trial.
The Court certainly has discretion to enforce the rules of discovery and ensure fairness.
That discretion was exceeded, however, when the Robertsons were allowed to capitalize on their
stonewalling of discovery and present Ms. Crane at trial.
Secondly, Ms. Crane testified. again over objection, about how the MidAmerican
contract operated, what it was intended to accomplish, and how it was not "breached." lhat
testimony directly contravened the Court's prior ruling that although it would permit Ms. Crane
to "testify on the course of negotiations with Mr. Robertson just to corroborate his testimony if
that's what it's being put on for, but I'm not going to let her testify or give legal conclusions to
the jury about the ultimate fact in question, which is, did MidAmerican forfeit money." (Trial
S Ms.

Crane is an Oregon resident and beyond this Court's subpoena power.
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Tr. 484: 10-16; Geston Aff. Ex. J.) But that is exactly what Ms. Crane did: give legal
conclusions about whether MidAmerican forfeited its earnest money.
An additional error of law occurred when the Court allowed the Robertsons' attorney to
cross-examine KLC~s witnesses about why KLC had not ensured that the MidAmerlcan land
purchase contracts, which MidAmerican had drafted. included a specific provision to control the
distribution of forfeited earnest monies, as required by Idaho Code § 54-2051. The obvious
point of this interrogation was to demonstrate that (1) KLe's real estate agents paid no attention
to the law, and (2) the absence of such a provision from the MidAmerican land purchase
contracts meant there was no agreement to share forfeited earnest money after all.
The Robertsons respond that such questioning was proper since "licensing statutes are
frequently used to prove civil cases and other contacts, such as bad-faith insurance claims, badfaith adjusting claim, real estate claims, and legal, accounting and medical client." (Robertsons'
Response at 21.) Of course, all of these "other contexts" involve torts-usually negligence
claims, where the standard of reasonable care may be proven by reference to "licensing statutes."
No such question was relevant to the instant case.
The Robertsons rely on Johnson v. McPhee, _Idaho _) 210 P .3d 563 (Ct. App.
2009).6 But McPhee was an appeal of a summary judgment concerned with whether a purported
oral contract to sell real property for compensation has satisfied the statute of frauds. Instead of
going directly to the statute of frauds addressing such agreements, Idaho Code § 9-508, the Court
of Appeals inexplicably analyzed the Idaho Real Estate License Law and the Idaho Real Estate
Brokerage Representation Act, and detennined that such a contract must be in writing (the one in

is by nO means certain that McPhee remains valid authority, given the subsequent
Supreme Court decision in Callies.
6 It

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT .. 15
BQisc-222636.4 0010908· 00008

,,:)

/07

08/1~/~OO~

15:56 FAX

IgJ017/024

that case was not, so summary judgment had been proper), McPhee detennined nothing more
than that, and it provides no justification for the Robertsons' exploitation of a statute that has
nothing to do with the controversy between them and KLC. That much is indisputable in light of

Callies, which had been anticipated by this Court when it held in its February 12,2009 Order,
finding that the Employment Contracts suffered from no legal deficiency, and, again, in its June
9,2009 ruling that Idaho Code §§ 54-20S0 and 2051 were not "applicable in the case at hand.
Rather, the statutes appear to be applicable in the context of an administrative hearing by the
Commission against a broker." (See the Court's Order on Motions, June 9,2009, at 5.)
Finally, the Court's Instruction No. 20 omitted any mention of the "knowledge"
component that must be shown before any violation of the Idaho Consumer Protect Act
C'ICPA") can be proved, State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447,615

P.2d 116 (1980), held that the State need not prove an "intention to deceive" before successfully
asserting a claim under the ICPA. However, Idaho Code § 48-603 expressly requires that any of
the 19 prohibited business practices it enumerates must have been practiced by "a person [who]
knows, or in the exercise of due care should know" that he was acting in such fashion before a
violation of the statute can be found. This is the "knowledge element" that must be shown
before a violation of Idaho Code § 48·603 can be found. Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 780, 133
P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006). The Instruction submitted by the Robertsons and gjven by the Court
made no mention of such a thing.
Considered as a whole, the Instructions were confusing at best and unfairly skewed
against KLC' s interests at worst. In either event, a new trial is required. The admission of
opinion evidence, the testimony by a witness whose knowledge had been concealed by the
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Robertsons, and the exploitation of irrelevant statutes to undermine the integrity and
professionalism ofKLC's real estate agents are all reasons for a new trial, too.

D.

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Should Be Entered
All of the arguments set forth above concerning the evidence adduced at trial are equally

applicable to KLC and John Knipe's demand for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV),
Questions of witness credibility aside, there is no reasonable way to reconcile the jury's finding
that the Robertsons did not breach the Employment Contracts with the documentary and factual
evidence, As the Court itself observed, "in both these ... transactions the purchasers did forfeit
the money, that is, they made a voluntary and unequivocal surrender to any claim or interest in
the controverted songs. There was aUtera! forfeiture." (Trial Tr. 475:10-13; Geston Supp. Aff.
Ex.1.) That evidence permits only one conclusion: the plain and simple requirement of the

Employment Contracts that ·the Robertsons share earnest monies forfeited by a prospective
purchaser with KLC.

E.

There Can Be No Further Relief Under the lePA
The Robertsons' Response continues to ignore the fact that the jury did not find that KLC

violated the ICP A. The Robertsons continually lump KLC together with John Knipe and argue
as if the Court should now consider further relief against both litigants, This is incorrect.

As far as Mr. Knipe is concerned, the only logical conclusion is that the jury did not
approve of his recommendation that demand for the money the Robertsons already owed KLC
not be made until after an agreement had been reached to extend the Employment Contracts'
effective terms. But, as also noted, the entire issue of that February 2008 agreement to extend
the tenns of the Employment Contracts was dropped from the controversy when KLC was
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allowed to file its First Amended Complaint. 'The Robertsons did nothing to assert an
independent cause of action founded on those circumstanoes.'
The Robertsons nevertheless claim that these ICPA issues were tried with the implicit
agreement of the parties. To the contrary, KLC and John Knipe continuously objected to
testimony concerning whether KLC made the demand for monies that were already owed to it,
either before or after the Employment Contracts were renewed in February 2009.
The Robertsons claim Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Cotp., 122 Idaho 868, 878, 840 P.2d
1090, 1100 (et. App. 1992). justifies the Court's post..trial consideration of additional relief
under the ICPA, and speCifically punitive damages. This argument is also intended to address
Plaintiff's observation that the Robertsons cannot claim punitive damages under the ICPA
because they never amended their pleadings to include such a claim, as required by Idaho Code
§ 6-1604(2). The Robertsons argue that. in Mikesell, the mere fact that evidence supporting the

punitive damages claim (even though such a claim was never mentioned until the close of
evidence) had been present at the trial meant that the parties had implicitly agreed that a
judgment could include such a claim. However,
[i]n Mikesell, the complaint requested $10,000 in punitive
damages, however, evidently neither party was aware that I.C.
§ 6 1604 prohibited such a request at the time of the trial and the
issue was fully tried. After the trial, the district court refused to
award punitive damages to the Mikesells because of the Mikesells'
noncompliance with I.e. § 6·1604(2) and rule 9(g). The Court of
Appeals determined that the district court erred in dismissing 1he
punitive damages claim after it had been tried, holding that where
an issue is improperly raised in the pleadings but tried by the
parties without objection, it will be treated as having been properly
raised.
w

7 The Court sustained an objection to testimony concerning the February 2008 reUsting
agreement, agreeing with the argument that "[t]his contract, this relisting, that's not part of our
controversy. That's not what we're tallOng about." (Trial Tr. 407:5·9; Geston Supp. Aff. Ex. K)
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Harwoodv. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 675-76, 39 P.3d 612,615-16 (2001). In this case, unlike
Mikesell, there was no mention in any of the Robertsons' pleadings of any claim for punitive
damages; that issue should not be injected into the controversy now.
The Robertsons have also failed to point out any evidence that would show that the
conduct of Mr. Knipe's that violated the ICPA-whatever it was-was "repeated or flagrant" as
is required by Idaho Code § 48-608(1) before punitive damages may be awarded. No such
award should be considered absent such evidence,
Next, there was no showing that the Robertsons suffered any ·'ascertainable loss" as a
result of John Knipe's supposedly deceptive actions, as is required by Yellowpine Water User's
Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 351-52, 760 P.2d, 54,56-57 (1983). Everything relevant to this

lawsuit had happened before the Robertsons briefly agreed to renew the effective tenns of the
Employment Contracts: the Employment Contracts had been executed; KLC had perfonned all
of its duties; KLC had found buyers who signed contracts and who paid money on account of
their intended purchase of land; both buyers had refused to close their respective transactions and
suffered the contractual forfeiture of their earnest money; and KLC's contractual entitlement to
half of that forfeited earnest money accrued at the moment the buyers announced their refusal to
close. All of that transpired well before February 2008. None of the rights that were in
controversy at the trial originated with the February 2008 agreement to extend the Employment
Contracts' terms, and it should not now fonn the basis for any affIrmative relief.
Finally, the Robertsons elected their remedies WIder Idaho Code § 48-608(1) when they
chose to "neat" the Employment Contracts as "voidableu within a few days after they received
KLe's first demand for its share of the forfeited earnest money. Under the plain wording of that
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statute, that was enough and they have no additional right to claim even nominal damages \Ulder
the ICPA.
F.

The Judgment Should Not Be "Amended" to Allow Additional Relief on Causes of
Action That Were Neither Pled nor Tried.

The Robertsons' argument that the Court may unilaterally keep this controversy open
after the verdict so they may seek additional claims for relief is not supported by any relevant
authority. Although Idaho Code § 48-608(1) may give the Court the ability to grant such relief,
the fact remains that the Robertsons did not seek any relief under the IepA that was not tried and
decided by the jury. In the absence of the parties' mutual agreement that claims which were not
disclosed in the pleadings were nevertheless fairly tried, the Robertsons cannot now go back,
review the evidence at their leisure and cultivate new causes of action. MK Transp., Inc. v.

Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980).
II. CONCLUSION
A new trial, at least, is recommended by the faulty Instructions given to the jury both

before and at the conclusion of after trial. Allowing the Robertsons' counsel to cross-ex2unine
KLC's witnesses about events that had nothing to do with the matters actually brought to trial,
and about statutes that the Court had already determined had no relevance to the contracts
between KLC and the Robertsons are additional grounds for a new trial. But what stands out in
the record is the refusal of the Court to follow up on what it had already ruled on in cOMection
with evidentiary objections and to instruct the jury that the Employment Contracts are
unambiguous and should not be interpreted by reference to anything other than their plain
language. Instead. Mr. Robertson was allowed to tell the jury what he privately believed
"forfeited'l meant, all without any factual basis. That error was amplified when Ms. Crane was
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allowed to offer her own opinion-and it was nothing more than that-about how the
MidAmerican land purchase contract operated.
The critical language in the Employment Contracts is simply that monies paid on account
of the purchase ofland by a prospective purchaser should be shared equally by the Robertsons
and KLC if they are "forfeited," As the Court observed~ such a forfeiture is simply "an
unequivocal surrender of any claim or interest in uncontroverted sum." (Trial Tr. 416: 18-23;
Geston Supp. Aff. Ex. H,) There is no rule of grammar or anything in the Employment
Contracts to obscure that plain meaning and justifY the Robertsons engrafting an additional
requirement that some other independent contract first be ·'breachedn before any "forfeiture" can
occur.
The Robertsons claim that it is not enough for a purchaser who is backing out of a land
purchase contract to lose all interest in and benefit of the earnest money it paid, before that
money can be deemed forfeited under the tenns of the Employment Contracts. Instead, they add
a moral gloss to the tenn, requiring that the purchaser losing any right to or benefit from its
money also have committed some unspecified wrong in the perfonnance of his own land
purchase contract-a contract, it must be repeated, is necessarily entirely separate from the
Employment Contracts and which would not have even been imagined, let alone written and
executed, when the Employment Contracts were signed between the parties to this lawsuit. To
the Robertsons' conception, the very fact that such a land purchase contract anticipated and
determined that the consequence of a failure to close should be a loss of any right to Or interest in
monies previously paid for that land, perversely means that the contract was not "breached" of
all, and that-now relying solely on Mr. Robertson's subjective feeling about what the word
"forfeited" as it appeared in the Employment Contracts meant-KLC was therefore entitled to
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nothing for all its work but the Robertsons would gain another quarter million dollars because of
it. The argument is illogical and must not obscure the admitted facts in evidence, all of which

show a deliberate breach of the Employment Contracts.
DATED: Augustrl,2009.
STOEL RIVES J..l.P

~.d~-=-

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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STATE OF IDAHO )
: SS.

County of Ada

)

MARK. S. GESTON, being fIrst duly sworn, deposes and says:
I.

I am an attorney with the law fmn ofStoel Rives LLP, counsel of record for

Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants, and as such have personal knowledge of the matters set
forth herein,
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Pages 434 to 437,

inclusive, ofthe Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial (Expedited) (herein "Trial Transcript"),
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Pages 454 to 457.

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Pages 490 to 497,

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of Pages 506 to 509,

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of Pages 526 to 533,

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of Pages 538 to 541,

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of Pages 238 to 241,

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of Pages 414 to 417.

inclusive, of the Trial Transcript.
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Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of Pages 474 to 477.

inclusive) of the Trial Transcript.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of Pages 482 to 485,

inclusive, of the Tria) Transcript.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of Pages 407 to 409,

incluSive, of the Trial Transcript.

FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.

Mark S. Oeston
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

J!L day of August, 2009.

N~

My Commission Expires /,;), ·151· W 1:S .

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFI
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW
TRIAL, OR~ IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDIN(~ THE
VERDICT .. 3
'" II 0
Boise 222679.10010908-0oo08
w

."

II

08/18/2009 16:00 FAX

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on August-4, 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT,
FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT on the following,

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise.IO 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980
Email: derekpica@msh.com
Attorney for Defendants

in the matter indicated below:

[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile

[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ",Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Robert T. Wetherell

BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
p, O. Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009
Facsimile: (208) 344·7077
Email: rtw@bI'Qssey.nef
Attorneys for Defendants

[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ .y'Via Hand Delivery
[ ] ViaEmail

Mark S, Geston
JeJUlifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFI
TIDRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR A NJ~W
TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT .. 4
tIJ I I ~

Boise·222679. J 0010908-00008

005/005

EXHIBIT A
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR
A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD

1

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

2

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

3
4

RECEIVED
5

KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho Corporation,

JUL l12009
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6
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) Case No. CV-2008-682
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8
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Defendants.
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14
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JOHN KNIPE, an
individual,
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16

Third-Party Defendant. )

17

-------------------------)

18

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
(EXPEDITED)

19

20

PRESIDING JUDGE:

THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER

21
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2009
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Page
(Plaintiffis Exhibit 43 moved for
admission.)
MR. WETHERELL: I object, Your Honor, as
irrelevant.
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, the relevant portion
that we wish to discuss is on page 11.
THE COURT: Page 11?
MR. GESTON: 11, yes. If the court wishes I
could just - we and counsel could just come up and I
can show you exactly what I had in mind.
THE COURT: (Nodding affirmatively.)
Okay. Can't you just take - pluck out
page 11 then? We don't need all the balance of it?
Mark that 43. All right.
(Bench conference.)
MR. WETHERELL: Lack of foundation, judge.
THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained.
(Admission of Exhibit 43 into evidence
denied.)
MR. GESTON: In that event, Your Honor, we
rest.
THE COURT: Plaintiff rests.
Mr. Wetherell.
MR. WETHERELL: Would you like to hear some
motions now, judge, or should reserve that and

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)

(9)
(10)
(11 )
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
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begin?
THE COURT: Why don't we just get going and
we'll take it up when we recess for the morning. How
about that?
MR. WETHERELL: Okay. I'm making the motion
now, Your Honor, and I would like to argue it when we
have our next recess.
THE COURT: Very well.
MR. WETHERELL: We would call Richard
Robertson.
THE COURT: Sir, if you'll come forward and
raise your right hand and be sworn, please.

(1 )
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11 )
(12)

RICHARD ROBERTSON,
Having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:

(14)
(15)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

(17)

(20)

a.

(22)
(23)

A.

(24)

a.

(25)

(2)

A.

(3)

Q.

(4)

A.

(5) Q.
(6)

A.

(7) Q.
(8)

(9)

A.

(10)

Q.

(11)

A.

(12) Q.
(13)
(14)

A.

(15)

Q.

(16)
(17)

A.

(18)
(19)
(20)

Q.

(21)

(22)
(23)

A.

(24)
(25)

(l)Q.
(2)
(3)

A.

(4) Q.
(5)

A.

(6) Q.
(7)

A.

(8) Q.
(9)
(10)
(11)

A.

(12) Q.

(14)
(15)

A.

(17)
(18)

(18)
(19)

(21)

(1)

(16)

(16)

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Good morning, Richard. Could you state
your name, spell your last.
Richard Robertson, R-o-b-e-r-t-s-o-n.
I'd like to have you explain to the jury
a little bit of your background. Where were you

CV-2008-682
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(13)

(13)

AL

(19) Q.
(20)

A.

(21) Q.
(22)
(23)

A.

(24) Q.
(25)

A.

born?
I was born in Coalinga, California.
What year?
1935.
And how old are you then?
I'm 73.
And where did you - well did you
graduate from high school?
No, I did not.
How far did you go with your schooling?
I didn't quite complete the tenth grade.
And after that can you tell us what you
did for employment?
I went to work.
Okay. And what did you go to work
doing?
Oh, everything from farm work to working
in service stations to working for a manufacturing
company.
And can you tell us from that time, from
the time that you got halfway through 10th grade,
where are the different places you've lived?
Well, we moved from California - well,
actually, we lived in Coalinga then we moved to
Fresno, California.

Page 437
You said "we," so let's go ahead and ask
that.
WellAre you married?
- my family.
Your family did?
Yeah.
When you get to the point where you met
Johnnie, will you stop me and we will talk about
that? Can you do that?
Yes.
Okay. So tell me what you did after the
tenth grade.
What other places you've lived, right up
to the time you met Johnnie.
Okay. From Coalinga to Fresno,
California. From Fresno, California - in Fresno, I
met Johnnie. She wasWhat year was that?
1952.
And are you - how long have you been
married to Johnnie?
In two days it will be 54 years.
And do you have any children?
Yes, I got three boys and a girl.
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Page 454
closing on that deal?
A. No.
Q. Did they breach their contract?
A. No.
MR. GESTON: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. Was there a forfeiture of any monies as a
result of the Harmon transaction?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. They didn't break the contract in any
way. They had a contingency to where they could get
out of the contract.
Q. Now, you signed a document talking about
a forfeiture. Do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. What's a forfeiture?
A. It's a breach of contract.
Q. Okay. And why do you say that? Where do
you get that?
A. It - I've always felt that a forfeit was
breaking the contract in some way.
Q. Have you read any books that would change
your opinion about what a forfeiture is?

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
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(1)

A.

(2)

MR. GESTON: Your Honor, I'll object to this.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. Did anybody ever mention to you prior to
February 19 of 2007 that the Knipe Land Company
letter, that half of the $35,000 from the Harmon deal
was going to be declared forfeited by your broker and
that they were entitled to half of it?
A. No. No.
Q. Excuse me. I'm going to have to do that
again.
February 19 of 2008. Prior to the Knipe
letter of February 19, 2008, did anybody either in
writing or verbally mention to you that your own
broker was going to declare that money forfeit and
claim half of it?
A. No.
Q. So what happened next?
A. I got a letter from Knipe Land.
Q. Okay. Now I want to go to the MidAmerica
deal?
A. Oh.
Q. The Harmon deal is over. All right?
A. Okay.

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

No.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
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Q. Okay. Then were you approached about
signing a new employment contract with Knipe Land an
Rowena?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was presented to you; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that changed it a little bit, because
it's my understanding that now you're going to sell
the whole operation?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you executed that document?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. After you executed that document
what happened next?
A. Clarify that for me again.
Q. Well, now you've just signed the second
contract, employment contract, to sell the entire
operation, both your personal property and the ranch
property.
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. What happened next?
A. Of course they done good job on
advertisement and everything and they brought in
MidAmerica.
Q. Okay. And now that's my question. Did
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the Knipe Land Company do a good job for you?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. And at this point A. Rowena was very thorough.
Q. She was very thorough, very good?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And by this time now the Harmon
deal is over and we're just starting into the
MidAmerica deal. How good of friends did you become
with Rowena?
A. Well, I think we was friends all the way
through.
Q. Did she start visiting the ranch more?
A. Oh, yes. She would bring her husband out
in the evening time and we would visit and ...
Q. Did you have dinners together?
A. No, we never had dinner together, no.
Q. Did you go fishing with them or just
showA. No, but I give her permission to go
fishing, yes.
Q. Do you think she would have caught a fish
if you would have taken her fishing?
A. Oh, I'm sure of that.
Q. Okay.
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A.

(1)
(2)

Yes.
And you sell them?
How much would a pup from a champion
(3)
(4)
line, or a sire and a dam that showed well in
(5)
competition, how much would a puppy you might sell
(6)
cost in 2006, 2007?
750
is our average price.
(7) A.
(8) Q.
Do you also have commercial - do you
(9)
also open your land for guided hunts, bird hunting?
(10) A.
Not guided hunts, but trespass leases.
(11) Q.
Pardon me?
Trespass leases.
(12) A.
(13) Q.
What's that?
(14) A.
To where a guy pays for access to come
onto your property and to hunt.
(15)
(16) Q.
How much does that cost?
(17) A.
It varies. If they - you know, normally
(18)
it's about $350 a day per gun.
(19) Q.
Per hunter?
Per hunter, yeah.
(20) A.
(21) Q. So say - and again, you know, times are
(22)
rough right now for everybody, but I'm looking back
to 2006 and 2007. So about how many of these hunts
(23)
did you have over the bird season, or over the year?
(24)
Oh, well, we don't do it yearly, we only
(25) A.
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do it from first of October to the end of the season,
which sometimes it ends December 31 and sometimes (2)
(3) Q. Sure.
- it ends January 15. But we never book
(4) A.
anything after the first of the year, so it's always
(5)
between first of October and into the - December.
(6)
(7) Q. So during though years how many hunters
ballpark do you think (8)
Usually we have about five parties that
(9) A.
will come on and hunt.
(10)
(11) Q. Now is that $350 per hunter?
(12) A. Yes.
Per day?
(13) Q.
(14) A. Yes.
How long is an average hunt?
(15) Q.
(16) A. Well, they can hunt, you know, as many
hours as they want to hunt.
(17)
Do you have clients that come out or did
(18) Q.
you
have clients that came out and spent a week?
(19)
No.
(20) A.
(21) Q. Couple days?
Probably the longest group we ever had in
(22) A.
would be probably four days maybe. We used to have a
(23)
group
that would do five days.
(24)
(25) Q. Was that during the 2006-2007 period or
(1 )

CV-2008-682
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(2) Q.

(1)

AL

A.

(3) Q.
(4)

A.

(5) Q.
(6)
(7)

A.

(8) Q.
(9)
(10)

A.

(11) Q.
(12)
(13)
(14)

A.

(15) Q.
(16)

A.

(17) Q.
(18)

A.

(19) Q.
(20)
(21)

A.

(22)
(23) Q.
(24)
(25)

A.

before?
Right in that area, yeah.
You mentioned a trespass lease?
Yeah.
I hate to sound ignorant, but what is
that again?
To give access to your property.
Okay. So that's when a hunting group
comes, and do you have a signed contract for that?
No, we don't sign a contract.
Do you send the hunters any written
documentation to, you know, formalize the terms of
them coming onto your land and hunting birds?
We - we do have a - a liability form.
Is that a contract?
Yeah, form to sign.
Okay. Who wrote it?
Derek Pica.
What's the point of a liability
contract?
Releasing liability to us while they're
on the property.
So and you have the hunters sign this
contract?
Yes.
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And I'm - tell me what it provides.
A. What's that?
Q. Does it provides for a hunter agreeing
with you that if he has an accident or hurts himself
he's not going to sue you for some dangerous
condition?
A. That's correct.
Q. Does it provide for anything else?
A. No.
Q. Ever have a hunter break that contract
and sue you anyway?
A. No.
Q. They always lived up to their end of the
contract?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Robertson, you've bought ahd sold
real property before you bought the ranch we're about
today, haven't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've also bought and sold both
residential and commercial property; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you signed contracts in those
transactions?
A. Yes.

(1) Q.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11 )
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
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(1) Q. Have you lived up to your end of those
(2)
contracts?
(3) A. Yes.
(4) Q. Have the people you - and of course
leaving aside our present controversy - have the
(5)
(6)
people you signed the contracts with lived up to
their end?
(7)
(8) A.
Yes.
(9) Q. Do you expect that if a contract is
(10)
written in plain English that the other side should
(11)
just live up to that?
(12) A. Well. if it's a legal contract and both
(13)
parties sign. I think they should live up to it,
(14)
yes.
(15) Q. Has that always been your rule?
(16) A. Yes.
(17) Q. All right. Do you try to - do you read
(18)
your contracts before you sign them?
(19) A.
Yes.
(20) Q. Did you read the employment contracts
(21)
that we're talking about in this case before (22) A.
Yes.
(23) Q.
- you signed them?
(24)
Did you have any question about the
(25)
meaning of any words in this contract?

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
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No.
Q. Now, we're talking - at this contract
we're talking about listing agreements, the
employment contracts signed in 2005. and the
employment contract with my client in 2007. You read
both contracts carefully, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't have any question about the
meaning of any of the words in that, in either
contract. did you?
A. No.
Q. Did you tell anybody connected with Knipe
Land that - what you thought the word "forfeiture"
meant?
A. No.
Q. The definition of "forfeiture" that you
discussed with your attorney, is that based on
anything other than your feeling?
A. Rephrase that.
Q. Is it based on anything other than just
what- how you feel?
Yes.
A.
Q. Is it based on somebody defining
something or a particular experience that we should
talk about?

(1)

(2) Q.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

A.

(9) Q.
(10)
(11)

A.

(12)

Q.

(13)
(14)

A.

(15)

Q.

(16)
(17)

A.

(18)
(19) Q.
(20)
(21)

A.

(22) Q.
(23)
(24)
(25)

A.

;:;J. 7

A.

(1)
(2)

A.

(3)
(4) Q.
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

A.

(9)

Q.

(10)

A.

(ll)Q.
(12)
(13)

A.

(14)
(15)

Q.

(16)
(17)
(18)

A.

(19)
(20) Q.
(21)
(22)
(23)

A.

(24)

Q.

(25)

aJ
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It's just what I thought it meant.
Let's just look at that language just a
little bit more that's in the employment contracts.
We've been over that a lot. And it's. "should a
deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be
forfeited. one-half thereon may be retained by you"
- you understood "you" to be my client; right?
Yes.
"And one half the balance" - the other
half - "would be paid to me."
Right.
"Me" being you and your wife and the
company?
Right.
And that was - you read that in both
contracts?
Yeah. But then it goes on, I believe, to
say, shall not exceed the commission.
All right. And that - yes, it does, it
says that.
Yep.
All right. Do you think - all right.
Now, let's just step back a moment.
The Harmons paid $50.000. Okay? Do you
think that was a deposit or amount paid on account of
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the purchase of the land?
Yes, it was a deposit towards the
purchase of the property. yes.
All right. I'll ask the same question
about the $450,000 MidAmerican paid. Was that a
deposit or amount paid on account of the purchase of
your land?
Well. there was more to it with No, no.
- MidAmerica.
Well, please just answer yes or no. Was
it or wasn't it?
The money would be taken off the purchase
price of the property.
Okay. So you'd agree with me that it was
a deposit or amount paid on account of purchase of
the land?
Except that the main reason it was given
was for due diligence.
Just - we'll get to that. Are you
saying it wasn't deposited or paid on account of
purchase of your land? That's all I'm asking.
Yes, it was.
All right. And if the sale had gone
through, that money would have been part of the
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(1)

A.

(2) Q.
(3)
(4)
(5)

A.

(6)

(7)
(8)
(9) Q.
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

A.

(14) Q.
(15)

A.

(16) Q.
(17)
(18)

A.

(19) Q.
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

A.

(1) Q.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

A.

(6) Q.
(7)

A.

(8) Q.
(9)
(10)

A.

(11) Q.
(12)

A.

(13) Q.
(14)

A.

(15) Q.
(16)
(17)
(18)

A.

(19) Q.
(20)
(21)

A.

(22) Q.
(23)
(24)
(25)

A.

Yeah.
- and I'm just trying to find out why
you made your choice. That's what we're talking
about when you began your discussion here.
The reason we made that choice was where
we could stay there to give us time to where we could
look for the type of property it takes to run this
kind of business.
All right. So then your one of factors
on why you chose the period of time or the contract
with the more money but the larger lead time was
because you could stay there for three years.
In this contract Yes.
-yes.
So it was a three-year lead time that was
appealing to you, not ten years?
Right.
I just wanted to clarify.
And also the fact that you'd make - that
the longer period-of-time contract that MidAmerica
offered would bring you a third again more money, and
here we are talking about very large amounts, that
was an important factor, too, wasn't it?
Absolutely.
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Were you aware that the offer you
accepted gave MidAmerican more time to reconsider its
position and pull out if it wanted to than the other
offer?
Yes.
So you were aware of that risk?
Yes.
Did Knipe Land discuss that with you,
Mr. Knipe?
No.
He did not?
No.
But your aware of it all by yourself?
Yes.
Did you have other consultants helping
you in your decision on what to do about this
MidAmerican No.
Didn't have an accountant or lawyer or
anybody?
I had a lawyer look at the contracts.
When you were discussing the contract and you negotiated the contract with MidAmerican;
right?
Yes.
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This was between you and MidAmerican,
(2)
right, for the sale of your land to it, in fact, that
(3)
was the point of this agreement?
(4) A. Yes.
(5) Q. There wasn't any discussion between you
(6)
and MidAmerican about how your agreement with it was
(7)
going to affect your listing contract the years
before with Knipe Land Company, was there?
(8)
(9) A. No.
(10) Q. There wasn't any discussion during the
(11)
negotiations for this transaction with Mr. Knipe
(12)
about how it was going to affect your listing
(13)
contracts with Knipe Land Company, was there?
(14) A. No.
(15) Q. You didn't tell anybody that you thought
(16)
if MidAmerican backed out, that that really - and
(17)
lost any claim to its money, that that in your mind
(18)
was not going to be a forfeiture under the terms of
(19)
the listing agreement. You didn't discuss that with
(20)
anybody, did you?
(21) A. No.
(22) Q. When MidAmerican did terminate,
(23)
Mr. Robertson, this agreement gave you a choice of
(24)
three things to do, didn't it? And the three - I'm
(25)
talking all together, because they're all basically
(1) Q.

(1)
(2)
(3)

A.

(4) Q.
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

A.

(9) Q.
(10)
(11)

A.

(12) Q.
(13)
(14)

A.

(15) Q.
(16)

A.

(17) Q.
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)

A.

(24) Q.
(25)
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the same, aren't they, the wording is the same on the
October agreements?
On what now?
I'm sorry, I'm getting a little ahead of
myself.
All three of the October sales agreements
with MidAmerican are the same provisions; right?
Yes.
They just - the single transaction
looked at different parcels of property.
Yes.
And you asked for it to be divided up
that way?
Yes.
For your tax planning?
Yes.
All right. These October agreements in
Paragraph 16 anticipate MidAmerica changing its mind
and not going through with the deal, didn't they?
Maybe you could look at that paragraph tell me what exhibit you're looking at so we're
a/l29.
29, now is that the September agreement?
MR. WETHERELL: October.
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A.

(2) Q.
(3)

A.

(4) Q.
(5)
(6)

A.

(7)
(8) Q.
(9)
(10)

A.

(11) Q.
(12)
(13)

A.

(14)
(15) Q.
(16)

A.

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25) Q.

(1)
(2)

A.

(3)
(4)
(5) Q.
(6)
(7)

A.

(8) Q.
(9)
(10)

A.

(11 )
(12) Q.
(13)
(14)
(15)

A.

(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
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Borah High School in Boise.
Go Lions?
Absolutely.
Okay. And then where did you - did you
go to college?
I took college courses at Boise State
University.
And then ultimately did you take a job
with MidAmerican?
Yes,l did.
And when did you start working for
MidAmerican?
The nuclear business or the holding
company?
What is MidAmerican?
MidAmerican Energy Holding Company is a
holding company that will owns several energy
businesses. They own PacifiCorp, which is a
regulated utility headquartered in Portland, Oregon.
They own MidAmerican Energy Company, which is a
regulated utility that is headquartered in
Des Moines, Iowa. And they also owned MidAmerican
Nuclear Energy Company, and they have other
business.
And then what's the - who was my client
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dealing with in this transaction?
Initially when the transaction started I
was conducting business as an employee of PacifiCorp
for the MidAmerican Energy Holding Company.
Okay. Now, is this a
multi-million-dollar operation you're working for?
Yes, it is, sir.
What is your title with this
organization?
My current title is president of
Interwest Mining Company.
And in two - well, when you were
negotiated with my client Richard, what was your
title?
At the beginning of the negotiations,
sir, I was the managing director of strategy for
PacifiCorp's Energy Division, and at the conclusion
of our contractual relationship I was the vice
president of business development for MidAmerican
Nuclear Energy Company.
Were you the point woman for MidAmerica
in this transaction with Richard?
Yes, I was.
And did you have an opportunity to meet
with Mr. Knipe?
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(4)
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(7)
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(10)
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(12)
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(13) Q.
(14)
(15)
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(16) Q.
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(19)
(20)
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(21) Q.
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I did.
Q. And did you have the opportunity to meet
with Ms. Rowena Strain?
A. I did.
Q. And did you have an opportunity to meet
with Johnnie Richardson (sic)?
A. Yes, I did, sir.
Q. Did you have an opportunity to meet with
Richard Richardson?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And was that all in conjunction with
negotiating the purchase of the ranch property that
Mr. Richardson owned?
A. That is correct.
Q. All right. Did you ultimately enter into
a contract with him for the purchase of his ranch?
A. Yes,l did.
Q. Okay. And you did that on behalf of
MidAmerica; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. All right. Could you look - well, since
it's right on everybody's mind, could you look at
Exhibit 29.
I have associate by the name of
Richardson and he is been here, so it's Robertson.

(3) Q.

(5)
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You understand that?
Yes.
Don't - correct me when I make
mistakes.
All right, no problem.
Can you look at Paragraph 16 of
Exhibit 29.
Okay. Seller's remedies?
Seller's remedies. Do you see that?
Uh-huh.
Okay. And that's a yes?
Yes.
All right. And you entered into a
contract that has certain contingencies; correct?
That is correct.
All right. Now, look at Paragraph 16.
And it says, quote, "if the seller accepts the offer
contained in this agreement." Do you see that first
line?
I do.
And then it says, "and buyer" - which
would be MidAmerican; correct?
That would be correct.
"Refuses or neglects to consummate the
transaction." Did MidAmerica refuse or neglect to

KNIPEL
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(3) Q.
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consummate this transaction?
No, we did not.
And why do you say that? Tell the jury
why you did not refuse or neglect to consummate this
transaction.
The contract was structured to provide us
a due diligence window of time in which we had the
right to terminate. And we exercised that right to
terminate during that period.
All right. And do you have lawyers that
work for your company?
Plenty.
So you have plenty of lawyers that work
for your company. And you drafted this - your
lawyer dra.fted this contract; correct?
That is correct.
In the transaction we are here about
today, does this paragraph even come into play?
Not as far as MR. GESTON: Objection, Your Honor.
THE WITNESS: - we're concerned, your honor
- or sir.
MR. GESTON: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
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Well, let's go on. You say MidAmerica
never refused or neglected to do anything; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. Now let's go back down to what the
remedies for the seller. Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. Did my client, Mr. Robertson or Johnnie
or anybody associated with my client, quote - well,
declare a forfeiture?
A. No, they did not.
Q. Now, there has been testimony that there
were three payments made by MidAmerica of $150,000.
Is that your understanding?
A. I need to understand the court's position
on our confidentiality agreement, sir.
Q. We can't talk about your big numbers, but
we can talk about the earnest money. Okay.
A. Could you scoot over for me for just a
quick second so I can see my counsel, sir?
Q. You brought your lawyer with you, didn't
you? Okay. So you're lawyer's in the courtroom;
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. So you're being watched by the
jury and your lawyer -

(1) Q.
(2)
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(Nodding affirmatively.)
(2) Q. - and - okay. So careful when you
(3)
answer the question. All right?
(4)
So there were three payments of $150,000
(5)
each; correct?
(6) A. That is correct.
(7) Q. What was that money paid for?
(8) A. That was nonrefundable earnest money that
(9)
we paid to get immediate and unfettered access to the
(10)
property, and so that we could perform nuclear plant
(11)
due diligence activities that are quite intrusive in
(12)
a very short period of time.
(13) Q. I'm going to represent to you that there
(14)
has been testimony by one of the real estate
(15)
professionals in this case that that money was not
(16)
paid for access to the property. You said you knew
(17)
Ms. Strain?
(18) A. I don't know her, sir, but I did meet
(19)
her.
(20) Q. Okay. You did meet her. Did you discuss
(21)
with her at all what this $150,000 was for?
(22) A. I never had any direct or any separate
(23)
discussions with her, sir.
(24) Q. Okay. In any event, you're representing
(25)
the company that's paying this money, and you paid it
(1)

A.
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for access to the property; is that correct?
(2) A. That is correct.
(3) Q.
I do have to ask you this question.
(4)
Being from Washington, you understand
(5)
there is no subpoena power that I have or this court
(6)
has over you; correct?
(7) A. I understand that.
(8) Q. Okay. And you have voluntarily on your
(9)
own dime flown to Boise, driven to Payette, and
(10)
appeared here to testify to these people today; is
(11)
that correct?
(12) A. I was asked if I would be able to and my
(13)
schedule permitted, and so I had other business in
(14)
Boise and made the trip.
(15) Q. Okay. So you made arrangements to do
(16)
other work while you're here?
(17) A. Yes, I did. I met Idaho Power on other
(18)
matters.
(19) Q. Okay. But you're here voluntarily, you
(20)
haven't been subpoenaed?
(21) A. That is correct.
(22) Q. And I guess what I'm getting to, I didn't
(23)
buy your plane ticket to be here, did I?
(24) A. No.
(25) Q. Okay. And there is no agreement that
(1)
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I believe it referred to the, period after
the due diligence period ended, up until the close.
But didn't the due diligence period go
right up to the close?
No, sir, it did not.
What intervened?
I'm sorry, sir?
What intervened? What was to happen
between MidAmerican's ability to be on the land and
the actual closing?
There was a due diligence period that was
defined by the contract. The closing period was a
12-month closing window.
So you had any time within a year to
actually pay the full purchase price and receive a
deed?
That is correct.
Could you just show me where that date is
it provided in that contract.
Are we looking at - on page 3,
Paragraph 6, it says closing date, September 23,
2008?
That's correct.
So if we'd gotten to that, if we had
gotten to that closing date and MidAmerican said it's

Page 539
happy with the land, here is a check for the
remainder of the purchase price deducting the
$450,000, give us a deed; right?
Yes.
And that would have consummated the
agreement?
Correct.
And that's consistent if you look let's see, on page 2, paragraph - well, 3-C, see at
the top it says final earnest money?
Do you see that?
It's right above Yes.
- numbered paragraph you see where D it
says, final earnest money, and the last sentence of
that paragraph says, if the transaction contemplated
herein is consummated in accordance did the term of
the agreement, the final earnest money shall be
applied to the purchase price at closing. So the
closing would be the consummation of this contract.
Correct.
But MidAmerica said, we're terminating
the contract; is that correct?
We had the right to do that during the
due diligence period.
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Q. So you didn't have to consummate the
contract?
A. Not during the due diligence period.
Q. Well, you said - your letter to the
Robertsons said, we terminate the contract, and
MidAmerica had no further efforts to buy that - or
no further agreement to buy that property; is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And MidAmerican forfeited it's $450,000,
didn't it?
A. We did not forfeited that. We paid that
as nonrefundable up front as part of our access to
the property.
Q. Where does it say that in the agreement?
A. It's listed as nonrefundable Q. Okay.
A. - earnest money.
Q. Okay. I was talking about the rest of
your statement. Nonrefundable for access to the
property, where does it say that?
A. It's defined as earnest money in the
contract.
Q. Okay. I know that, I'm just saying - I
was trying to follow up on the rest of your

Page 541
description. You said for access to the property.
Where does it say that?
A. It doesn't define that in the contract.
Q. So it doesn't say it in the contract.
Does it?
A. It does not define that in the contract,
sir.
Q. It doesn't even say anything like that in
the contract, does it?
A. It does not say "access" in the contract,
sir.
Q. There is nothing that directly relates
the payment of the earnest money, the $150,000
payments that were made by MidAmerican, specifically
to access to the property. There is nothing like
that in that agreement, is there?
A. Not in the contract, no, sir.
Q. And there is not anything like that in
any of the other three contracts MidAmerica signed,
is there?
A. No, sir. They are all identical with the
exception of which property and the amounts.
Q. MidAmerica never - when MidAmerica
terminated the agreement, it had no more intention of
- well, consummating the contract, did it?
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That was written February 24, 2006.
Q. February 24, 2000-what?
A. '6.
Q. 2006.
Now, would it - if Richard received that
check for $25,000 nonrefundable earnest money and
neither you nor Knipe claimed a dime of it, wouldn't
he think that that was nonrefundable earnest money
and not forfeited money?
A. He signedMR. GESTON: Objection, Your Honor, calls for
speculation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. What's the definition of a forfeiture,
ma'am, do you know?
A. No.
Forfeited Q. Now, wait a minute. This is a term you
had my client sign?
A. Okay. Forfeited means the money - it's
just common language, it means that when you forfeit
something it is no longer to benefit you, it is money
that is gone, you cannot recoup it. It's gone
forever.

A.

(1) Q.
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A.
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Nonrefundable earnest money is gone
forever, isn't it, unless the sale goes through?
Gone from the - from the potential
buyer, it is gone.
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, upon the apprehension
that we may be referring to a treatise here going to
the dictionary, I'll object. There is no implication
of ambiguity in the wording here.
THE COURT: Well, I'll have to see.
MR. WETHERELL: I haven't asked my question
yet, judge.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
All right. You said the plain and
ordinary term - forfeiture is a plain and ordinary
term; correct?
It's if - I shouldn't say plain and
ordinary. It's a terminology that we - that we have
quite often that the - most of us are familiar with
it. I would say the average person is very familiar
with forfeit.
Okay. Would you agree with me you could
look at a dictionary - if I was looking for a
definition of a plain and ordinary term, I didn't
know quite what it was,l could look in the American
Heritage Dictionary?
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MR. GESTON: 1'/1 renew the objection, Your
Honor. I can see where he's going.
THE COURT: Yeah, there is a plain and clear
meaning of forfeiture, this is argumentative.
Sustained
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. I'm going to - if I was to read you a
definition, number one definition of forfeiture,
something surrendered and MR. GESTON: Your Honor, I think I just
objected and that was sustained.
THE COURT: I'll sustain it. Maybe
Mr. Wetherell can call his own witnesses about their
understanding.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. You had my client sign this agreement;
correct?
A. Your client is a very expertise
businessman. He - he readTHE COURT: Ms. Strain, please.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. Did you have my client sign this
agreement?
A. I did not have him. Your client elected
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to sign the agreement.
Q. Okay. Anywhere in that agreement does
the contract define "forfeiture" for him?
A. No, itQ. It doesn't?
A. No, it doesn't.
Q. Now we're here over $300,000, and the
term you're using is forfeiture and it's not defined
in that contract; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. So explain to me again why, in
2006, you guys didn't declare that $25,000 forfeited
and split it with him, as opposed to writing him a
check for the whole thing?
A. When we wrote the check it was not - at
that time there was still a pending sale, and that
money would have been released to him as
nonrefundable moneys.
Q. Well, now, once again, you're a licensed
real estate agent; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And if two or more people are entitled to
money and it's in a trust account, do you know what's
supposed to happen to it?
A. In a - in a trust account?
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(2)

OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:
THE COURT: Please be seated.
We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel
and parties are present.
Counsel?
MR. WETHERELL: Excuse me, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Somebody want to take something
up?
MR. WETHERELL: Oh, yes, Your Honor, I had an
offer of proof on using the dictionary, because this
is the last witness of the plaintiff's case in chief,
and I just wanted to say that both Rowena testified
that you use the plain and ordinary meaning of the
term. It's my understanding - welf, the law is if
it has a set legal meaning you're supposed to go with
the set legal meaning.
Welf, I can't find Idaho case that has a
set legal meaning for forfeiture. The closest one I
could find was that opinion of Judge Mitchelf where
Judge Mitchelf had this very contract in front of him
and the defense argued that - the defense argued
that it wasn't enforceable and what Judge Mitchelf
ruled was that as matter of law that since there was

Page 415
no breach of contract there couldn't be a forfeiture,
and therefore this provision that we're talking about
here didn't apply. That's the closest thing I find
that's a set legal meaning.
And then it's my understanding under the
law that if it isn't defined in the contract, there
is not a set legal meaning, you would go to plain and
ordinary meaning. And, of course, it's our position
the plain and ordinary meaning would come right out
of the dictionary, so I have the American Heritage
Dictionary where it would define forfeiture Judge, I ended up in the emergency room
last night because of this eye and I'm having a hard
time reading today. I kind of look like Popeye.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay.
The American Heritage, if I was alfowed
to I would have the witnesses testify the very first
definition is, quote, "something surrendered as
punishment for an offense or breach of contract."
And then Webster's plain and ordinary
meaning of the term is the very first one,
forfeiture, from Webster's Handy Cof/egiate
Dictionary, is a deposit - a posit hostage or agreed
penalty surrendered through neglect default! a crime,
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error, et cetera. And that's what I would use,
judge.
And I don't want to do it with Mr. Knipe
if the court's going to stay with its ruling, so I
wanted to make that offer of proof at this time.
THE COURT: Mr. Geston.
MR. GESTON: Welf, Your Honor, I think the
court's decision is correct. I mean, the very
argument itself shows that we don't need a
dictionary. Counsel says let's refer to a treatise
for a plainly and ordinary meaning of a word. Welf,
if the jury can't - doesn't know the plain and
ordinary meaning of a particular word, it's not a
plain and ordinary word. So that's the jury's
business and I think they can perfectly welf figure
out what the word "forfeiture" means in this
contract.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the
objection. I think forfeiture is - the
understanding of forfeiture and particularly in this
context is just an unequivocal surrender of any claim
or interest in controverted sum. So I think they
understand that.
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the
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objection. I think it would be time-wasting, I think
it would be a diversion of our juror and factfinder
for something that's easily comprehended by them.
I'm going to sustain it.
MR. WETHERELL: And then, judge, with that
ruling then I wiff not use this - I won't use this
at alf.
THE COURT: Just have him telf us what he
thinks it means, and then have your client telf us
what he thinks it means, because that's why we're
here.
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, judge.
THE COURT: Alf right. Thanks.
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:
THE COURT: Alf right. Please be seated.
We're again taking up 08-682. Counsel
and parties are present, jurors are present.
We're continuing with the
cross-examination of Mr. Knipe.
Sir, you wifl recalf you have been sworn
and are under oath.
Go ahead, sir.
MR. WETHERELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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My view of this case is that the reason
we are here is that it faJls between the legal
cracks. If it were that patently clear, I'm sure
sagacious counsel as we have in this case would have
found some way to avoid determining the resolution to
a jury.
So at this juncture I'm charged with
viewing the proofs in an evidence most favorable to
the nonmoving party. And we can dispatch a couple of
things that are raised in - what's it caJled
EJlsbury or - the New Jersey case.
MR. WETHERELL: EJlsworth Dobbs.
THE COURT: Right, EJlsworth Dobbs, and its
progener in that there is no inequality of bargaining
power here. I'm satisfied by the proofs that
although Mr. Robertson did not even complete the
tenth grade, he's obviously a man of vast
intefligence, and better yet he's shrewd. There is
just no showing that there is any inequality of
bargaining power. He resorted to authorities before
and consulted his personal authorities before he
entered into this transaction.
What drives what - in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, a showing can be
made that this was an incredibly unique piece of
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realty, that there was some showing that the sale may
take a extended period of time because of the
significance of the real property, it's beauty and
the extent of it.
In that case, the parties could have
we", and, in fact, in these two transactions, the
parties - it could have been within the
contemplation of the parties that there would be
actuaJly a technical forfeiture of the monies. And
in both of these he transactions the purchasers did
forfeit the money, that is, they made a voluntary and
unequivocal surrender to any claim or interest in the
controverted sums. There was a literal forfeiture.
And because of the extensive negotiations
involved, the parties could have contemplated that
there might be a case in which there was a
forfeiture. And even in the Lee Electric case my
good and scholarly friend Justice Burdick
contemplated that there may be some instance where
this is a factual ambiguity, and in such cases that's
a fact question that's left to the trier of fact.
And for those reasons and because of the
uniqueness of these particular facts, I think it
would be improvident for me to grant a motion for
directed verdict and/or summary judgment and the same
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wifl be denied again.
Let's see. Are we ready to continue?
And we were about to start Mr. Robertson's cross.
Anything else before we begin?
MR. GESTON: Not for the plaintiff, Your
Honor.
MR. WETHERELL: WeJl, judge, while we have
moment, I'JI just - we have that Consumer Protection
claim thatTHE COURT: Yep.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay.
THE COURT: You didn't submit any instructions
on it.
MR. WETHERELL: WeJl, and it wifJ - the way
you read that statute is it looks like it's an
equitable remedy the court imposes.
THE COURT: WeJl, as far as damages go.
MR. WETHERELL: Correct. I just - I was just
wondering how the court wanted - how the court
wanted to handle that.
THE COURT: Mr. Geston has got an idea.
MR. GESTON: WeJl, Your Honor, first of aJl I
don't think there's been any proof of it as the
court's THE COURT: WeJl, we aren't anywhere near done
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with this case.
MR. GESTON: WeJl, so far then. So far.
THE COURT: I told him yesterday to hold off
on that.
MR. GESTON: Sure.
THE COURT: That's going to get us aJl murky.
MR. GESTON: We don't have any instructions on
it as the judge has just observed, and I'm not so
sure - I mean, the problem is, is that the prime
right of action under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act is 48-608. That has hasn't received a lot of
treatment by the Supreme Court. There's the Noah
case and there is the Fenn - weJl, Noah versus Fenn
and I think one other. And that reaJly just said
about the measure of damages that there is that
$1,000 alternative to actual damages. That sounds
like a matter for a jury rather than an equitable
action. This is a statutory remedy.
THE COURT: WeJl, we can sort aJl that out
with a special verdict, but I understand. Goes from
nominal damages by showing just a violation up to
actual damages. So we wiJl just see what he can put
on, you know, and then we'JI take a look at it at the
end. If he hasn't made out a case I'm sure you'JI
point it out to me.
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what you think each of these individuals know. And
plaintiff refused. And that was never supplemented.
I have no idea what she's going to say, I have
nothing in the record, I had no reason to go depose
her or send her any inquiries.
THE COURT: Make is an offer of proof here,
Mr. Wetherell, while we were in recess and tell me
here what you think she can testify to.
MR. WETHERELL: She will testify that she was
present - first of all, she's senior vice president
of MidAmerica, she is the one that negotiated this
deal and dealt with the real estate agents involved
and with my client, and that the $150,000 payments
were paid for access to the property and she was
present when that was discussed and that's why they
paid that money. Oh, and that and that there was no
forfeiture. So those are the two areas THE COURT: I'm not going to let her make that
conclusion. How could she make that conclusion? She
doesn't know all - we", she could say it was my
intention to give up the money and forfeit, how is
she going to make the conclusion it wasn't
forfeited. That's why we're here.
MR. WETHERELL: She's just - she's going to
say I did not consider that money paid as a
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forfeiture, I paid that money for access to the
ranch. That's it.
THE COURT: Mr. Geston.
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, two things. First of
all we're to look at the substance I'm equally
puzzled as how she can even talk about such things.
But first thing I'd like to bring to the court's
attention, all this is news to me. I'm hearing it
now for the first time.
Now we identified her as a person we
thought to have knowledge, but we didn't know what it
was so we didn't ask for our interrogatories and
we're not going to ask to put her on. Now they tell
us, identifying her as a witness, the first time we
got her deSignation last week or within ten days, and
no supplementation of discovery, no response to our
request, and what do you think each of these people
know that is relevant to our controversy.
And yet the plaintiff's answer was, well,
you know, you go find out. Now I don't think that's
the way this discovery process should proceed.
MR. WETHERELL: It's exactly the way it
proceeds. It's our - this is a witness that we
don't control. There is no rule that requires us to
te" the other side what witnesses we have no control
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overTHE COURT: Okay.
MR. WETHERELL: - wifJ testify to.
THE COURT: Well, it's not a surprise to me
that she's going to testify, and I know a lot less
about it than either of you do. And, secondly, you
know, when we've got experienced counsel like this
and they see Ms. Crane knocking around the case, then
they can take whatever actions they want to take.
Second thing is that I'll permit her to
testify on the course of negotiations with
Mr. Robertson just to corroborate his testimony if
that's what it's being put on for, but I'm not going
to let her testify or give legal conclusions to this
jury about the ultimate fact in question, which is,
did MidAmerica forfeit money. All right?
MR. WETHERELL: I understand.
THE COURT: Let's take another five since we
took this long, tiJI 10:20 by the courtroom clock.
(Recess.)
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:
THE COURT: Please be seated.
We're again taking up 08-682.
And, Mr. Robertson, you're on the stand,
you will recall you have under oath and you have been
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sworn.
Our jurors are all present and seated
appropriately and counsel and parties are here.
Mr. Geston.

(5)

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GESTON:
(8) Q. Hello, Mr. Robertson.
(9) A. Hello.
(10) Q. I'd like to begin by going over one or
(11)
two of things you mentioned about your background
with the property yourself.
(12)
(13)
You said you purchased the property we've
(14)
been talking about in 1997?
(15) A. I believe it was December of '97 that we
(16)
done it.
(17) Q. Thereabouts?
(18) A. Yeah.
(19) Q. How much did you pay for it?
(20)
MR. WETHERELL: Objection, Your Honor,
(21)
irrelevant.
(22)
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, we've already gone
(23)
into (24)
THE COURT: Sustained.
(25)
BY MR. GESTON:
(6)
(7)
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he did back out of it?
I heard Rowena say that, yes.
Do you recall her saying that?
MR. GESTON: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Back out of what deal, counsel?
BY MR. WETHERELl:
Backed out of this listing of February
20, '08, that he could back out at any time and he
did. Do you remember her telling the jury that?
I remember her telling us that, yes.
Okay.
I'm not saying that I agree with it,
but Well, you don't agree with it because
you're suing him for it?
('m not saying I agree with it or I don't
agree with it.
Okay.
I'm just saying, yes, I heard her say
that.
But the next day after he signed the
contract he actually got a copy of your letter;
correct?
In the U.S. mail?
Yes?
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Okay.
Q. Okay? Rowena said he could get out of
this contract, but you're suing him because he didn't
go through with that last listing, aren't you?
MR. GESTON: Your Honor, excuse me again. If
we're referring to by this contract to this
relisting, that's not part of our controversy.
That's not what we're talking about.
THE COURT: Yeah. Sustained.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. I don't know if - I mean, we have a
Consumer Protection Act claim, so do I - would the
court like me to wait to put on that evidence or THE COURT: I would.
MR. WETHERELL: Okay.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. Mr. Knipe, I'm handing you what's been
marked as Exhibit KK. DO you see that?
A. Could you repeat the question?
Q. Do you recognize Exhibit KK?
A. Can I have a second to read through it?
It's hard to read.
Q. Please go ahead. It is very hard to
read.
A. Yes, I do.

A.
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And what is that?
A. It looks like a note I wrote to Richard
and Johnnie telling them that First American says
they have the earnest money, they're going to prepare
a document for everyone to sign confirming it's okay
to release the money, it's nonrefundable money.
'Will fax or email to you their document upon
receipt. Thank you, John."
Q. So now this is an email that you sent to
Richard. Was this on the very first $150,000 that
was released from the MidAmerican deal?
A. I don't see that it says, but I assume it
is.
MR. WETHERELl: Okay. I'd ask tor the
admission of Exhibit KK.
(Defendant's Exhibit KK moved for
admission.)
MR. GESTON: No objection.
THE COURT: KK will be admitted.
{Exhibit KK admitted into evidence.}
MR. WETHERELL: May I publish it to the jury,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
BY MR. WETHERELL:
Q. All right. This is the very first
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$150,000, and you are telling Richard what's going to
happen to this money, it's hard to read, but number
one - correct me if I'm wrong - one, you say
following up on our conversation a few minutes ago,
you say, one, have call in to title company to
confirm they have received money into escrow.
Waiting for them to confirm. They were all in some
company meeting and expect a call back in few
minutes. Two, will instruct the company - the title
company to cut you a check as follows: A, half to
Robertson Kennel, Inc.; B, half to Richard and
Johnnie Robertson personal property; C, will ask them
to deduct 5 percent commission on money deposited.
Our listing says we are to be paid 5 percent on any
nonforfeited nonrefundable money you receive at the
time that it is paid to you. That money is to be
credited back at closing.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So this was - what did you
consider to be - you're saying that this is
nonrefundable earnest money and they get 95 percent
of it; right?
A. Well, I - I think at the very beginning
I'm saying that the title company is preparing escrow
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DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
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RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
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v.
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COMES NOW, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe
(collectively. unless otherwise noted, "KLC") by and through its attorneys, Stoel Rives LLP, and
submits this Reply in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees ("Reply Brief").
I. FACTS

KLC incorporates by reference the facts previously set forth in KLC's Memorandum in
Opposition to DefendantslThird Party Plaintiffs~ Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees
("Memorandum") filed with this Court On July 29,2009.
II. ARGUMENT

KLC requests that the Court disallow the DefendantslThird-Party Plaintiffs' (collectivelYt
the "Robertsons") Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees, in whole or in part, because the
Robertsons did not prevail on aU issues at trial, the amount of fees and costs is improperly
inflated and because a signitic.ant portion of the fees was unreasonably incurred.
A.

The Robertsons Were Only Partially Successful, and Therefore Fees and Costs
Should be Denied or, Alternatively, Reduced.

KLe urges the Court to decline to award the Robertsons any costs or attorneys' fees, as
the Robertsons were only partially successful in this litigation. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(1)(B) provides the legal standard governing a court's resolution of the prevailing party
issue" stating:
In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing
party and entitled to costs t the trial court shall in its sound
discretion consider the finaJ judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial coun
in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.

PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES· 2
Boise·222658..3 00 j 0908- 00008

,:::J I

h,

III 004/008

,08/1912009 15:49 FAX

Idaho R. elv. P. S4(d)(1)(B). When both parties are partially successful, it is within the court's
discretion to decline an award of attorneys' fees to either side. Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho
24,27,72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003) (detennining entitlement to fees under Idaho Consumer
Protection Act ("ICPA"). Idaho Code § 48-608(4».
As set forth in KLC's Memorandum, KLC prevaiJed on several key issues as a matter of
law. Further, the Robertsons were only partially successful on the remaining issues that went to
the jury. While the jury found that the Robertsons had not breached the Employment Contracts,
it also rejected the Robertsons' two counterclaims that the money disbursed from the second
buyer's deposits had been converted and that KLC had violated the ICPA. Because KLC was at
least partially successful. it respectfully requests that the Court decline to award attorneys' fees

and costs to the Robertsons.
Alternatively. if the Court decides to make an award of fees and costs, KLC requests that
the Court only award fees and costs that the Robertsons incurred in pursuing claims that they
won at trial. "Where parties have each prevailed on different causes of action tried in the same
lawsuit, attorney fees may be apportioned accordingly." Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v.

Peterson, 102 Idaho' Ill, 121, 626 P.2d 767, 777 (1981). The Robertsons have urged the Court
to ignore the clear language in Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(1)(B)-which specifically allows a court to
consider whether a party prevailed in part and to apportion costs accordingly-because they are
well ..aware that they were only partially successful in this litiaation. The purely contractual
claims asserted by KLC against the Robertsons are distinct, both legalJy and in their factual
particulars, from the claims the Robertsons made against John Knipe for conversion and ]CPA
violations. As such. the extent the Robertsons prevailed on their ICPA claim.s may be considered
separately from the fate ofKLC~s contractual claims against them and need not be combined

b"
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together to determine a single, winner-take-all "prevailing party." Nguyen v. Bu;, 146 Idaho 187,
_ , 191 P.3d 1107, 1115 (et. App. 2008).

The Robertsons cannot be said to have prevailed On their claims against John Knipe when
one compares the $1,000 verdict to the open-ended relief the Robertsons sought against him.
Therefore. should the Court award the Robertsons fees and costs, KLC respectfully requests that
the award be reduced by at least one-third so that the Robertsons are not collecting fees incurred
in pursuing claims that were lost at trial,
B.

The Robertsons Have Oventated the Costs They May Recover.

As a matter of right, the Robertsons may only recover their filing tee, deposition costs
and the cost of preparing the documents actually admitted into evidence. See Idaho R. Civ. P.
S4(d)(1)(C)(1), (9). (10). These costs total $1,380.50. Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(I)(C)(6) allows
only the "[r]easonable costs of the preparation of ... exhibits admitled In evidence as exhibits" to
be awarded as a matter of right. (Emphasis added.) At trial, only 27 pages of copied documents
were admitted as exhibits, which, at the Robertsons' claimed cost of SO, 15 a page, totals $4.05.
KLC submits that the Robertsons' request for costs incurred to publish 12 sets of each exhibit is
unreasonable and far from efficient. The remaining costs claimed for copied "exhibits" should
be disallowed
Although the Court, in its discretion, may award copying costs and travel expenditures,
the party requesting such expenses must show that such expenditures were "necessary and
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party." Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d){l)(D). The Robertsons have made no such showing.
Routine copying expenses, mediation costs, expenses associated with traveling to and from
court, and costs of meals are not the "exceptional" costs contemplated by the rule.
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The Attorneys' Fees Sought by the Robertsons Are Unreasonable, Duplicative, and
Excessive.

The calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the court. Bott'V.
Idaho State Bldg. AUlh.) 128 Idaho 580, 592,917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996), A court may examine
the reasonableness of time and labor expended by an attorney and disallow fees that were
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred. Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho
259,263,999 P.2d 914. 918 (Ct. App. 2000). KLC urges the Court to exercise its discretion in
disallowing part, ifnot all, of the Robertsons' fees and costs on the basis that the bills reflect
unreasonable billing practices. Specifically, as described in detail in KLC's Memorandum, the
bills are rife with block entries, ambiguous billing descriptions and unaccounted-for time. all of
which impede the reasonability analysis. Further. the bills reveal duplicative billing by three
separate attorneys (two of whom have over 20 years of legal experience each) despite this being
a conventional breach of contract case. Although the reason for the Robertsons' choice to bring
in additional counsel on the eve of trial is unknown, KLC should not endure the expense of
disorganized, last-minute preparation and all the inevjtable inefficiencies that go along with it.
Moreover, the Robertsons' request for paralegal fees at a rate only $35 less than that charged by
Derek Pica, who has over 20 years of experience as a lawyer. is simply unreasonable. Perhaps
more disturbing is that the $2,800 being requested in "paralegal fees" was spent on the Internet
"researching" individuals on the jury panel.......-clearly a clerical duty. Based on the foregoing,
KLC requests that any award of fees and costs be reduced by at least 15 percent.
D.

The Court Should Deny the Robertsons' Request for Fees and Costs Related to
Their Second Motion for Summary JUdgment as Well as Their Motion to
ReconsiderlMotion for Clarification.

The Robertsons' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion to
ReconsiderlMotion for Clarification were both duplicative and unnecessary. Both motions
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ignored a clear ruling from the Court on the panies' cross-motions for summary judgment. As
admitted to by the Robertsons, the motions were not based on any new evidence or any
previously Wlavailable law. The Robertsons should not be able to collect the thousands of
doJlars unreasonably incurred in researching and drafting motions that were improperly filed.
III. CONCLUSION

The Robertsons should be prevented from recovering any attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in this litigation, as both KLC and the Robertsons were partially successfu]. If the Court
does award the Robertsons' fees and costs, KLC respectfully requests that the Court disaJlow
costs not pennitted as a matter of right and reduce discretionary costs by at least one-third.
Further, KLC requests that the Court award the Robertsons only those fees reasonably associated
with defending KLC's breach of contract action because they did not prevail on any other claim.
Finally. KLC requests that the Court decline to award fees dedicated to researching and drafting
the Robertsons' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion to ReconsiderlMotion
for Reconsideration, as such motions were unnecessary and duplicative.
DATED; August,4, 2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on August 4-.2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF

AND TMRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES on the following, in the matter indicated
below;
[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ .'] Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise,ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336~4980

[vf

Email: derekpica@msn.com
Attorney for Defendants

Robert T. Wetherell
BRASSEY. WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P. O. Box 1009
Boise, ID 8370 1~ 1009
Facsimile; (208) 344-7077

[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ 1- Via Overnight Mail
(v1 Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Email: rtw@brQ$sey.net
Attorneys for Defendants

..

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ~TTOBNEYS FEES - 7
Boisc-222658,3 0010908-- 00008

c;il/ 7 ifJ

'AUG-19-2009(WED) 14:09

Bras,

(FAX)

WetherelL et al.

P.002/010

44 7077

FILED
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRiCT COURT
p",ljatt~ 04unty• Idaho

AYg t 9 2009

Robert T. Wetherell, ISS No. 3011
:Srad\ey S. Rl.cbardson, 1SB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, .t.LP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
:aoise~ Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (20S) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077

_ _~A.M
J. DRi!6EN

P.M.

Attorneys for Defendants

IN TH.E DlST.RlCT COURT O.F ~rH.E THlR.) JUDlCIAl... D.IS~r.RlC'f
OF THE STAT.E O.F lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETT.E

KNIPE LAND COM:PANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682

Plaintiff.
vs.
REPLV TO »J...ATNTTFFn'HIRD·

RICHARD A. ROB:ERTSON and
JOH'NNlE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

·.>AR"JY 'DEFENDAN"r's
o:PPOSrrlON TO :D:E:F.ENDANTI
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR EQUITABLE
RELIEF UNDER THE mAHO
CONSUMER PROT.ECTION ACT

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNrE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
!NC., an Idaho Corporation

Third.Par1y Plaintifrs~
VS.

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third..P

Defendant
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T.
INTRODUCTI.ON

In its Opposition, Plaintiffrehashes many ofthe same arguments tllllt it made in. connection

with its Motion to Amend theJudgment,a.nd Motion for aNew Trial and.mOV. To the c~tentthcsc
arguments were previously raised, .Defendants hereby ineorporo.te and refer the Court to their prior
bri efing as contained in the Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, for a New Trial, or,
in tbe Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
Plaintiff argues that equitable relief should not be given to 'Defendants under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act. In. doing SOt Plainti ff contends that the jury already determined the issues
in this case and therefore the Court cannot gI':itllt equitable relier. Accorcling to Plaintiff, any
restitutionary or punitive damages should likewise be precluded.
This reply brief, however, will show that: (1) the Court should grant equitable remedies bnscd
upon its inherent power under the Act; (2) the violative conduct oiMc. Knipe is sufficient to sustain
the damage award under the Act; (3) the Court should impose a constructive trust and gtmlt
rostitutiQ.Ilary damages; a.nd (4) tl1e Court should grant punitive damages as there was suf.llcicnt
evidence at trial to support such an award.
Accordingly, tbe Courtsbould grant Defendant's Motion for Equitable RcliefundertheIwlho
Consumer Protection Act. This requested reliefsi10uJd also include the enjoining of future use of
the representation agreement and an award of prejudgment interest to Defendants.

rulPJ..Y pro PLATN"I"WFtrHJ.lW·PARTY D'E'FENOANT'S OPPOS1'nON TO OE'FBN'OA'NTmuRJ)·PAA'l'Y
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u.
ARG1JMeNT
The Final Judgment Should Include AdditioDal Remedies Under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act.

Pla.in.tifrs llrst argument Is that the Court cannot grant remedIes under the Act because the

case was resolved by the jury. See 1'.4 ofthe Plaintiffs Opposition. AddiLionully, Plaintiff argues
that Defendants elected their remedies and thus cannot pursue other remedIes under the Act. See p.1
ofthe Plaintiff s Opposition. Nevertheless. these arguments fail as the Aet expressly gives the Court
authority to grant remedies above nod beyond drunagcs determined by the jury. The Act stntes as .

to th.is issue:
§ 48-608. Loss from purchase or lease - .. Actual and punitive damages.
(l) Any person wbo purcbases or leases goods or services and thereby

su.ffers any aScortninable loss ofmoncy orpropmy, real orpcrsonnl,
as a result of tile usc or employment by anotbcrpcrson ofa method.
aet or practice declnred unlawful by this chapter, may treat any
agreement incid.ent thereto as voidable Of, in the alternative, may
bri11g an aClion to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars
($1,000). whichever is greater ••.. Any such person or class may
also seek restitution. an order enjoin.ing the use or employment of
methods. acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and
any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion mny
deem just and necessary. The court may, in its discretion, award
punitive damages and rna)' provide such equitable reHeras it deems
necessary or proper in cases of repeated. or flagrant violations.
See I.C. § 48-608 (emphasis added).

1"hus, under the express wording of the statute, the Court may grant restitution, an order
enjoining violative practices.l'unitive damages, and any other appropriate relief-all in addition to
Defendants' recovery of actual oJ'l1ominal damages. See itl. Notably, there is no requirement under
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this provision that ajury's verdict precludes the Court from granting additIonal relief. RenceJ U,e
express wording under the statute states tha.t in addition to nctual or nominal damages, the person
"may also seek" other damages which "the Court in its discretion ma.y deem just and neecssnry/'

See id. As a result, the Court has inherent authority to grant remedies above and beyond the damages .
awa.rded by the jury.
Plaintiffs election of remedies argument a.lso rails. Specifically, Defendants pled to make
the contracts voidable, or in the alternative. to obtain damages. As the Court is well aware, thc=

actual trial proeeccled under the theory that there was a valid and enforceable employment cOl1tra~
and that Defendants intended to live up to the terms of the contract and fulfill their obligations. As
a result, any argument that there has been;m election ofrcmcdics is unpersuasive.
B.

There is Sufficient Evidence to Support the Jury's Verdict for $1,000 Under the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendants failed to show "ascertainable loss" at trial and
accordingly cannot receive any damages. See 13.8..9 of the Plaintiff's Opposition. Specifically,
Plaintiffrellcs upon Yellow Pille Water

Usel'~.'/

A$$ociatioll

V.

IlIIel, lOS Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54

(1983). Nevertheless, more recent Idaho appellate authority shows that statutory damages must be

given once a violation is found. See Wllitev. Mock, 140 ldnho 882, 890, l04P.3d 356, 364(2004).
In Mock, the'ldaho Supreme Court held that it is a reversible error for the jU1)f, hnving

determined a violation under the Act, to not make an award ofat least S1,000. See id. This holding
was affim1ed again by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court in that case held: "Once a violation of
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is found, it is error to not award statutory damages." Fellll v.
Noal" 142 Idallo 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240.1244 (2006).
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Additionally, Oerendants presented. evid.ence to the jury that they had been ciama&ed by
Plaintiffwhen it kept $22,500. Given Defendants' conversion claim, however, Dcfendants asked the
jury to simplyaward$l,OOO under the Act, which thejurydid. Therefore, theju.ty·saward of$1,000
ispropcr and should be sustained.

C.

The Court Should Impose a Constructive Trust and Grant Rcstitutionary
Damages.

Similar to its other arguments, Plail1ti.ff contends that the jury already deter.mincd the

outcome as to rcstitutionary damages when it decided on Defendant'S conversion clnim.. See 1'.1 0
ofthe Plolntifrs Opposition. Plain.tiffdoes not support its argument, however, with any Idaho Jaw.
As set forth in prior briefing, constructive trusts arc equitable in nature and are il1voked where

title to property is found in. one who in fairness ought not to retain it. Cleill v. $I,a,v, 109 Idaho 237,
240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. HISS). Furtllcr, a constructive trust applies where

it

party

obtains property in any '''unconseientious man.ner." See id.

In the case at bar,

~laintiff

retained $22,500 in money owed to :Oefendunts u.nder the

transaction with MidAmerlea.n. Therefore, this property must be rcconvcyed by .Plaintiff to
Defendants. This result is consistent with the remedy of restitution under the Idaho Consumer
Protecti 011 Act.
rhe Idaho ConsunlCf Protection Aet gives the Court authority, sepa.rate and distinct of any
role of the jury, to grant restitution La Defendants in this case. See

Le.

§ 48-608(1). Further,

restitution under the Act includes the surrendering of all monies taken in association with a party's
violation of the Act. See Kidwell v. Muster Distributors, llle., 101 Idaho 447. 456,615 P.2d 116,
125 (19S0)(quoting Fletcller v. Security Pat:iflt: NaL BatIk, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cat. '197~1)) ("·One
requirement ofsueh enforcement is a basic policy that those who have engaged in. proscribed conduct
surrender all pro'fits flowing thcrefrom.'j.
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The Court should grant rcstitutionary damages in this ease as Plaintiff's actions have been
deemed to violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See Ans. to Question 6 ofVcrcUet Form.. It
is undisputed that Plaintiff kept $22,500 from a tn111saction under the 2007 ctnployment contract.

Plaintiffclid this despite no contractual authority to do so. In fact, the jury found no breaeh oftl1e
contracts by:Defendants. As a result, Plaintiffshould not be allowed to benefit, but should surrender
the proceeds obtained from its violative conduct. See Kidwell, 101 Tdaho at 456, 61 S P.2d at 125.
'D.

The Court Should Enjoin Future Use of the Represenmtion Agreement.

Plaintiffncxt argues that no mention of injunctive reliefwas made to the jury, and thus this
remedy should be precluded. See p.l 0 of Plaintiffs Opposition. This argument, however. lacks
merit given that injunctive reliefis a matter to be determined by the Court, and not by the jury. See
I.C. § 48-608(1) (stating that a person may also seck from the court "an order Cl1joining the use or
employt'nent ofmethods. aets or praetices declared unlawfu.l under thjs chapter,").
A determination llns been made by the jury that Mr. Knipe's conduct violated the Act. As
a result, there is a sufficient basis to gnmt injunctive reliefprohlbiting Pinintifffrom similar future
conduct. Further, this will help to safeguard the interests ofother consumers. See Kidwell. 101 Tduho
at 455, GIS 1).2d at 124 (discussing the overall purposes of the Aet).
E.

The Court Should Grant Punitive Dnmages to Defendants.

Plaintiff also contends that the Court expressly denied Defendants' request

fOT

punitiv.:

damages, See p.ll ofPlamtifrs Opposition. Additionally, Plaintiffargues that Defendants never
moved to amend their Complaint for punitive damages, and thus they are precluded. See p.ll of
Plaintiff'S Opposition. Nevertheless, the Court should grant punitive damages to :Oefendants based
upon the singular remedies provided under the Act.
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A review ofthe Court IT''Jl1scripl as provided by Plainti:r-rindi cates that the Court did not deny

Defendants' request for punitive damages. Ruther, the Court. declined an invitatic.'m to insl.ruct the
jury on the issue Ofpul1iLive damages, which; under Idaho law, would merely have been advisory to

the Court. Sec Trial Tr. S60: 19-21 as contained in Exhibit "P" of Affidavit of Ooston. This is
consistent with the express wording or the statute which grants the determination of punitive
damages to the trial court. See 1.C. § 4S..G08(l).
Significantly, punitive damages underthe Idaho COllsumerProteen.on. Act are ul,ique. These

damages are .not based in common law. but rather prescnt an entirely now remedy ereated by the
legislature. See Mac Tools, rite.. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho

193~

198, 879 P.ld 112G, 1131 (1994). In

fact, punitive damages under the Act are to be considered onlyby tbe Court, and not by the jury. See
I.C. § 48-608(1).
Tho [net that :Defendants did not formally amend their pleadings prior to trial is not

dispositive on this issue. Where evidence regarding the issues ofpunitive damages arc fully tried
by the parties. a district court should treat the issue as ifit had been properly pled. See Mikesell v.

New World Deve/oPIIU!II4 Corp., 122 Idaho 868. 877, 840 P.2dl090. 1099 (Ct. App. 1992).
PlaintiffwtlS well aware in advance orma! as to the evidence used to support Defendants'
punitive damage claim. This is because the evidence at trial with respect to this elaim came
primarily from the depositi.on of Mr. Knipe.

Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants' claim for punitive damages.
F.

The Court Should Crant Prejudgment Interest to Defendants.

Pla.i.nt:i.f:rs fi.nal contention is that any demand forprejudgmcnt interest by Defendants should
be denied. See p.13 of Plaintiffs Opposition. Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to provide any legal
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authority OT argument. As such, Defenda.nts are entitled to a constructive trust and reslitutionury
damages from tl,e date in which the unlawful holding or taking ofDefendanl;s' monies occurred.
Idaho statute grants prejudgment interest where moneyis ~'received to the USe ofanothcr and
retained beyond a reasonable time without the owners' consent" See I.C. § 28-22-104(4).
Moreover, prejudgment interest merely requires a liquidated OT readily ascertainable amount. See
Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274,27G, 178 P.3d G39, 041 (Ct. App. 2007).
The monies held and retained by Pla.intiffbcyond a reasonable time in th.is matter arc entitled

to prejudgment interest. As a result, the Coun should grant Defendants prejudgment interest on the
amount of$22,500, beginning at the time Plaintifffai led to return the demanded monies on February
11.200S.

m.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Oefendm1ts' Motion for Equitable RelieF,
including the imposition of a constructive trust, rcstitutionary damages, and punitive damages. 1"he
Court should also enjoin Plaintiff from futuro usc of its forfeIture provision and grant prejudgment
inlerest to Defendants.
DATED' this

~y of August, 2009.
BRASSEY, WETl-I.ER.ELL & CRAWFORD

REP.LY TO pLA.l'N'l1FFm.tlRO·.PAR1"Y O.aF.l!NDANT·S OPPOSITION TO DEFBNJ)ANTmrm.O.lWRTY
PLAlNTTJi'FS' MOT)ON 1:0.R EQurrABLE REtTEr UNOlm TIm IDAHO CONSUMER PR01"2CTION At::r - 8
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1HEREBY CER.TIFY that on this
ofAugust, 2009, I sm-ved a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by ca.using the same: to be delivered by the
melhod and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Oeston
Stoel Rives. I..LP
101 S. Capitol Blvd .• Stc. 1900
:Boise, Idaho 83702

_

U.S. Mail. postage prepaid
Hnnd..OcUvcred
_ 'pvcrnigllt Mail
~Facsimile 389·9040

OerckPiea
199 N. Capital Blvd, Su.ite 302
Boise. Idaho 83702

_
_

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand..Delivered
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Robert 1', Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bmelley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, WErIfERELL & CRAWJ:;'ORD, LLP
203 W. Mai.!1 Street
"P.O. Box 100~
'Boise~ Idaho 83701 .. 1009 .
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsin,ile: (208) 344-7077
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TRIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
O.F'rHE STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O'F PAYETTE

KN1P.E LAND COMPANY,
.Pla.inti.ff,
VS.

R(CHARD A. ROB.BR"rSON and

JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBER"rSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

Case No. CV 2008-682
l\IIEMORANDUM IN SVPPOI~T
OF MOTION TO STRIKE
SUPPLEMENTAI~ AFFIDAVIT OF
MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPORT 0.)1"
PLAINTIFFftU..IRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S .MOTION TO AMEND
~IUOGME!NT, FOR A NEW TRlAL,
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE; FOR
JI.1DGMJt:NT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNlE L. R.OBERTSON, husband
and wife; and R.OBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Tdaho Corporation
111ird-Party Plaintiffs,
VB.

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Part Defendant.

MEMOMNDtJMTht SUPPO.R.TOPMOnON'l'OSTRIK.'EST.1PPLEMaNTALAF'F'n)AVITOP MARKS. GBSTON
TN SUPPORTOFPLAlNTlFFmrm:o PARTY O.w:.ENDANT·SMOTI0N'1"O AMSNl) JTJ:OOMeNr.FORA NEW
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COME NOW, Defendantsf'rlUrd.·Party Plainli Frs (hereinaiter"Defcndantsn ) by and through
their counsel ofrecord. Brnssey, Wetherell & Crawford, and provides this Memorandum in Support

of Motion to Strl.kc Supplemental Affidavit of Mark S. Gcston in SuP.port ofPlaintiff/third :Party
I

Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment. for a New Trial, Or:. in the Alternative, Por Judgment

NotwHhstanding the Verdict. as follows:
l.R.C ..P. S9(b) allows 14 days from the entry ofJudgment to present a motion for a new trial.

r.R.C.P. 59(c) requires those affidavits to be subJllitted in support of the motion at the time the
motion is filed. Ii is well seltled law in Idaho. that tho a.r.adavits must be filed at the time ofthe filing

of the motion in order to provide the opposiog party time to respond. Defendant has not had time
to rcspond to the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff and the affidavit should. be stricken. As the

Supreme Court has sUtted, and as is settled law:
"the trial court corroctly ruled that Watson had not complied with the
time requirements ofLR..C.P. 59(c) in fiUng the affidavit opposing
International Harvcsterfs motion (or new tria.l and it did .oat err in
refusing to consider Watson's second set of affidavits:'

Watson v. Navistar International Tram~p()rtati()n Corp.. 1211daho 643, 827 P.2d. CiSCi.
Based upon the foregoi..ng. the Court should. grant Defendant's Motion to Strike the

Supplementa1 Affi.davit ofMark Gcston with respect to Plaintifi's Motion for NewTrlnlandJNOV.
DATED this -..:.- day of August, 2009.

BRASSEYt WE~rHERELL & eRAWFOR'O

MSMOAANOUM TNSUPPORTOP M0110NiO STRncEStJPPLJ!M.EN'l'AJ.,MFIDAvrr OF'MART<S. GBSTON
IN SUPPORT OFPLATNiTFF/TFflltt) PARTVOBFENDAN1.'·S M01'10N oro AMBNl) .rtJl)GMENT. FOR. ANEW
'11Ut\L.. OR. IN 1"l'l'a AtiERNATlV2. FOR JTJDGM1iNT N01"Wl1'HS'L'ANDlNO Tl"!E VEROTCT • 2
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THl!REBY CERTIFY that on. tW~.L~ay ofAugust, 2009, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered bythc
method and to the addresses indicated below:

Mark S. Geston
StoclRivcs,LLP
101 S. Capitol :Blvd., Stet 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702-

U.s. Mail, postage prepaid.
Hand-Delivered
__ pvemight Muil
...fL' Facsimile 389·9040

Derek Pica
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302
Boise, Idaho 83702

_U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered

_

_

for:m1sht Ma.il
Facsimile 336-4980

~

M1!MOAANDUMIN SLTPPORT OF MOTION TO S'I'1Ur<! StTPl'L'EM'ENTALA'FfTDAvrr OFMAlU<S. G'ESTON
IN SUPPORT OF PLAIN'I'IFFmrrn:o PARTY DEFl!NOAN'l"'S MOTtONTOAMBNtl.Tt1DGMENT. FOR A NeW
TIUAL. OR. IN nm ALTERNATJ'VE. FOR .1t.JDGMBNT NO'l"\VJTaSTANt>lNG nm vaROtCl'· 3
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Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BR.ASSEY, WETHERELL &. CRAWFORD. LLP
203 W, Ma.i.n. Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boisc~ Idaho 83701 .. 1009
Telephone: (208) 344·7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
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TN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

O:F THE STATE OF IDAHO, 'IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE L..AND COMPANY,

Case No, CV 2008-682

VS.

RICH.AR:O A. RO.aER:rSON and
JOHN'NIS L. R.OB,ER~rSON, husbnnd
and wife; and ROB,ERTSON KENNELS,
lNC., an Idaho Corporation,

I~

'.,

Attorneys for DefendantS

PlaintifL:

.

$

MOTION TO STRIKE
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFlDAVlT OF
M.ARf( S. GESTON IN SlJPPO,RT OF
PLAlNTIFFrrH1RD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND
JlJDGMEN~t!l 'FOR A NEW TRIAL,
OR, IN TUE ALTERNATIVE, FOR

JTJDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING

THE VERDICT
Defendants.
RICHAR.O A. ROBERTSON and
JOF!NNI5 L. R.OBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
lNC.; an Idaho Corporation
Third.Pnrty Pla.i.n.rlffs,
VB.

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
TI"ird-Part Defendant.

MOTION 1'0 S"t'lUKU SUPPL'EMBN"rAl.. AFl:WAVIT OF MARK S. GasTON 1N SUPPORT OF Pt..AfN..
"fmFrrAlRD PAATY DU1!NDANi'S MOrlON 1'0 AMEND JUDGMENT. FOa A NEW TRTAL. OR. tN 'r,HE
ALTERNA1"I'Va, FOa JUOOM'E'NT N01Wl1'HS1'ANDING TfifS vtmOlCT - 1
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COME NOW, OcfcodantslThird..Party Plaintiffs (hereina.fl:er"0 efendants'j by and through
their counsel ofreeord, BrJ..'lSey, Wetherell &. Crawford, and hereby move the Court for an Order

striking the Supplemental Affidavit ofMark S. Geston in Support orPlaintifflthird. Party Defendant· s
Motion to Amend J ud,;,ttnent, for a New ~rrial, Or, in the Alteolativc. For Judgmcnt Notwithstanding
the Verdict.

This motion is supported by the memorandum in support filed contemporaneously herewith.

~y of August, 2009•

DATED thitlL

.BRASSEY, WETH::E:ltELL & CRAWPOR.O

Mo'nON TO STlUlOl SUPPLEMeNTAl.. AFFIDAVlT OF MARK S. GESTON IN SUPPOR.'l' OF PLAIN·
l"ll<F111fI1U:J PARTY D.l!FENDANT'S MOTION TO AMENt) JUDGMENT. FOR A NlSW TRTAL. OR. IN TH.E
ALTERNA'rIVB. POR JtJDGMi!NT N01'W1TRSTANDlNO '1'11.1; VERDIct ·2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

thi~sty

I HEREBY CaAT.l'FY that on
ofAugust, 2009, Tserved a true and correct copy
of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causil'lg the same to be dc:livcred by the
method and to the addresses indicated bc:low:
Mark S. Gc:ston
Stoel Rives, 'l.LP
101 S. Capitol :stvd., Stet 1900
Boise,Idaho 83702

_
_

OcrekPlca
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302
Boise, Idaho 83702

_

U.S. Mail. postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
~vcrolght Mait
Facsimile 389..9040

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand..:Oclivcred
_
2Vcrnight Mail
~ Facsimile 336-4~SO
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MOTION'fO S'1'R.lKE SUP.PJ..EMENTAt AFFIDAVl1' 01: MA1U{ S. O.ES'rON IN SUPPORT OF PI..AlN·
T1FFmmm PAR.'IY DEFHNDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDO:MENT, FOR. A NBW 't1Ut\.l.., OR..1N 'l''.I:1B
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

**********
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER
COURT REPORTER: Denece Graham
DATE: August 21, 2009

Knipe Land Company, etal.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2008-000682

-vsRichard A. Roberston, etal.,
Defendant.

COURT MINUTES
Time: 1:33-2:11 p.m.
Courtroom #1

This being the time and place set for Motion for Attorney Fees,
Motion for Equitable Relief Under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act,
Motion to Amend Judgment,
for New Trial,
or in the
Alternatvie for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, present
before the Honorable Stephen W. Drescher were Mark Geston,
attorney on behalf of the plaintiff, and Robert Wetherell,
attorney on behalf of the defendant.
Mr. Geston presented argument
motions.
The Court gave his
testimony during the trial.

on behalf of
interpretation

the plaintiff's
of Ms. Crane's

Mr. Wetherell responded to the plaintiff's motions.
Mr. Geston replied.
The Court advised it would revisit the issues and make a decision
to the motions.
Court was adjourned.
STEPHEN W. DRESCHER
essen, Clerk
BY:

Court Minutes page-1-

SEP 1 7 2009

--_.. - A.M.

P.M.

BETIY J. DRESSEN
By

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

)

KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, )
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants.

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L.
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,

)
)

Third Party Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTIONS

)

CASE NO. CV-2008-682

ORDER ON POST-TRIAL
MOTIONS

I

Deputy

Appearances: Mark Geston for Plaintiff
Robert Wetherell for Defendants

The factual history of this case has been set forth at length in prior orders issued by this
Court. Those facts will therefore not be repeated here, but are hereby incorporated by reference.
Initially, the Plaintiff moved to amend the judgment to strike certain language not
permitted by LR.C.P. 54(a). The Defendants agreed that the rule does not allow for a recitation
of the pleadings in the Judgment. The motion is therefore granted on that point.
The Plaintiff next seeks a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to IRCP 50(b).
The standard of review was well set out by the Idaho Court of appeals in Carlson v. Stanger, 146
Idaho 642, 646, 200 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Ct.App.2008) as follows:
The issue to be determined on a motion for j.n.o.v. is whether substantial evidence
supports the jury's verdict. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943 P.2d
912, 921 (1997). Substantial evidence does not require that the evidence be
uncontradicted. Highland Enterprises, Inc., v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 337, 986 P.2d 996,
1003 (1999). Rather, the evidence need only be of sufficient quantity and probative value
that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. ld. Upon a
motion for j.n.o.v., the moving party admits the truth of all adverse evidence and all
inferences that can legitimately be drawn from it. ld. In ruling on a motion for j.n.o.v., the
trial court cannot weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or make its
own factual findings and compare them to those of the jury. Id. The trial court draws all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. ld. The motion should be granted only where
there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have
reached and when that conclusion does not conform to the jury verdict. ld.

In this case, context is everything. The actions of the parties before, during, and after the
signing of the Employment Contracts and the Purchase and Sale Agreements relating to both
offers they received, established the understanding of the parties as to the meanings of the terms
of those contracts. It was the duty of the trier of fact to decide this case in light of the actions of
2
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the parties, along with the other circumstances of this case presented at trial. Drawing all facts
and inferences in favor of the Robertsons including, but in no way limited to, the failure of the
Plaintiff to seek payment under the first Purchase and Sale Agreement in a timely manner, along
with the timing of the extension of the Employment Contracts, this Court finds that reasonable
minds can conclude the jury verdict was reasonable. As stated by the appellate court above, a
motion for new trial should only be granted where there can be but one conclusion and that
conclusion does not conform to the verdict. This is a demanding standard that has not been
satisfied in this case. Therefore, the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied.
Turning next to the Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, the Court's review of such a motion
under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) is different from its review of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. A motion for new trial calls the trial judge to weigh the evidence and determine (1)
whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether
a new trial would produce a different result. Juarez v. Aardema, 128 Idaho 687, 695, 918 P.2d
271,279 (1996); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188,193 (1990); Quick v.
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986); Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v.
Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826,833,136 P.3d 297,304 (2006).

As stated previously, context is everything in this case. There was a clear course of
conduct of both parties manifesting what they believed the contracts meant.

There was

substantial evidence presented at trial that the Plaintiff did not make any claim on the relatively
small amount of money at issue from the Harmon Offer to Purchase until after the $450,000
from the subsequent prospective buyer came into question. In addition, Ms. Crane testified that
the $450,000 was simply money paid

III

exchange for a license to enable the subsequent
3
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prospective buyer to thoroughly and extensively investigate the property. In sum, at no time did
anyone other than the Plaintiff treat the money that went to the Defendants as a forfeiture.
Moreover, the Plaintiff only treated it as such after there was a large sum of money at issue from
the second prospective purchaser.

This evidence, in this Court's view, clearly supports the

jury's verdict. Likewise, it is this Court's opinion that the evidence presented at trial, when
taken as a whole, makes the possibility of a different result for the Plaintiff unlikely, should a
new trial be granted.
With respect to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7), The
Plaintiff alleged ten errors of law that it believes entitles him to a new trial. Upon review of each
of these asserted errors, this Court is of the view that the decisions at issue were each made with
due deliberation and consideration, and were appropriate under the facts and circumstances. The
Motion under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) is therefore denied.
Next, the Court turns to Defendants' Motion for equitable relief under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act. The jury was given the option to award damages thereunder, and they
elected to award a nominal amount. That award was one upon which reasonable minds could
agree given the facts of this case. The Court therefore declines to alter that award.
The Court likewise declines to award punitive damages under the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act. [W]hen a party brings an action for violation of the ICPA, that party does not
have to show an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct in order to be awarded
punitive damages, but rather must show repeated or flagrant violations of the ICP A. Mac Tools,

4
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Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198, 879 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1994). The evidence in this case
simply does not rise to the necessary level needed to support an award of punitive damages.

Finally, we come to the Defendants' Motion for Costs and Fees. The applicable statute in
this case, where the gravamen of the lawsuit was a commercial transaction, is

I.e.

12-120(3)

which states in pertinent part:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be
set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.

The determination of who is a prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Suitts v. First Security Bank, 125 Idaho 27,
35, 867 P.2d 260, 268 (Ct.App.l993). "The determination of a prevailing party involves a threepart inquiry: The court must examine (1) the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2)
whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which either party prevailed
on each issue or claim." Joseph CL. U Ins. Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557, 789 P.2d
1146, 1148 (Ct.App.1990);

Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 162, 968 P.2d 247,

257 (Ct.App.l998).

The substantive procedural history of the case is as follows: Plaintiff s motion to amend
the Complaint to add punitive damages was denied. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
was granted on the issue of the validity of the contracts, but denied on the remainder of the
issues. Both of Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment were denied, as was their
motion to reconsider. At trial, the jury found that the Defendants did not breach the Employment
5
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Contracts and the Plaintiff was not awarded any of the $220,000 sought. The Plaintiff was
likewise found not liable on the issue of conversion, resulting in Knipe land Company being
permitted to retain the $22,500 it previously received. In addition, Third Party Defendant John
Knipe was found to have violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and nominal damages of
$1,000 were awarded to the Defendants. Considering these facts in their entirety in the light of
the case law set forth above, this Court finds that the Defendants are the prevailing party in this
matter.
The Court, having found the Defendants to be the prevailing party in a suit where a
commercial transaction was the gravamen of the complaint, see Miller v. Sf. Alphonsus Reg.

Med Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825,839,87 P.3d 934, 948 (2004), pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), now
makes the following findings:

1.

The litigation was pending for approximately one year. The trial lasted three
days;

2.

The issues of the case were not particularly unique;

3.

It was necessary for counsel to possess appropriate trial skills and
professionalism to present the case;

4.

The charges claimed are consistent with seasoned trial counsel in
Southwestern Idaho;

5.

The attorney's fees in this matter are fixed;

6.

The Court is unaware of any time limitations imposed by clients;

7.

The discrepancies between the amounts sought and those recovered were
discussed previously;

8.

The case in not an undesirable one;

9.

The nature and length of the relationship between the parties and their counsel
are unknown to the Court;

10.

The award of attorney fees is consistent with the fees awarded for comparable
time and effort in similar cases; and
6
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11.

The Defendants do not seek reimbursement of automated research costs.

Upon review of the billing statements, the Court finds that Mr. Pica charged an additional
$50 per hour over and above his standard hourly rate for 104 hours of trial preparation and the
trial itself. It is the opinion of this Court that Mr. Pica mainly assisted during the trial of this case
and he should therefore not be entitled to more than his normal hourly rate. The attorney fees
sought will therefore be reduced by $5,200 to reflect this. Therefore, attorney fees in the amount
of $105,107.50 will be awarded. Costs as a matter of right in the amount of $1,876.58 will
likewise be awarded. This includes $71 for the filing fee, $500 for exhibits, and $1305.58 for
depositions. Discretionary costs will be disallowed as the same are merely the ordinary and
incidental costs of a law practice.

---

'200~7?

DATED this ~-+-

/;:~
Stephen W. Drescher
District Judge
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CER TIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was forwarded to
the following persons on this 11th-day of~..R3< 2009:
Mark S. Geston
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd, Ste. 1900
Boise, ID 83702

Robert T. Wetherell
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83701

Derek Pica
199 N. Capitol Blvd, Ste. 302
Boise, ID 83702

Deputy Clerk
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Robe11 T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077

FILED

TH!HD JUDICIAL D!STR~CT COUHT

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND COMPANY,
Case No. CV 2008-682
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant.

JUDGMENT -1

This matter having come on regularly for jury tlia1 and the jury having rendered its verdict
in this cause on June 26, 2009, and the Court having hearing the post trial motions involving
multiple parties and multiple causes of action, and the Court specifically finding that there is no just
reason for delay,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that JUDGMENT is hereby
entered and that Plaintiff KNIPE LAND COMPANY'S Complaint in this matter is dismissed, with
prejudice and Plaintiff KNIPE LAND COMPANY shall take nothing by way of its Complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that Defendants RICHARD A.
ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE:t. ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation, be awarded $1,000.00 on its counterclaim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation, be awarded $105,107.50 for attomeys fees, and costs as a matter of rights of
$1,876.58. Discretionary costs are DENIED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that JUDGMENT be entered
in favor of Defendants RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation and against KNIPE LAND
COMPANY and JOHN KNIPE, an individual in the total amount of$1 07,984.08.

<i(/

DATED

thi~!
~

day of September, 2009
!

:;;~
HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER

JUDGMENT - 2

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

?f2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2009, I served a tme and correct
copy ofthe foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by
the method and to the atIdresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702
Robert T. Wetherell
Brassey, Wetherell, & Crawford
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009

JUDGMENT - 3

/U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

L

US. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 344-7077

~002/010

10/01/200,9 13:43 FAX

Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346
Email: msgeston@stoel.com
Jennifer M, Reinha:rdt, ISB No. 7432
Email: jmreinhardt@stoeJ.com
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 389-9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETIE
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,
PlaintitflAppellant,
V.

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
DefendantslRespondents.

RlCHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,

an Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents
v.
JOHN KNIPE, an individual,

Third Part Defendant!A eHant.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
Boisc·223549.1 0010908-00008

Case No. CV 2008-682
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

IdJ 003/010

10/01/2008 13:43 FAX

TO:

THE ABOVE·NAMED RESPONDENTS, RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and

JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., BY AND
THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

l'he above-named Plaintiff/Appellants, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third

Party Defendant lohn Knipe (collectively, "Appellants"), hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court against Defendants and Third Party Plaintiff's Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L.
Robertson, husband and wife, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, "Respondents"). from
the following judgments, decisions, and orders entered in the above entitled action, the
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding:
a.

The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion in Limine, filed on April 9,

2009, to foreclose admission at trial of testimony and extrinsic evidence interpreting,
explaining, and modifying unambiguous contracts.
b.

The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion in Limine, filed June 18,2009,

to foreclose testimony at trial by Respondents' witness, Cindy Crane.
c.

The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion for a Directed Verdict 011 June

25,2009;

P.e~

d.

The jury's Verdict entered on June 25,2009;

e.

rae .JHSgmeRt efttefed hHy 8, 2009, as modified by the Court's Order Oft

Trial :MetioftS efttefed Oft Septemtter 17,2009;
fA

The Court's Order on Post-Trial Motions entered on September 17,2009,

denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. or. in the Alternative, for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict. . and erroneously awarding costs as a matter of right.

f.

The Judgment ejltered on September 30,2009.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL. 2
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2.

ftj004/010

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders and

Judgments set forth in section 1 above are appealable PUl'suant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(l) .
Appellants state that the following issues are the subject of this appeal, subject to

3.

their right to assert other issues on appeal:
A.

That the District Court erred by failing to rule that the Employment

Contracts in controversy are unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence should not be
admitted to interpret, explain, or otherwise modify their plain meaning.

B.

That the District Court erred by failing to decide whether the Employment

Contracts were ambiguous or not and consequently abdicated that determination to the
jury.

C.

That the District Court erred by permitting testimony and other extrinsic

evidence regarding the meaning of unambiguous contracts.
D.

That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents· witness, Cindy

Crane, to testify as to the meaning of unambiguous contracts that were irrelevant to the
Employment Contracts in controversy, and, additionally, permitting her to testify when
Respondents had failed and refused to disclose her relevant knowledge in response to
Appellants' written pretrial discovery.

E.

That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents' counsel to

examine John Knipe and Rowena Strain about inapplicable statutes, and then permitting
said counsel to argue such matters of irrelevant law to the jury after the close of evidence.

F.

That the District Court erred by improperly instructing the jury, as

follows:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL· 3
Boise-223549.l 0010908-00008
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13:44 FAX

i.

By giving Opening Instruction No.4 erroneously instructing the

jury that the parties had reportedly agreed that the earnest monies deposited by
MidAmerican included "the 5% commission" disbursed to Knipe Land Co.;
it

By refusing to give Appellants' requested opening Instruction

No.5 and their requested closing Instruction Nos. 7,12, 15,19, and 20;

iii.

By giving the jury Instruction Nos. 11, 12, and 13, instructing it to

determine issues oflaw;
iv.

By giving the jury Instruction No. 16, instructing it as to the

Robensons' affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel when the evidence failed to
satisfy the criteria for such affirmative defense;
v.

By giving the jury Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to fmd

violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (UICPA") that had no support in
the evidence, concerned events which were irrelevant to the rights of the parties
under the contracts in controversy, inadequately instructed on what was needed to
show a violation of that statute, and ignored the fact that the ICPA was
inapplicable to the present controversy as a matter of law,
O.

That the District Court erred by allowing the jury to consider alleged

violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act without any relevant evidentiary support
for an allegation that Third Party Defendant had breached any portion of Idaho Code
§ 48·603 or that Respondents had suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property as

a result thereof.
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H.

That the jury's Verdict is not supported by any relevant evidence, Of, in

the alternative, that the Verdict is at such variance with the evidenoe that a new trial is
required.
I.

That the District Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's

Motion for a New Trial, given the unambiguous terms of the Employment Contracts and
the undisputed factual evidence.
J.

That the District Court erred by denying Appellant's Motion for a

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
K.

That the District Court erred by erroneously awarding costs as a matter of

L.

That the Judgment entered on September 30. 2009 must be reversed and

right.

set aside and that the matter either remanded to the District CoUll for a new trial. or that
judgment should be entered by the Spring Com in favor of Plaintiff and against
Remondents. there being no question of fact to be resolved in a new trial.
4.

An Order was entered sealing portions of the record on July 17,2008, which was

modified by the District Court's oral ruling on June 21, 2009, granting Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant's July 19,2009 Motion to Amend Confidentiality and Protective Order.
5.

A reporter's transcript bas been requested.

A.

Appellant requests a standard transcript (both hard copy and electronic

copy) of the August 21, 2009 hetU'ins on Knipe Land Company's Motion to Amend
Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL· 5
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B.

Appellant requests a supplemented transcript (both hard copy and

electronic copy), of the June 21,2009 through June 25,2009 Trial, including the
following items of additional record otherwise excluded by Rule 25(c):
i.

The opening statements and closing arguments of counsel.

ii.

The conference on requested instructions, the objections of the

parties to the instructions, and the District Court's rulings thereon.
iii.

The oral presentation by the court of written instructions given to

the jury and reported by the reporter.
6.

In addition to the standard documents included in the clerk's record under Idaho

Appellate Rule 28, Appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record:
A.

The District Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed

February 12,2009.

B.

Plaintiff Knipe Land Companyls Motion in Limine filed April 9, 2009;

C.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in

Limine filed Apri19, 2009;
D.

Appellants' Affidavit and evidence filed in Support of Plaintiff Knipe

Land Company's Motion in Limine on April 9,2009;

E.

Defendants' Memorandum. in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in Limine,
their supporting Memorandum, and the Affidavit of Richard A. Robertson. dated May 7,
2009;
F.

Appellants' Reply in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion

in Limine dated May 13. 2009.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6
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G.

Appel1ants' Motion in Limine, supporting Memorandum oflawJ and

supporting Affidavit of counsel, filed on June 18, 2009.
H.

Respondents' Memorandum of law and Mfidavit, filed on or about June

19, 2009, opposing Appellants' June 18, 2009 Motion in Limine.
I.

Appellants' requested opening and closing Jury Instructions.

J.

Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant's Trial Brief dated June 15,2009;

K.

Plaintiff and Defendants' Stipulation of Facts dated June 16,2009;

L.

PlaintifflThird Party Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, for New

Trial. or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. dated July 20,
2009;
M.

PlaintifflThird Party Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, dated July 20, 2009;
N.

Respondents' response to Plaintifrs Motion to Amend Judgment, for New

Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, dated August 14,
2009;
O.

Reply Brief in Support ofPlaintiffiThird Party Defendant's Motion to

Amend JUdgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, and Supplemental Affidavit of counsel J dated August 19, 2009i
P.

Respondents' Motion for Costs and Fees and to supponing Affidavits of

counsel J filed on or about July 15, 2009; and
Q.

AppellantsJ Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Fees and Costs, filed

on or about July 29,2009.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7
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Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered were

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
A.

Trial Exhibit Nos. 4, 6, 7,8,10,12,13,16,17,20,21,22,23,25,26,28,

29, 30, 31. 32, 34, 38, 43, Q, R. T, and U.
8.

I certify:
A.

That a copy oithis Notice of Appeal has been served on the court l~eporter,

Denece Graham. at the address set forth in the Certificate of Service attached;
B.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reponer's transcript,
C.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record ofS100.00 has

been paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost;
D.

That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid;

E.

That seNice has been made upon all parties required to be served )lursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

DATED: October ~ 2009.

STOEL RIVES LLP
Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on October

--L, 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing AMENDED

NOTICE OF APPEAL on the following, in the matter indicated below:
[ ] Via U.S. Mail
[ %,Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise,ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980
Email: derekpica@msn.com
Attorney for Defendants
Roben T. Wetherell
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P. O. Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701-1009
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: rtw@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendants

Denece Graham, C,S.R.
1675 E, 9th Street
Weiser, ID 83672

[ tYia U.S. Mail

[vi' Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
( ] Via Email

r ~ia U.S. Mail

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Via Facsimile
Via Overnight Mail
Via Hand Delivery
ViaEmaU

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346
Email: msgeston@stoel.com
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com
STOEL RIVES LLP
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
Boise,ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 389-9000
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV 2008-682

Plaintiff/Appellant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
v.

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants/Respondents.
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents
v.

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third Part Defendant/Ap ellant.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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Filing Category: L.4
Filing Fee: $101.00

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., BY AND
THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Plaintiff!Appellants, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third

Party Defendant John Knipe (collectively, "Appellants"), hereby appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court against Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L.
Robertson, husband and wife, and Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, "Respondents"), from
the following judgments, decisions, and orders entered in the above entitled action, the
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding:
a.

The Court's denial of Appellants' M6tion in Limine, filed on April 9,

2009, to foreclose admission at trial of testimony and extrinsic evidence interpreting,
explaining, and modifying unambiguous contracts.
b.

The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion in Limine, filed June 18,2009,

to foreclose testimony at trial by Respondents' witness, Cindy Crane.
c.

The Court's denial of Appellants' Motion for a Directed Verdict on June

25,2009;
d.

The jury's Verdict entered on June 25, 2009;

e.

The Judgment entered July 8, 2009, as modified by the Court's Order on

Post-Trial Motions entered on September 17, 2009;
f.

The Court's Order on Post-Trial Motions entered on September 17,2009,

denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and erroneously awarding costs as a matter of right.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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2.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders and

Judgments set forth in section 1 above are appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) .
3.

Appellants state that the following issues are the subject of this appeal, subject to

their right to assert other issues on appeal:
A.

That the District Court erred by failing to rule that the Employment

Contracts in controversy are unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence should not be
admitted to interpret, explain, or otherwise modify their plain meaning.
B.

That the District Court erred by failing to decide whether the Employment

Contracts were ambiguous or not and consequently abdicated that determination to the
Jury.
C.

That the District Court erred by permitting testimony and other extrinsic

evidence regarding the meaning of unambiguous contracts.
D.

That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents' witness, Cindy

Crane, to testify as to the meaning of unambiguous contracts that were irrelevant to the
Employment Contracts in controversy, and, additionally, permitting her to testify when
Respondents had failed and refused to disclose her relevant knowledge in response to
Appellants' written pretrial discovery.
E.

That the District Court erred by permitting Respondents' counsel to

examine John Knipe and Rowena Strain about inapplicable statutes, and then permitting
said counsel to argue such matters of irrelevant law to the jury after the close of evidence.
F.

That the District Court erred by improperly instructing the jury, as

follows:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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1.

By giving Opening Instruction No.4 erroneously instructing the

jury that the parties had reportedly agreed that the earnest monies deposited by
MidAmerican included "the 5% commission" disbursed to Knipe Land Co.;
II.

By refusing to give Appellants' requested opening Instruction

No.5 and their requested closing Instruction Nos. 7, 12, 15, 19, and 20;
III.

By giving the jury Instruction Nos. 11, 12, and 13, instructing it to

determine issues of law;
IV.

By giving the jury Instruction No. 16, instructing it as to the

Robertsons' affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel when the evidence failed to
satisfY the criteria for such affirmative defense;
v.

By giving the jury Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to find

violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICP A") that had no support in
the evidence, concerned events which were irrelevant to the rights of the parties
under the contracts in controversy, inadequately instructed on what was needed to
show a violation of that statute, and ignored the fact that the ICP A was
inapplicable to the present controversy as a matter of law.
G.

That the District Court erred by allowing the jury to consider alleged

violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act without any relevant evidentiary support
for an allegation that Third Party Defendant had breached any portion ofIdaho Code
§ 48-603 or that Respondents had suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property as

a result thereof.
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H.

That the jury's Verdict is not supported by any relevant evidence, or, in

the alternative, that the Verdict is at such variance with the evidence that a new trial is
required.
I.

That the District Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's

Motion for a New Trial, given the unambiguous terms of the Employment Contracts and
the undisputed factual evidence.
J.

That the District Court erred by denying Appellant's Motion for a

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
K.

That the District Court erred by erroneously awarding costs as a matter of

right.
4.

An Order was entered sealing portions of the record on July 17, 2008, which was

modified by the District Court's oral ruling on June 21, 2009, granting Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendant's July 19,2009 Motion to Amend Confidentiality and Protective Order.
5.

A reporter's transcript has been requested.
A.

Appellant requests a standard transcript (both hard copy and electronic

copy) of the August 21,2009 hearing on Knipe Land Company's Motion to Amend
Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict.
B.

Appellant requests a supplemented transcript (both hard copy and

electronic copy), of the June 21, 2009 through June 25, 2009 Trial, including the
following items of additional record otherwise excluded by Rule 25(c):
1.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5
Boise-2233633 0010908- 00008

The opening statements and closing arguments of counsel.

11.

The conference on requested instructions, the objections of the

parties to the instructions, and the District Court's rulings thereon.
iii.

The oral presentation by the court of written instructions given to

the jury and reported by the reporter.
6.

In addition to the standard documents included in the clerk's record under Idaho

Appellate Rule 28, Appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record:
A.

The District Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed

February 12,2009.
B.

Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in Limine filed April 9, 2009;

C.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in

Limine filed April 9, 2009;
D.

Appellants' Affidavit and evidence filed in Support of Plaintiff Knipe

Land Company's Motion in Limine on April 9, 2009;
E.

Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion in Limine,
their supporting Memorandum, and the Affidavit of Richard A. Robertson, dated May 7,
2009;
F.

Appellants' Reply in Support of Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion

in Limine dated May 13,2009;
O.

Appellants' Motion in Limine, supporting Memorandum oflaw, and

supporting Affidavit of counsel, filed on June 18, 2009.
H.

Respondents' Memorandum of law and Affidavit, filed on or about June

19,2009, opposing Appellants' June 18,2009 Motion in Limine.
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I.

Appellants' requested opening and closing Jury Instructions.

J.

Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant's Trial Brief dated June 15,2009;

K.

Plaintiff and Defendants' Stipulation of Facts dated June 16, 2009;

L.

Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, for New

Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, dated July 20,
2009;
M.

Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, dated July 20, 2009;
N.

Respondents' response to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, for New

Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, dated August 14,
2009;
O.

Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to

Amend Judgment, for New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, and Supplemental Affidavit of counsel, dated August 19, 2009;
P.

Respondents' Motion for Costs and Fees and to supporting Affidavits of

counsel, filed on or about July 15,2009; and

Q.

Appellants' Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Fees and Costs, filed

on or about July 29,2009.
7.

Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered were

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
A.

Trial Exhibit Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17,20,21,22,23,25,26,28,

29,30,31,32,34,38,43, Q, R, T, and U.
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8.

I certify;
A.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter,

Denece Graham, at the address set forth in the Certificate of Service attached;
B.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
C.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record of$100.00 has

been paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost;
D.

That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid;

E.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

DATED: September30, 2009.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on

September~,

2009, I served a copy of the foregoing NOTICE

OF APPEAL on the following, in the matter indicated below:

Derek A. Pica, PLLC
Attorney at Law
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302
Boise,ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980
Email: derekpica@msn.com
Attorney for Defendants

[t.-]Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Robert T. Wetherell
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P. O. Box 1009
Boise,ID 83701-1009
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
Email: rtw@brassey.net
Attorneys for Defendants

[0Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Denece Graham, C.S.R.
1675 E. 9th Street
Weiser, ID 83672

[vr-Via U.S. Mail
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via Overnight Mail
[ ] Via Hand Delivery
[ ] Via Email

Mark S. Geston
Jennifer M. Reinhardt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Vs.

Payette County Case No.
CV-2008-00682
Supreme Court #

--------

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents
Vs.
John Knipe, an individual,
Third Party Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal from:
Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable
Stephen W. Drescher, presiding.
District Court:

CV-2008-00682.

Order or Judgment appealed from: COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE, on April 9, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE, on June 18, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS'
JURY'S VERDICT
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT on June 25, 2009.
on June 25, 2009. COURT'S ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS on
September 17, 2009. JUDGMENT on September 30, 2009.
Attorney for Appellant: Mark Geston attorney of record for Knipe
Land Company and John Knipe.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Case Number from Court:

I

D'I-ST-~~T.,I\.QE___ P.M. ,I

Knipe Land Company, an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendant/Respondents.

I

U,~ iJjU~

""'---

***************

f

C;untf, idaho

Attorney for Respondents: Dereck Pica and Robert Wetherell
attorney(s) of record for Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L.
Robertson, and Robertson Kennels, Inc.
Appealed by: Plaintiff
Appealed Against: Defendant
Notice of Appeal Filed:

October 1, 2009

Amended Notice of Appeal Filed: October 1, 2009

Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed:
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed:
Appellate Fee Paid: Yes, October 1, 2009, $101.00.
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record
filed:
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional
Reporter's Transcript filed:
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes

Estimated number of pages: no estimate in file.
Appellant did
not pay the estimated cost of reporter's transcript of $200.00 to
the clerk.
If so name of reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as
named below at the address below: Denece Graham
Official Court Reporter
1675 E. 9~ Street
Weiser ID 83672

DATE:

October 2, 2009
Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

By~~~~~~=--._____

Cl.erk

-

:;)tate of Idaho
County of Payette 55

I hereby certify that the foregoing
instrument is a true and correct copy of the
origin JI on file in this office.

02~ed
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BETT' J. DRESSEN

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
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FILED
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson. IS:a No. 7008
BUSSEY, WETHERELL &. eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 8370l-10m)
Telephone: (20S) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7071
email: rhY.®]my;sC..l.net

OCT 2 12009

_ _ _A.M

8€T.TY J.

By

IN T.I.I£ DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JT.1DICIAL DIST.RlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAliO, .IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE·

Case No. CV 2008·682

PlaintifflCounterdefendantlAppellant!
Cross-Respondent,
NOTICE OF CROSS·APPEAL
VS.

RICHARD A. RO:aSRTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS.
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
DefendnntslCounterclaimantsl
Respondents/Cross-Appellants.
RlCliARO A. ROBERTSON and
JO.HNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaint.i1fsIRespondentsl
Cross-Appellants,

NonCE Or CROSS.APPEAL .1

P.M.

DRi~

Attorneys for DefcndantsIR.espondents/
Cross-Appellants

KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation

I

THIRD JW.JlCIAL DlSTRlCT COURT
~ CAu.'1t'!, kl.I<ho
I

,Oepu

Bras

y, WetherelL et al.

(FRX)2083447077

P. 003/005

VB.

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant!Appellant!
Cross-Respondent.

TO:

TBEABOVE-N.AMED CROSS.RESPONDENTS.,KNlPELAND COMPANY
AND JOBNKNIPE AND TBE PARTJES'ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Cross-Appellants, Richard A R.obertson, Johnnie L. Robertson aod

Robertson KennelSt Inr;'7 bereby cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against Plaintiffl
Counterdcfeodant!Appellant Knipe Land Company and Third.Party Defendant/Appellant John

Knipe, trom the following decisions and Order entered in the above-referenced action, theHonomble
Stephen W. Drescher presiding: Order on Post-trial Motions dated September 14, 2009.
2.

Cross-Appellants have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Order described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and. pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
11(a)(1),

3.

CrOSS-Appellants provide the following pretiminmy statement on appeal which the

Cross..Appellants intend to assert in the appeal. This prcliminary stateolent, however, provides only
preliminary issues, and shall in no way prevent the Cross-Appellant 110m asserting other issues on
appeal. Theprcliminaryissuo on cross..appenl is: Did the district court err in not granting restitution

and/or a constructive trust: or other rem edi cs under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which would

NOT1C£ Or CROSS.A.PPJ;.AJ.. ·2

Bras
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(FAX)

,Wetherel L et a!.

3447077

P. 00111005

have required Cross-Respondents to rcturn the $22,500 to Cross-Appellants that was placed as an.
advance on the Cross-R.espondents' commission. I
4.

No additional reporter tnmscript is requested, as it was requested previously in the

original appeal.

s.

Cross-Appellants do not request any additional documents to be included in the

Clerk's record as they were previously designated in the original appca1.

o.

No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as ~hibits arc requested in this

Cross-Appeal as they were requested in the original appeal.
7.

1 certify:
~

That a copy of tlUs Notice of Cross-Appeal. bas been served on the court

reporter, Denise Clniliam, at the address set forth in the certificate of serviee attached;
b.

That .DO additional fees arc ncccssuy as no additional doeuments ba.ve been

requested;
e.

'!hat service has been 'made upon an parties required to be served pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this ~ day of October, 2009.

BRASS:SY, 'WETHERELL.· eRAWFORD, LLP
;

.'

I To the ~nt: that rcmitution and/or il constructive trust is not approprlnte, the Coun; should grnnt punitive
damages to deter Crass-R.c:spoudc:nU4 .from c:nguginB in futW'l; 'imilar .pm~i/;C$,

NOTIC! OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3
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cxRTDnCATEQFSERVTCE
.
,
THEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,,6/ day of October, 2009, I served a true and correct:
copy ofthe foregOing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by
t11c method and to the addresses indicatcc1 below:

Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rivest LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idabo 83702

U.S. Mail, postageprcpaid
Hand-Delivered
_
~vcmigbt Mail
~Pacsi:mile 389·9040

Derek Pica
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302
Boise, Idaho 83702

_

Oenise Graham
lo7S:E. 9th Street
Weiser, Idaho 83672

NOTIce OF CROSS..APPJ;.AL. • 4

_

_

-J

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
.ffiemight Mail
y Facsimile 336-4980
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
O,vcmight Mail
:Facsimile

FILED
THiRD J{.!5ICl,<\L DISTRICT COUHT
Pe.l'~~C..um'y, !d!l).hc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

, Deputy

***************

Knipe Land Company, an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

AMENDED
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Vs.

Payette County Case No.
CV-2008-00682

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendant/Respondents.

Supreme Court #37002-2009

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents

that the foregoing
u't is a true and correct copy of the
'" or! fiie in this office.

Vs.
John Knipe, an individual,
Third Party Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal from:
Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable
Stephen W. Drescher, presiding.
Case Number .from Court:

District Court:

CV-2008-00682.

Order or Judgment appealed from: COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE, on April 9, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS'
MOTION IN LIMINE, on June 18, 2009. COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT on June 25, 2009.
JURY'S VERDICT
on June 25, 2009. COURT'S ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS on
September 17, 2009. JUDGMENT on September 30, 2009.
Attorney for Appellant: Mark Geston attorney of record for Knipe
Land Company and John Knipe.
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

-

1 -

Attorney for Respondents: Dereck Pica and Robert Wetherell
attorney(s) of record for Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L.
Robertson, and Robertson Kennels, Inc.
Appealed by: Plaintiff
Appealed Against: Defendant
Notice of Appeal Filed:

October 1, 2009

Amended Notice of Appeal Filed: October 1, 2009
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: October 21, 2009, filed by Attorney
for the Respondent, Robert Wetherell.

Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed:
Appellate Fee Paid: Yes, October 1, 2009, $101.00.
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record
filed:
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional
Reporter's Transcript filed:
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes

Estimated number of pages: no estimate in file.
Appellant did
not pay the estimated cost of reporter's transcript of $200.00 to
the clerk. Fee was paid on October 6, 2009.
If so name of reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as
named below at the address below: Denece Graham
Official Court Reporter
1675 E. 9~ street
Weiser ID 83672

DATE:

October 22, 2009
Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
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". Dec.?3 2009 3: 54PM
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FILED

THiRD JUOfCW. DISTRICT COURT
Payette County, Id$bo

DEC2a _

Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008
BRASSEY, \VETHERBLL & eRAWFORD, LLP
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077

_ _ _A.M

BETTY J. DRESSEN
By

Derek A. Pica, 1SB No. 3559
Attorney at Law
199 N. Capital Blvd, 8te. 302
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 336-4144
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980
Attorneys for DefendantslRespondentsl
Cross-Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

KNIPE LAND
corporation

COMPANY~

an Idaho

Case No. CV 2008-682

Plaintif:t7CounterdefendantlAppellant!
Cross-Respondent,
A.\1ENDED NOTICE OF
CROSS-APPEAL

VS.

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants/Counterclaimantsl
Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1

. P.M.

"Dec'23 2009 3:54PM

LASERJET 3330

RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS,
We., an Idaho Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiffs/Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
vs.

JOHN KNIPE, an individual,
Third-Party Defendant!Appellant!
Cross-Respondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, KNIPE LAND COMPANY
AND JOHN KNIPE AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS OF RECORD; AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Cross-Appellants, Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L. Robertson and

Robertson Kennels, Inc., hereby cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court against Plaintiff!
CounterdefendantiAppellant Knipe Land Company and Third-Party DefendantJAppellant John
Knipe, from the following decisions and Order,! entered in the above-referenced action, the
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding: Order on Post-trial Motions dated September 14, 2009

and Order on Motions for Summary Jud2ment dated Febmary 12, 2009.
2.

Cross-Appellants have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Order described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
l1(a)(t).

3.

Cross-Appellants provide the following preliminary statement on appea1 which the

Cross-Appellants intend to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, provides only

AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2

p.3

,.uec.~3

LASERJET 3330

2009 3:54PM

preliminary issues, and shall in no way prevent the Cross-Appellant from asserting other issues on

appeal. The preliminary issue on cross-appeal is: Did the district court en- in not granting restitution
and/or a constructive trustor otherremedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which would
have required Cross-Respondents to return the $22,500 to Cross-Appellants that was placed as an
advance on the Cross-Respondents' commission. 1 An additional issue on Cross-Appeal is: Did

the district court err by failing to declare that the contracts in this matter were unenforceable
under the Ellsworth Dobbs doctrine and the associated cases and prineiples, and therefore the
district court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for Summarv Judwent.

Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants recoWIize that it may not be necessary to raise this
latter issue in the cross-appeal under Idaho AppeUateRules Il(&) and 35(b)(41 but nonetbeless
raise this issne in the Cross-Appeal to ensure that the issue is preserved on appeal.
4.

No additional reporter transcript is requested. as it was requested previously in the

original appeal_
5.

Cross:-Appellants do not request any additional documents to be included in the

Clerk's record as they were previously designated in the original appeal.
6.
Cross~Appeal

7.

~o

additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are requested in this

as they were requested in the original appeal.

r celtify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been served on the court

reporter, Denise Graham, at the address set forth in the certificate of service attached;

1 To the extent that restitution and/or a constructive trust is not appropriate, the Comi should grant punitive
damages to deter Cross-Respondents from engaging in future similar practices.

AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS·APPEAL - 3

p.4

, • Dec' .23 2009 3: 54PM

b.

p.5

LASERJET 3330

That no additional fees are necessary as no additional documents have been

requested;
c.

That service has been made upon

an parties required to be served pUrSllil.llt

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

DATED this _ _ day of December. 2009.
BRt\SSEY, WETHERELL & eRAWFORD

T. Wetherell. of the finn
ttomeys for Cross-Appellants

AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4

· ., Dec' .23 2009

3: 54PM

LASERJET 3330

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CJ'~(~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _(A_.:J_ day of December, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by
the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Mark S. Geston
Stoel Rives, LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702

u. S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 389-9040

Derek Pica
199 N. Capital Blvd, Suite 302
Boise, Idaho 83702

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 336-4980

Denise Graham
1675 E. 9th Street
Weiser, Idaho 83672

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS·APPEAL - 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

Knipe Land Company, an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Vs.

Payette County Case No.
CV-2008-00682

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendant/Respondents.

Supreme Court #37002-2009

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents
Vs.
John Knipe, an individual,
Third Party Defendant/Appellant.

I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Payette do hereby certify that the following is a
list of the exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been
lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated:
Jury Trial June 23 , 2009
Plaintiff1s Trial Exhibits:
Exh.No.
Description
1
Map of Little Willow
Creek Property

2

Map of Defendant's
real property

Certificate of Exhibits - 1

Marked

Admitted

x

x

x

x

Retained by Clerk

3

Legal description of
Defendant's real property

X

X

4

Employment contract

X

X

5

Records of Payette County X
Recorder for Tax parcels
#7784, 2400, 2401, 2402,
2404, 2457, 2458, and 7777

X

6

Purchase and sale agreement X
- Harmon

X

7

Harmon purchase agreement
- Addendum 1

X

X

8

Harmon purchase agreement
X
- Addenda 2 and 3 ($25,000)

X

10

RE 11 - Addendum 7 ($10,000) X

X

12

Email from Robertson to
Strain re extension to
Harmon contract

X

X

13

Notice to terminate
contract (Harmon)

X

X

15

Letter with Little Willow
Ranch brochure

X

X

16

Email from Robertson to
X
Strain - list the whole ranch

X

17

Employment contract
X
(Robertson Kennels, Inc property)

X

X

X

20

Maps of defendant's
real property

21

Marketing information
X
prepared by plaintiff and reviewed
by defendant Richard Robertson

X

22

Marketing information
X
prepared by plaintiff and reviewed
by defendant Richard Robertson

X

Certificate of Exhibits - 2

23

Marketing information
X
prepared by plaintiff and reviewed
by defendant Richard Robertson

25

Employment contract
X
X
renewals for defendant's real property

26

Agreement to sell and
purchase

28

Instructions to escrow X
X
First American Title Co ($75,000/ $75,000)

29

Agreement to sell and
purchase - Kennel Ranch

30

Agreement to sell and
X
purchase - Robertson residence

X

31

Agreement to sell and
X
purchase - Little Willow Ranch

X

32

Instructions to escrow First American Title Co.

34

Instructions to escrow X
X
First American Title Co ($75,000/$75,000)

38

Termination Letter

43

Defendants Richard and
X
X
Johnnie Robertson's 2007 tax returns - page 11 only

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
($75,000/$75,000)

X

X

Defendant's Trial Exhibits:
A

2005 employment contract

N

Rowena Strain facsimile
X
stating Richard will extend closing
with non-refundable earnest money

X

o

Harmon extension agreement
dated February 15, 2006

X

X

Q

Check from Silverhawk
Realty to Knipe ($10,000)

X

X

Certificate of Exhibits - 3

X

X

R

Check from Knipe to
Robertson ($25,000)

x

x

T

Check from Silverhawk
Realty to Knipe ($10,000)

x

x

u

Check from Knipe to Robertson X
($10,000)

X

v

Notice to terminate contract
and release of earnest money

KK

Email from Knipe to Robertson X
dated September 26, 2007 regarding
non-forfeited earnest money

X

MM

Emails between Knipe
X
and Strain dated October 5, 2007
regarding earnest money

X

PP

Email from Richard to Rowena X
X
dated February 11, 2008 regarding $22,500

QQ

Emails between Knipe and
X
Strain regarding telling Robertson of
claim to earnest monies and extension

RR

Letter from Knipe to Robertson X
X
regarding earnest money dated February 19, 2008

TT

Knipe's notes to himself

X

X

X

X

X

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed the seal 0
the said Court at Payette, Idaho, this
3
da y 0 f
Yl
r 2 010 .

Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

Certificate of Exhibits - 4

:<~3;;-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
Knipe Land Company, an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Vs.

Payette County Case No.
CV-2008-00682

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendant/Respondents.

Supreme Court #37002-2009

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents
Vs.
John Knipe, an individual,
Third Party Defendant/Appellant.

I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the
Third JUdicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Payette do hereby certify that I have personally served
or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of
the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the
parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:

MARK GESTON
101 S. Capitol Blvd Ste 1900
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for:
Appellant/Plaintiff

ROBERT WETHERELL
203 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for:
Respondent/Defendant

The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date
of service of the appeal record to file any objections, together
with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court.
If no
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be
filed with the Supreme Court.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-l

If there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), I will
serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating
which party shall be served.
If no stipulation or order is filed
in seven (7) days, I will serve the party whose name appears
first in the case title.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this {3
day of
~ (vt My
, 2 0 ---12- .

____ b

Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

BY~~
Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

Knipe Land Company, an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellants,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Vs.

Payette County Case No.
CV-2008-00682

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendant/Respondents.

Supreme Court #37002-2009

Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie
L. Robertson, husband and wife;
and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an
Idaho Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs/Respondents
Vs.
John Knipe, an individual,
Third Party Defendant/Appellant.

I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Payette do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under
my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and
pictures offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause will be
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE -1

I further certify that, in addition to the exhibits
identified in the Reporter's Transcript, the following will be
submitted as a confidential exhibit to the Record on Appeal:
NONE
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this ~
day of
,Awc", ~f ' 20 JCL.. .
Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

BYf~
Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

-~

